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The project at hand takes as its object of study an affect-centered model of subjectivity 
that emphasizes the role authentication plays in determining the intensity of the subject’s 
feelings, and thus, I argue, the degree to which the subject becomes different. This 
model is derived from the fiction of Zadie Smith and David Foster Wallace, who belong 
to a generation of authors whose work has been frequently periodized as responding to 
or “coming after” an academic construction of postmodern culture most popularized in 
the West during the last decades of the 20th century. By elaborating on the nature and 
implications of this model of subjectivity, this project seeks to understand the shift in 
literary sensibilities that occurs at the turn of the millennium as, in part, an impulse to 
“make room” for affect, not only in the character function of fiction, but also in Western 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
 
The project at hand takes as its object of study an affect-centered model of subjectivity 
derived from the fiction of Zadie Smith and David Foster Wallace. Smith and Wallace, I 
argue, belong to a generation of authors whose work has been frequently periodized as 
coming after postmodernism. By elaborating on the nature and implications of this 
model of subjectivity, this project seeks to understand the shift in literary sensibilities 
that occurs at the turn of the millennium in the neoliberal West as, in part, an impulse to 
“make room” for affect, not only in the character function of fiction, but also in Western 
conceptions of human becoming. 
In his article “Beginning with Postmodernism,” Adam Kelly mentions Richard 
Powers, Jennifer Egan, Jonathan Franzen, Colson Whitehead, and Wallace as exemplars 
of this generation, and I would hasten to include Dave Eggers, Jeffrey Eugenides, 
George Saunders, and Smith. According to Kelly, these authors belong to the post-baby-
boomer Generation X,1 and they share postmodernism as a point of departure in three 
respects: they publish their early work in the last two decades of the 20th century, placing 
them in conversation with high-postmodern authors like Don DeLillo and Thomas 
Pynchon; they witness the rise of the “information age” whose emergence is often 
                                                
1 Kelly specifically places them as being born “roughly between the late 1950s and the 
beginning of the 1970s” (392), though given the central role my analysis of Zadie 
Smith’s work plays in the project at hand, I would extend that latter date to the middle of 




speculatively dramatized by the literature of postmodernism; and they tend to have 
attained academic degrees in the humanities during the 1980s, “when theory was at its 
zenith of influence in the American academy” (392). With Kelly, I argue they therefore 
“begin with the academic construction of American literature and society specifically as 
‘postmodern’,” and thus their work can be fruitfully read as a response to that “academic 
construction” of Western, neoliberal culture-as-postmodern (392-396). 
As I use the term throughout my project, however, postmodernism only vaguely 
refers to the tenets of postmodern or poststructuralist theory, and it would be a mistake 
to characterize these authors as somehow transcending or rejecting incredulity toward 
metanarratives, the fact that signs only ever refer to other signs, the dispersed nature of 
the subject, or the fact that language of any kind is always political and value laden. 
Rather, my idiosyncratic use of the term more strongly indexes a discursive style, a 
rhetorical posture, a set of methodologies, or a way of thinking whose grain runs in the 
direction of suspicion and irony. Whether this style was popularized or merely echoed 
by the ascendency of theory in the academy, its cold, affectless cynicism signals 
sophistication in the context of the Western cultural milieu at the turn of the millennium. 
While this generation of authors rarely if ever find themselves interested in challenging 
postmodern ontological assumptions, they are distinguished from their forebears in that 
their posture toward the postmodern is no longer one of fascination—it has become the 
air they breathe.2 As such, this project seeks to locate within a representational subset of 
                                                
2 Jeffrey Nealon’s observation is helpful here: “Think of Roland Barthe’s ‘Death of the 




their work a particular point of departure from the postmodern, and in so doing it is in 
conversation with scholarship by Stephen Burn,3 Adam Kelly,4 Nicoline Timmer,5 and 
others. 
Emerging from this scholarship is a consensus about a renewed focus on 
character that marks literature after postmodernism, a claim expounded upon by Burn: 
“In post-postmodern novels… we get a fuller sense of a character’s personal history 
because these younger authors more freely interrupt time’s passage through strategically 
deployed analepses” (Jonathan 24). Burn notes that while “each successive major 
literary movement in the past 100 years has routinely announced that it had a more 
tenacious grasp on character than its predecessor,” one of the features that mark this 
latest shift toward characterization concerns “the influence of ideas drawn from 
neuroscientific research, which suggest that the neurophysiology of the brain underpins 
character motivation” (23, 25). Throughout my project, I place heavy emphasis on 
Burn’s latter observation—I argue that, for the kind of subject assumed by Smith and 
Wallace (as evidenced by the characters I encounter in their fiction), affect is the seat of 
                                                
have to laboriously sell to freshmen. They already know this stuff; in fact, they live it. 
Postmodernism, performativity, and the death of the author are no longer ‘emergent’ 
phenomena, but they’ve become ‘dominant’ ones” (Post-Postmodernism 64). 
3 See his first chapter in Jonathan Franzen at the End of Postmodernism where Burn 
reads the work of Franzen, Powers, and Wallace as “post-postmodern.” 
4 Aside from “Beginning with Postmodernism” which reads Egan’s work as coming 
‘after postmodernism,’ see his “David Foster Wallace and the New Sincerity in 
American Fiction” which figures Wallace’s use of sincerity as a response to postmodern 
culture. 
5 See her Do You Feel It Too? The Post-Postmodern Syndrome in American Fiction at 
the Turn of the Millennium where she provides post-postmodern readings of Wallace, 




that subject’s evaluative decision-making (agency), and given the way affect is often 
figured as a set of autonomic, neurological heuristics, the neurological very much takes 
center stage when accounting for the behavior of their characters. 
I would add to Burn’s analysis of the renewed concentration on character present 
in the fiction after postmodernism by arguing that it represents a shift in terms of “what 
matters” in contemporary fictional projects. In Brian McHale’s Postmodernist Fiction, 
where he attempts to account for the shift in literary fiction from a predominantly 
modern to a predominantly postmodern sensibility, he notes that if modern fiction is 
largely concerned with the epistemological (the limits of knowing), then postmodern 
fiction concerns itself with chiefly ontological questions: “What is a world? What kinds 
of world are there, how are they constituted, and how do they differ?” (10). For authors 
like Don DeLillo, John Barth, and Paul Auster, each of whom writes fiction that explores 
the “postmodern condition” at a moment of literary fascination with critical theory, there 
is a tendency to allow these ontological concerns to become the driving forces that 
motivate their fictional characters to do things in the world. In Barth’s “Lost in the 
Funhouse,” as Ambrose “wondered at the endless replication of his image in the 
mirrors,” he loses himself “in the reflection that the necessity for an observer makes 
perfect observation impossible” (94). According to this recognizably postmodern 
diagetic strategy, the function of Ambrose-as-character is to wonder at and become lost 
in a challenging ontological problem, namely, that all perceptions of the world are 
subjective and value laden. As for how Ambrose feels about this realization, the reader 




He wishes he had never entered the funhouse. But he has. Then he wishes 
he were dead. But he’s not. Therefore he will construct funhouses for 
others and be their secret operator—though he would rather be among the 
lovers for whom funhouses are designed. (97) 
Ambrose’s feelings of regret or ostensibly sadness are largely irrelevant when it comes 
to explaining his actions. He is resigned to construct funhouses for others because while 
he is still alive, he is unable to himself be a lover, a subject possessed by passion, 
because his knowledge of the world has somehow placed him beyond the consequences 
of his emotions. 
 A similar pattern is found in Auster’s “City of Glass,” where detective fiction 
author Daniel Quinn takes on a real case as a private investigator, and is lead from clue 
to clue, each of which prove to be merely signs that point to other signs, never serving to 
“resolve” the mystery at hand. By the end of the novella, Quinn has made peace with the 
intractability of reading and interpreting signs, a realization which forecloses ‘detection’ 
altogether. He is content instead to write “about the stars, the earth, his hopes for 
mankind” (New York Trilogy 133). For these authors, still fascinated with the tenets of 
high theory, it is as though the protagonists are living out a kind of postmodern 
bildungsroman, as if the trajectory of human education always terminates among the 
shoppers in the supermarket at the end of DeLillo’s White Noise, “where we wait 
together, regardless of age, our carts stocked with brightly colored goods. A slowly 
moving line, satisfying, giving us time to glance at the tabloids in the racks” (310). The 




the end of history a Baudrillardian surrender to images, a celebration of the foreclosure 
of the epistemological struggle. In other words, in much of the literary fiction 
immediately preceding the work of authors like Smith and Wallace, it is the acquisition 
of esoteric knowledge rather than the experience of feeling that motors the subject along 
their trajectory of becoming. 
 This tendency to marginalize feeling in the stylistics of postmodernism is 
identified by Fredric Jameson as “the waning of affect,” a condition brought about by the 
“deconstruction of the very aesthetic of expression itself” which stems from a rejection 
of “some separation within the subject” along with the “whole metaphysics of inside and 
outside, of the wordless pain within the monad and the moment in which, often 
cathartically, that ‘emotion’ is then projected out and externalized” (Postmodernism 11). 
It is unfashionable, according to the postmodern aesthetic, for the subject to be portrayed 
as harboring emotional content within some locatable ‘inside’: 
as for expression and feelings or emotions, the liberation, in 
contemporary society, from the older anomie of the centered subject may 
also mean not merely a liberation from anxiety but a liberation from 
every other kind of feeling as well, since there is no longer a self present 
to do the feeling” (15). 
Interestingly, Jameson also describes a condition that very much resonates with that of 
Auster’s detective Daniel Quinn: “the subject has lost its capacity actively to extend its 
pro-tensions and re-tensions across the temporal manifold and to organize its past and 




cultural productions of such a subject could result in anything but ‘heaps of fragments’” 
(Postmodernism 25). Given this fragmented state, the subject finds itself caught in a 
“windless postmodern stasis,” feeling paralyzed and finding it difficult to marshal the 
scattered pieces of itself toward the pursuit of meaningful life projects (Kelly 
“Beginning” 398). Whereas Jameson attributes the prevalence of the fragmented, 
paralyzed postmodern subject to a rejection of “temporal organization in general,” 
according to the model of subjectivity I offer here, there is very much a correlation 
between the waning of affect and the attenuation of the subject’s ability to strategically 
suture enough fragments of its lived experience to establish a position in the language-
games it plays. Indeed, I argue that for the characters that populate the pages of Smith 
and Wallace, feelings are the exclusive catalyst of becoming, and they play a vital role in 
the work of emplotment,6 or the subject’s ability to teleologically configure the 
associations that comprise a sense-of-self. 
Another distinguishing feature of the literature after postmodernism is a tendency 
to reframe “critique” as merely one stop on the road to a larger project. As I present 
them here, these authors tacitly agree with Rita Felski’s assessment of postmodernism’s 
dominant mode of thinking in The Limits of Critique: “its overriding concern with 
questioning motives and exposing wrongdoing (the moral-political drama of detection) 
results in a mind-set—vigilant, wary, mistrustful—that blocks receptivity and inhibits 
generosity. We are shielded from the risks, but also the rewards, of aesthetic experience” 
                                                
6 I borrow Paul Ricoeur’s conception of emplotment as he uses it in Oneself as Another 




(188). In Felski’s view, those rewards are more fully actualized within “another regime 
of interpretation: one that is willing to recognize the potential of literature and art to 
create new imaginaries rather than just to denounce mystifying illusions. The language 
of attachment, passion, and inspiration is no longer taboo” (187). 
Felski’s comments resonate with those made by Smith in her essay collection, 
Changing My Mind. Speaking of her time studying critics like Roland Barthes in her 
time at Cambridge, Smith confesses that 
I’m glad I’m not the reader I was in college anymore, and I’ll tell you 
why: it made me feel lonely. Back then I wanted to tear down the icon of 
the author and abolish, too, the idea of a privileged reader—the text was 
to be a free, wild thing, open to everyone, belonging to no one, refusing 
an ultimate meaning. Which was a powerful feeling, but also rather 
isolating, because it jettisons the very idea of communication, of any 
possible genuine link between the person who writes and the person who 
reads. Nowadays I know the true reason I read is to feel less alone, to 
make a connection with a consciousness other than my own. (Changing 
54) 
Smith elaborates on the kind of “reader I was in college” in response to a question about 
her time at Cambridge after a reading of On Beauty, noting that she “had a tough time in 
[her] second year because it was about learning what you had to do to do well in a place 
like that,” explaining that she had “to become quite masculine in the way you think and 




thinking,” a mode of thought she describes as being “more generous, more open” 
(Thalia). In order to be a good reader of poststructuralist theory, she had to become, in 
her words, “incredibly fierce.” These sentiments are echoed throughout On Beauty itself, 
perhaps most distilled in a conflict between the married couple Kiki and Howard Belsey: 
“It’s like after 9/11 when you sent that ridiculous e-mail round to everybody about 
Baudry, Bodra—” (394). Howard interrupts: “Baudrillard. He’s a philosopher. His name 
is Baudrillard.” Kiki continues: “About simulated wars or whatever the fuck that was… 
And I was thinking: What is wrong with this man? I was ashamed of you. […] We’re 
really here—this is really happening. Suffering is real.” For Smith, postmodernism’s 
“way of thinking” is too masculine, too fierce, too alienating from others to allow for 
genuine connection. 
This impulse to transcend the limits of critique can also be found in scholarship 
surrounding Wallace’s work. Kelly claims that “the most striking feature of Wallace 
studies” is “the agreement among so many critics with Wallace’s professed premise that 
fiction should act as both ‘diagnosis and cure,’ that it should be viewed not primarily in 
terms of aesthetic representation, but of ethical intervention” (“Critical Reception” 49). 
Roughly two-thirds of this project is dedicated to showing, through close readings of 
their work, that Wallace and Smith’s overriding ethical prescriptions for the Western 
neoliberal subject at the turn of the millennium are to “be sincere” and “only connect,” 
respectively. The rest of my project consists in deriving an affect-centered model of 
subjectivity for which those prescriptions could ostensibly hold curative value, while 




compelling readings of two iconic Western literary authors writing at the turn of the 
millennium, furthers the discourse (and literary jurisdiction) of affect theory, and 
provides a methodological litmus test for a larger project, such as an investigation of the 
work of all of the aforementioned authors belonging to the same literary generation as 
Wallace and Smith, specifically in terms of whether they assume the same kind of 
subject. If such a project were already successfully carried out, I would feel fewer 
trepidations about my project’s boldest conceit, which is to henceforth refer to the 
generation of authors under consideration here as the affect realists after postmodernism. 
Before proceeding to more fully survey the various components of this project, 
however, I should clarify some of the terms I’ll be using throughout, and also provide an 
explanation for why I selectively focus on Wallace and Smith. First off, what do I mean 
by the “neoliberal West?” In one sense, I mean the nations whose economic systems are 
compatible with and therefore complicit in the language-games of global capitalism as 
they exist at the turn of the millennium.7 I am using the term “neoliberal” as opposed to 
merely “capitalist” to refer to the global economic system in order to mark the crossing 
of a threshold—a crossing that occurred during the final decades of the past millennium 
due to the ascendance of an economic arch-philosophy that sanctifies, above all else, the 
                                                
7 I am largely drawing from David Harvey, who argues that “a cardinal feature of 
neoliberal thinking” is “the assumption that individual freedoms are guaranteed by 
freedom of the market and of trade” (7). He provides an example via the U.S. occupation 
of Iraq: “What the US evidently sought to impose by main force on Iraq was a state 
apparatus whose fundamental mission was to facilitate conditions for profitable capital 
accumulation on the part of both domestic and foreign capital. I call this kind of state 
apparatus a neoliberal state. The freedoms it embodies reflect the interests of private 




wiles of the free market; and to the exponential growth of information technology for the 
production and near instantaneous dissemination of media (and increasingly other 
goods)—a phenomenon that has seen to the commodification (and therefore the 
destabilization) of ever increasing territories of lived Western experience. Given the 
transnational nature of this network of dissemination, I find it restrictive to narrow the 
scope of this investigation, as Kelly does, to literature produced within the United States, 
and for this reason find it necessary to broaden my scope to at least include Smith’s 
work. As Jeffrey Nealon argues in Post-Postmodernism, the term “neoliberal” also 
marks the integration of the emancipatory ethos of postmodernism into the logic of 
capitalism itself: 
The ethos of liberation that surrounds cultural postmodernism (the 
transgressions of hybridity, the individual ethics of self-fashioning, 
Dionysiac celebrations of multiplicity, endlessly making it new) can’t 
simply be walled off from the substantially more sinister work that these 
very same notions index within the economic realm—they’re the 
watchwords of neoliberal capitalism as well. (23) 
I should also note that I often use “neoliberal West” to refer to a cultural landscape that, 
despite being constantly subjected to what Deleuze refers to as “deterritorialization,”8 by 
                                                
8 Nealon refers to Deleuze as the “thinker du joir” for the “post-postmodern” moment, 
and argues that just as “contemporary biology is not merely interested in interpreting 
genes, but in changing (and thereby potentially financializing) them,” the logic of capital 
in the neoliberal West similarly incentivizes profitable adjustments (Post-
Postmodernism 147-148). Given the broader purview of capital under the “commodify 




and large still continues to privilege performances that reify heteronormative masculinity 
and the racialization of class. This landscape very much has a gradient of privilege, in 
other words, and the performing subject, in her bids to authenticate by “getting away 
with” citations of this content, is always establishing her position and posture on this 
landscape. 
For better or for worse, I chose Wallace because I was drawn to this generation 
of authors through his work, and when commencing this project, his oeuvre was most 
familiar to me. Throughout my graduate studies, I kept bumping into people who shared 
a high estimation of his “cultural significance,” a sentiment echoed by Smith in her 
introduction to the short story collection The Burned Children of America published in 
2003, where she remarks on how Wallace’s Infinite Jest “sat like a challenge on the 
shelves of hipsters everywhere,” and claimed it was “the book you were going to have to 
deal with sooner or later, just as a previous generation had to deal with Gravity’s 
Rainbow” (xi). In her preface to her short story collection Martha and Hanwell, she also 
proclaims Wallace as “the greatest contemporary innovator in the [short story]” (vii). It 
turns out, however, that attempting to provide quantitative evidence for the “cultural 
significance” of a contemporary author is a fraught exercise, due largely to the 
proprietary nature of readership data which unfortunately falls under the category of 
“corporate intel” for publishing houses. 
                                                
dislodged from familiar territory, forced to either circle the wagons in the name of 
fundamentalism, or learn how to position themselves using new language-games and 
political frameworks. Deleuze and Guattarri refer to this phenomenon as 




 I have become wary, however, of touting Wallace’s legacy for three reasons. The 
first is due to his treatment of the poet Mary Karr, with whom he had a troubled 
relationship in the early 90s. In Megan Garber’s article “David Foster Wallace and the 
Dangerous Romance of Male Genius” published in The Atlantic, she recounts how 
Wallace “once pushed Karr from a vehicle. During another fight, he threw a coffee table 
at her.” Garber goes on to reference one of Karr’s tweets: “that’s about 2% of what 
happened. tried to buy a gun. kicked me. climbed up the side of my house at night. 
followed my son age 5 home from school. had to change my number twice, and he still 
got it. months and months it went on.” As Garber implicitly argues, to engage in the 
unqualified promotion of Wallace’s work is to further reify the dangerous cult of male 
genius as a discursively embedded excuse for the abusive treatment of women. The 
second major qualification I’d like to make about Wallace here at the outset is the 
myopic nature of the kinds of subject represented in his fiction. As Clare Hayes-Brady 
points out, “Wallace’s lack of engagement with female characters is palpable throughout 
his work,” and “a similar pattern governs the appearance and exploration of issues of 
racial difference,” such that “Wallace’s characters are chiefly white, male East Coasters” 
(“Personally I’m neutral” 63).9 With Jorge Araya, I acknowledge that “writers, after all, 
                                                
9 So as not to misrepresent Hayes-Brady, I should point out that in this article (and also 
in her 2016 monograph The Unspeakable Failures of David Foster Wallace), she is 
something of an apologist for Wallace’s myopia. She explains that “Masculinity in 
Wallace’s writing and characters is dominant, but subscribes to the myth of masculinity 
in crisis, attempting to narrate and occupy instead of converse and understand. The fear 
to which this misogyny is ascribed, then, is not merely the reaction of a masculine 
subject that feels itself under threat from the feminine, but rather more subtly, the terror 




have no obligations to diversity” (239), but nonetheless find Wallace’s representational 
aporia problematic, given that Wallace proclaims the role of fiction to be an exploration 
of “what it is to be a fucking human being” (McCaffery 131). This second qualification 
is imbricated with my third qualification, which is that Wallace’s fiction champions a 
particular kind of hero, one who bravely constructs, via sincere speech acts, a sense-of-
self robust enough to serve as a barrier for filtering out the influence of the other. While 
in the context of his fiction the construction of this barrier is figured as a coping 
mechanism for drug addiction and for withstanding the paralyzing effects of Western 
media, when coupled with his tendency to only represent WASP males, it fails to 
acknowledge the fact that sincerity is not always a viable strategy for those whose 
subject-positions are violently marginalized by hegemonic, neoliberal culture. 
Given my hesitations about Wallace, a small part of my rationale for reading him 
alongside Smith seems evident: among the other authors of his generation, her voice 
represents one of the furthest coordinates from Wallace’s on the neoliberal subject-
position matrix, and perhaps for this reason she shares none of the inhibitions Wallace 
apparently had for portraying non-WASP characters. Beyond this, however, there is a 
tenuous connection that exists between Wallace and Smith that is as persistent as it is 
difficult to pin down. Both authors made their precocious debut on the Western literary 
scene at the age of twenty-four and at the tail end of their respective undergraduate 
educations (Wallace’s The Broom of the System in 1987, Smith’s much more widely 
                                                
subjective Other, with this fear specifically reified in the distinction of genders” 




received White Teeth in 2000). Both authors published large, sprawling novels near or at 
the turn of the millennium (White Teeth, and Wallace’s second novel Infinite Jest 
published in 1996) which were so acclaimed that their names were established in some 
circles as orienting landmarks on the sprawling territory of neoliberal literary 
production.10 
Further solidifying the connection between these two authors are scattered pieces 
of evidence of the influence Wallace’s fiction exerted on Smith. In her introduction to 
The Burned Children of America, she claims Wallace, among the other authors11 whose 
work is represented in the collection, as a member of “my literary generation” (xiv). One 
of the two epigraphs of Changing My Mind, her 2009 collection of essays published 
roughly a year after Wallace’s death, is attributed to Wallace: “You get to decide what to 
                                                
10 Commenting on U.T. Austin’s acquisition of Don DeLillo’s archive in 2004, Harry 
Ransom Center Director Thomas Staley notes that DeLillo’s work “provides a bridge 
from the work of earlier postmodernists, such as Thomas Pynchon, to the current 
zeitgeist represented by modern young writers, such as Jonathan Franzen, David Foster 
Wallace, Richard Powers, and Zadie Smith” (“Ransom”). Echoing this sentiment, David 
Marcus writes in 2013 that “a new group of avant gardists—Richard Powers, David 
Foster Wallace, Dave Eggers, and Zadie Smith—tried their hand at the now… This new 
generation sought to rebuild the world rather than deconstruct it, … to mine the present 
for those rare, fragile moments of contact—those brief human intersections that remind 
us that while we are all each desperately unknowable and alone we are also in this 
together” (“Post-Hysterics”). In an interview with literary critic James Wood appearing 
on Slate in 2015, Isaac Chotiner describes Wood as “someone who was happy to write 
harsh appraisals of everyone from Zadie Smith to David Foster Wallace,” as though their 
names somehow constitute an exhaustive range of the contemporary literary landscape. 
11 The collection features fiction from Aimee Bender, Arthur Bradford, Judy Budnitz, 
Amanda Davis, Myla Goldberg, Dave Eggers, Jeffrey Eugenides, Jonathan Safran Foer, 
A.M. Homes, Shelley Jackson, Ken Kalfus, Matthew Klam, Jonathan Lethem, Sam 





worship.” In the last essay of the collection, Smith declares “he was my favorite living 
writer,” and argues that “a difficult gift like Brief Interviews [with Hideous Men] merits 
the equally difficult gift of our close attention and effort” (259-260). There have been 
attempts to articulate a connection between the two authors beyond the coincidence of 
their fame, timing, and awareness of each other. Wood himself lumped Smith’s White 
Teeth and Wallace’s Infinite Jest together (among works by other authors like Salman 
Rushdie) in his now infamous New Republic article, “Human, All Too Inhuman” 
published in 2000, where he argues they belong to a new genre of “big, ambitious novel” 
he refers to as “hysterical realism.” Under the aegis of hysterical realism, Wood argues, 
authors like Smith and Wallace enforce “connections [between their characters] that are 
finally conceptual rather than human” for the sake of maintaining a “bonhumous, 
punning, lively serenity of spirit” leaving the reader bereft of depictions of real human 
beings in believable situations. For Wood, this kind of literature suffers from a lack, and 
“that lack is the human.” 
I would argue, however, that this stitching together of characters via artificial, 
unbelievably serendipitous and largely impersonal forces belongs to a broader trend in 
cultural production at the turn of the millennium, one that film critic Alissa Quart calls 
“hyperlinked cinema” which, she argues, organizes films such as Magnolia, Crash, and 
Happy Endings (“Networked”). Rachel Greenwald Smith identifies the same organizing 
logic of hyperlinked cinema operating in Karen Tei Yamashita’s 1997 novel Tropic of 
Orange, noting that “the partitioning of the narrative into character perspectives […] is 




from the start as a narrative construction rather than as reflecting an established fact of 
individual experience” (21). The result is a refusal “to locate value in the personal, 
formally refiguring feelings as unpredictable forces that are modified, intensified, and 
transmitted through interpersonal and interobjective relationships that exceed the 
capacities of any individual to manage them” (24). The effect of this strategy of 
narration, in other words, is to identify feelings as the motivating force behind “what 
happens” instead of fully agentive subjects or even readily believable events. 
Perhaps, then, rather than constituting what Wood would consider to be a failure 
in the mimetic representation of human beings, the fiction of affect realists at the turn of 
the millennium marks a shift in terms of what matters in meaningful representations of 
characters in fiction. If, as Deleuze and Guattari argue, “writing has nothing to do with 
signifying,” but rather “has to do with surveying, mapping, even realms that are yet to 
come” (Thousand Plateaus 4-5), then I believe Smith, Wallace, and their contemporaries 
are engaged in a project of mapping out what Nealon refers to as the post-postmodern 
moment where “it’s all about the practices of force and power, not about the states of 
truth or representation” (Post-Postmodernism 94), and affect is figured in their fiction as 
the place where the effects of force and power manifest in the human subject. The realm 
“yet to come” these authors appear to be surveying is “the (non)site where the logic of 
the individual subject overlaps with the logic of globalization” (42). Rather than 
prioritizing a verisimilitude of “real human situations,” these authors appear to be 
stricken with an urgency to portray what it feels like to be subjected to the all-




subject” (100). Much more relevant, then, to such a mapping out of the overlap between 
the determining, global forces of capital and the iteratively performing subject are 
representations of feelings which, for the purposes of my project of reading Smith and 
Wallace together, act as idiosyncratic, agentive condensates of the experiences a given 
subject registers and enfolds. For this reason, perhaps, part of the way these authors 
“make room” for affect is in occasionally allowing the intensity of the absurd or the 
unlikely to lure it into view. Rather than “hysterical realism,” then, I prefer to refer to the 
movement Wood identifies as affect realism. 
My final and most compelling reason for reading Smith alongside Wallace is due 
to the fact that Smith more fully realizes, in her characterization, an affect-centered 
model of subjectivity. Wallace’s myopia when it comes to the influence of the other 
seems to stifle him, to prevent him from imagining all the ways one’s feelings are 
constituted in relation to that other, such that his project is largely confined to the role 
affect plays in constituting a self-of-self. In this respect, Smith’s project circumscribes 
Wallace’s, for while she also very much explores the constitution of a sense-of-self, that 
“self” is much more seamlessly affected by the communities in which the subject 
participates. This aspect of her work, I argue, stems from her insistence on showcasing 
the inherent value of connection when it comes to establishing not just a sense-of-self 
but also a sense-of-belonging. In summation, I have chosen Wallace and Smith because I 
believe their work to be representational of the concerns of a generation of writers that 
come after postmodernism; because Smith’s fiction elegantly addresses and surpasses 




hope to make clear throughout my project, because the assumptions they both make 
about the crucial role authentication plays in the becoming of the neoliberal subject call 
for the installment of more space, time, and assent for sincere articulation in the 
dominant language-games of the West. 
By way of providing a roadmap for this project, in my second chapter I attempt 
to schematize a retooled model of subjectivity based on the assumptions of Wallace and 
Smith. This model assumes that even during the most mundane of human experiences, 
we are constantly forming the neuro-synaptic associations that inflect the affect-
heuristics we use to evaluate the positioning of ourselves and others within language-
games. It assumes that when forming these associations, our perceptions are filtered and 
modulated by our feelings, the way light filters through a prism. At the same time, those 
very feelings are sculpted by associations made in the past. As such, much like the 
subject of poststructuralism, this is a subject that is constantly under construction, but 
what my model simultaneously insists upon is that, due to variation in the nature, order, 
and intensity of any subject’s experiences, each subject is inherently singular. When we 
feel, according to this model, we become in ways that are inevitably idiosyncratic. I refer 
to this model as “the authenticating human” in order to emphasize the association-
intensifying role our feelings play when we register a performance (whether our own 
performance or the performance of another) and we not only fail to detect something like 
“phoniness” in the performance, but perhaps even feel something like catharsis, or 
recognition, or the feeling of something clicking into place. I refer to this phenomenon 




effects function not only to further cement the associations we make based on our 
perceptions during the performance, but to also further cement the level of authority 
(ethos) we ascribe to the performer in representing the various language-game dependent 
categories into which we classify them. 
Given this definition of authentication, my model figures sincerity, a key term for 
my reading of Wallace, as a particular kind of authentication, one in which the performer 
and audience inhabit the same body—sincerity happens when we ourselves perform, 
register, and authenticate our own performance. Conceiving of the term in this way 
allows me to make sense of Wallace’s insistence on the curative value of sincerity by 
enabling me to argue that one of the things that “becomes” when we perform sincerely is 
a sense-of-self made more “robust” via the effects of authentication: when we perform 
sincerely, we become not only incrementally different, but also more confident in that 
difference, allowing us to more readily locate our position in language-games. Another 
benefit of conceiving of sincerity in this way is that it allows the term to retain its 
historical connotation, which, in Lionel Trilling’s terms, is “the congruence between 
avowal and actual feeling” (2), without having to invoke the essentialized self that 
poststructuralism so thoroughly disperses. This is because, according to this model, one 
can be true to one’s feelings while simultaneously possessing as many “senses-of-self” 
as there are language-games that we habitually play (though it may be that some 
associative “consolidation” occurs, for the sake of cognitive efficiency, when we enfold 




I go on in my second chapter to show the role authentication plays in the 
establishment and molding of cultural identity when we as audience members witness a 
performance. In the context of identity making, in order for a performer to “pass” as a 
member of a particular community, the performer must attempt to cite memetic content 
which has been felicitously performed and authenticated within that community in the 
past. This performance of cited content is then scrutinized via the affect-heuristics of the 
audience members. When audience members authenticate that performance, their 
enfolding of this memetic content inevitably comes to inflect what it takes for 
performers to authenticate within that same community in the future. Additionally, the 
authentication of a performer is often explicitly signaled by audience members with the 
performance of a different class of memetic content (the nodding of the head, applause, 
verbal acknowledgement, an expression of rapt attention, etc.), and I refer to this kind of 
signaling as “the granting of assent.” When a performer registers an audience’s granting 
of assent, a sense-of-belonging to that community is established or reified in the 
performer. As such, authentication not only plays a central role in how we establish a 
sense-of-self, but also in how we establish cultural identity, conceived of as a suturing of 
a sense-of-self to one or more senses-of-belonging. Conceiving of cultural identity and 
belonging in this way enables me to makes sense of Smith’s insistence on the inherent 
value of “connection” for the subject. By granting assent to the other, even (or perhaps 
especially) in the context of mundane human interaction, we are not just allowing them 
to feel a sense-of-belonging with us—we’re infinitesimally changing what it takes for 




My third chapter focuses on Wallace, and is organized around the conceit of 
investigating “what happens” to Hal Incandenza, the main protagonist of Infinite Jest, 
who by the end of the novel’s plot is rendered mysteriously incapable of expressing 
himself. Departing from the prevailing scholarship on this mystery, which would point 
toward Hal having been exposed to either a hallucinogenic drug or the dangerous film 
that shares the novel’s title, I argue that Hal’s predicament can be fruitfully read as a 
cautionary tale for what happens when a culture’s dominant language-games become so 
saturated with irony and cynicism that there remain scant opportunities for the subject to 
engage in enough sincere self-expression to establish a viable sense-of-self. Hal’s 
emaciated sense-of-self prevents him from being able to soberly evaluate his own 
positioning in language-games, rendering him not only unable to speak, but also bereft 
of the ability to forge a sense-of-belonging within any supportive communities or to 
imagine himself engaging in any meaningful life-projects. Conversely, I show how the 
character Joelle Van Dyne is able to find both belonging and meaning through a twelve-
step recovery program where she is induced to play language-games that privilege 
sincerity. 
By reading the novel in this way, I showcase the assumptions Wallace makes 
about the subject in terms of the central role its affective heuristics play, and the 
susceptibility of those heuristics to the overall “tone” of a culture’s dominant language-
games. Wallace’s prescription for the Western neoliberal subject, then, is to be sincere, 
to bravely push past the fear of being registered as too sentimental, or the fear of failing 




articulate mimetic representations of one’s feelings so as to construct relatively stable 
senses-of-self. In this light, a sense-of-self functions as an evaluative reference point for 
our affect-heuristics as they perform the calculus of determining our next move in 
language-games, and as a necessary prerequisite for ever establishing a sense-of-
belonging within community. 
My fourth chapter showcases Smith’s assumptions about the subject for whom a 
central struggle is always the establishment of a sense-of-belonging—a task made highly 
fraught by the paucity of viable cultural identities available for subjects who are 
gendered and/or racialized. Borrowing a conceit from Christian Moraru, who argues that 
E.M. Forster’s admonition to “Only connect!” serves as an organizing theme for Smith’s 
work, I survey the breadth of her novels and essays, identifying the various valences I 
feel the admonition accrues in an attempt to distill her own ethical prescription for the 
Western neoliberal subject. In a way that dovetails nicely with Wallace, I show how 
Smith is also invested in proclaiming the value of sincere expression, particularly within 
the context of interpersonal relationships. Reaching far beyond the scope of Wallace’s 
concerns for the subject, however, Smith also demonstrates how belonging within 
community can serve as a kind of shelter and as an expanded horizon for expression, 
particularly for those who are drastically over/under-determined by the identities made 
available for them to authenticate against within hegemonic Western culture. 
Where in Wallace, “the mundane” typically warrants something like paranoid 
vigilance for the nefarious influence of Western media, in Smith the mundane becomes 




“unknowable” nature of the subject, whose idiosyncratic affect-heuristics are only ever 
expressed via the “one size fits all” nature of memetic expression, the simple act of 
granting assent to the unknowable other in the course of mundane interaction is figured 
in Smith as a powerful enchantment, as the instantiation of a more just world which, 
however ephemeral or contingent, inevitably changes both the self and the other. As 
such, Smith’s prescription to “only connect” treats not only the individual subject by 
providing them opportunities to establish a sense-of-belonging, but also treats culture at 
large by setting the stage for larger adjustments of the protocols of authentication. 
In my concluding chapter, I attempt to showcase the value of the authenticating 
human as a piece of equipment for describing the literature after postmodernism, using it 
as a lens to perform brief readings of three novels by Franzen, Eggers, and Eugenides. In 
the course of these readings, I also attempt to further develop the ethics of 
authentication, arguing that it calls attention to a particular kind of suffering which could 
be alleviated through the further installment of the conventions of sincerity and assent in 
Western language-games. I end my project by outlining the scope of future work, both in 




CHAPTER II  
THE AUTHENTICATING HUMAN 
 
There is a generation of literary authors12 writing at the turn of the millennium who, I 
argue, felt the impulse to “make room” for a more affect-centered model of subjectivity 
within the stylistics and tendencies they inherited from the strain of postmodern 
literature that preceded them. The conceits of this project are to figure this generation of 
authors as affect realists, and to consider the work of Zadie Smith and David Foster 
Wallace as being representational of the concerns of these authors—concerns which, as I 
argue in my introduction, are in part about diagnosing postmodern cultural ‘ailments’ 
and prescribing certain behaviors or postures as being ‘curative’ for the unhappy 
postmodern subject. What follows in the present chapter is an attempt to articulate this 
affect-centered model of subjectivity in such a way as to make sense of Wallace and 
Smith’s prescriptions to “be sincere” and “only connect,” respectively. 
 If the model of subjectivity implied by the fiction of Smith and Wallace is as 
affect-centered as I claim, it behooves me to place their work in conversation with what 
Patricia Clough refers to as the affective turn in the humanities and social sciences. In 
his foreword to the collection The Affective Turn edited by Clough, Michael Hardt 
identifies “the two primary precursors to the affective turn” as being “the focus on the 
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body, which has been most extensively advanced in feminist theory” by critics such as 
Judith Butler, and “the explorations of emotions, conducted predominantly in queer 
theory” by critics such as Eve Sedgwick (ix). As will become evident in my 
schematization of this model of subjectivity below, I largely rely on the assumptions of 
Butler’s theory of performativity for the constitution of this subject, though for my 
purposes the “site” of what she refers to as sedimentation is the affect. I find this reliance 
to be warranted by language like the following found in Smith’s fourth novel NW: 
Daughter drag. Sister drag. Mother drag. Wife drag. Court drag. Rich 
drag. Poor drag. British drag. Jamaican drag. Each required a different 
wardrobe. But when considering these various attitudes she struggled to 
think what would be the most authentic, or perhaps the least inauthentic. 
(333) 
While clearly gesturing toward performative ideas of subject formation given the use of 
the word ‘drag,’ Smith also here demonstrates a concern for the ‘authentic’ that 
manifests throughout her work, perhaps nowhere more evidently so than in her second 
novel, The Autograph Man. I argue that affect is precisely the site of overlap between the 
singular subject (standing in here for the authentic) and the various culturally embedded 
scripts the subject must cite when playing language-games. Rather than employ the 
psychoanalytic framework Butler uses, however, I account for both the singularity of the 
subject and the mechanics by which cultural scripts become sedimented within that 





From within affect theory, there is also a tendency to orient much of its 
discussion about the relationship between the body and Foucauldian notions of power 
according to a line of thought that traces its origin back to Baruch Spinoza, who 
according to Hardt, is “the philosopher who has advanced furthest the theory of the 
affects and whose thought is the source, either directly or indirectly, of most of the 
contemporary work in this field” (ix). Spinoza’s concept of the ‘affectus’ as the 
modification a body experiences in its interaction with other bodies is particularly useful 
when attempting to refer to the effects of power on a subject. Deleuze and Guattari 
perhaps most popularize the term affectus in A Thousand Plateaus to refer to the 
potentiality of the body to transition between its various capacities to act in response to 
the experience of power over time—a way, in other words, to speak of fluctuating 
intensities of biopower as they manifest agentively in the body. My own engagement 
with this line of discourse is to argue that power manifests in two ways: as an experience 
to be registered by the subject (i.e. a routine traffic stop or the advertisement of a 
pharmaceutical company), and also as the way our affective responses to that experience 
are inflected by past experiences of power. I argue that the ‘affectus’ is inevitable: 
experiences of any kind always modify the subject, and the specific site of this change is 
the affect. This renders my model of subjectivity radically susceptible to even mundane 
expressions of power, like the perception, even in the periphery, of a billboard on a 
highway. Rather than leading to something like cultural determinism, however, I insist 
that it is precisely this radical susceptibility that guarantees the singularity of the subject, 




experience of power. In other words, no two subjects ever register the same experience 
of power exactly the same, and therefore the effect of power on any subject is always 
idiosyncratic. 
The neurologically oriented nature of my model exemplifies an increasing 
tendency in affect theory to converse with the sciences, an impulse manifested, for 
instance, in Sedgwick and Adam Frank’s work with the psychologist Silvan Tomkins,13 
or in Brian Massumi’s Parables for the Virtual which often narrates the instantaneous 
and autonomic workings of the central nervous system as it registers both external 
stimuli and then constantly re-registers its own responses. This appeal to the 
neurological, as I mention in my introduction, is often employed by the affect realists 
after postmodernism. As Stephen Burn writes, “the 1990s was designated ‘The Decade 
of the Brain,’” and “neuroscientific explanations of behavior form a much more 
prominent part of the worldview of the post-postmodern novelist” (Jonathan Franzen 
25). Despite the way Hardt characterizes Butler’s work as a “focus on the body,” 
however, a neurological grounding for a model of subjectivity in many ways flies in the 
face of the postmodern tendency to be suspicious of scientific discourse. In Bodies That 
Matter, Butler’s approach to the “materiality of the body” is largely to demonstrate the 
constructed nature of materiality via the same phenomenon of sedimentation I alluded to 
earlier. For Butler, biological categories like sex imply an “absolute ‘outside,’ an 
ontological thereness that exceeds or counters the boundaries of discourse” (8). Such 
                                                





attempts to draw “the line between what is and is not constructed” only ever result in a 
situation where “the ‘unconstructed’ becomes bounded once again through a signifying 
practice, and the very boundary which is meant to protect some part of sex from the taint 
of constructivism is now defined by the anti-constructivist’s own construction” (11). 
I would argue, however, that the neuroscientific impulse to account for all human 
memory, feeling, and cognition as the autonomic soliciting and interpreting of the purely 
associative encoding of registered experience ultimately has the effect of grounding 
constructivism itself in the ontological. In this way, then, I find little difference between 
the psychoanalytic, “Copernican revolution” of figuring the unconscious as an 
associative rebus and the implications of neuroplasticity. While the erotics of 
postmodern discourse certainly privilege psychoanalytic terms such as the “dream” and 
the “phantasmatic,” such terms are often registered after postmodernism, particularly in 
pedagogical contexts, as needlessly esoteric. I hope to show how the tendency to appeal 
to neurological rather than psychoanalytic rhetoric in this strain of affect theory provides 
an alternate way of speaking about the constructed nature of the subject, while also 
opening up new, more accessible avenues for considering the nature of agency; and also 
for considering, as Wallace and Smith do, the possibility that the “healthiness” of the 
subject depends in part on its ability to establish a sense-of-self and a sense-of-
belonging.  
 As a final introductory note, I have organized what follows according to the 
various core components of this model, intending for them to build upon each other as a 




sciences and my current vocation as a software developer within the digital humanities. 
Taking a page from Massumi, I will also attempt, wherever possible, to provide 
examples of what I mean in the form of narratives (or in Massumi’s terms, parables). 
Also, for the sake of brevity and for reasons that will be made clear, I refer to this affect-
centered model of subjectivity as “the authenticating human.” 
 
Human Singularity as an Ever-Changing Connectome of Pure Association 
The human neurological system is, of course, far afield from what I am qualified to 
speak about. Nonetheless, I tread forward here with the audacity of a theorist in the 
humanities, and under a banner that reads “Interdisciplinarity!” in hopes that I will be 
granted the most generous assumption, and that the inevitable ways in which I am 
misrepresenting the field of neuroscience will become constructive points of contention. 
I begin my foray into the forests of neurons that comprise our brains by invoking the 
idea of singularity, the notion that each human being is somehow unique. In Sebastian 
Seung’s Connectome: How the Brain’s Writing Makes Us Who We Are, he refers to the 
unique configuration of neuronal association in a given human brain as a “connectome,” 
and argues that we are, in essence, our connectomes. Our connectome is built over time, 
via iterative encounters with phenomena in the world. Every word at our disposal, every 
image, smell, touch, taste, and sound that we can recall “lives” in our neurological 
system, encoded in the form of pure association, existing as clusters of neurons that light 





By way of reductive example, consider the toddler who stares at a tree. When she 
does so, the optical wiring of her nervous system sends encoded signals about what she 
sees to her brain, lighting up neurons corresponding to her perception of the shapes and 
colors of the tree’s form. When her mother points to the tree and makes the sound of the 
word “tree,” new signals are sent, this time coming from the auditory wiring of her 
nervous system, lighting up entirely different clusters of neurons corresponding, perhaps, 
to the sound of “ee.” When these two stimuli occur simultaneously, a synaptic bridge is 
established between the two clustered sets of neurons (the ones established in her 
registering of its visual form and the ones established in her registering of her mother’s 
voice). The more this toddler sees examples of trees coupled with hearing the word tree, 
the more intensely these clusters of neurons will fire in tandem, and the stronger the 
synaptic bridge between them becomes, until eventually, when either seeing a tree or 
hearing the word “tree,” both clusters light up like fireworks. The point of this imaginary 
scene of learning is to explain how the sum total of human experience becomes encoded, 
one way or another, in the form of pure association, as neurons firing with varying 
degrees of intensity connected by synapses with varying connection strengths. Seung 
insists that this process of learning, of wiring and then re-wiring the brain, never stops. 
We encode until we die. He refers to this mutability of our grey matter as 
“neuroplasticity,” and refers to the various processes of change our brains undergo as the 
‘four R’s’—“reweighting, reconnection, rewiring, and regeneration,” which are the 
observed means by which our brains are constantly reconfiguring themselves in response 




moment we encounter a set of stimuli as a “registering,” the moment our brains engage 
in the reconfiguration of our neurons and synapses as an “enfolding,” and the content 
that gets enfolded as “pure association.” 
 It is crucial for my purposes, however, to insist that nodes in this neural network 
of associations, as well as the connections that span them, grow and shrink with every 
registering, such that there is always a topology of association. Some clusters of neurons 
become referenced more than others in any instance of registering and enfolding, such 
that they become like localized centers or hubs for efficiently routing associative traffic 
pertaining to particular stimuli. In David Kemmerer’s Cognitive Neuroscience of 
Language, he notes that when a neuron fires, “it’s always an all-or-nothing affair, never 
a matter of degree” (35). When I speak of intensity, therefore, I refer to the fact that 
“neurons vary greatly, however, in the precise rate at which they fire,” and a particular 
neuron’s “firing rate will increase significantly above its baseline level” thus indicating 
“how confident it is that its preferred stimulus is present” (35-36). In a study referenced 
by Kemmerer, a single neuron was identified in a patient as having “responded robustly” 
to “photographs of the television host Oprah Winfrey” (38). Interestingly, “this neuron 
also responded to pictures of the actress Whoopi Goldberg,” though it did so “to a much 
lesser degree.” What studies like this reveal is that, within the associative network that 
comprises our brain, there is always unfolding a great drama of centering and re-
centering, of adapting efficiently, via the phenomenon of neuroplasticity, to the world as 




 We might imagine, in other words, the brain as a topographical map of 
associative intensities not unlike the rhyzomic yet stratified intensities of power Deleuze 
and Guattari use to characterize transnational networks of power in A Thousand 
Plateaus. I draw this analogy not to suggest that a map of the sprawling territory of 
capital exists within a subject’s skull, but to suggest that there is enough of a homology 
or shared organizational logic between the two systems so as to render the use of 
neurological rhetoric in speaking about the subject useful when also speaking of that 
subject’s relation to power. The neuro-rhetorical conceit that we encode our experiences 
of the world in the form of pure association is largely compatible with a Freudian 
conception of the unconscious, allowing it to be in conversation with more 
psychoanalytically oriented discourses. As Lacan notes, Freud opens “the royal road to 
the unconscious” by insisting that “the dream is a rebus” (128). Just as “it would be 
sheer buffoonery to pretend that in a given [Egyptian hieroglyphic] text the frequency of 
a vulture which is an aleph, or a chick which is a vau […] prove that the text has 
anything at all to do with these ornithological specimens,” so too would it be folly to 
look for anything like “meaning” in the topological network of pure association that our 
connectomes comprise. If I have a preference in this project for a neurological rather 
than psychoanalytic discursive anchoring in schematizing the authenticating human, it is 
to shift away from somewhat mystical emphases on the “mirror stage” or the 
interpretation of dreaming or the nature of signs, and to focus instead on how the 
unconscious is constantly “under construction,” built incrementally over time via the 





The Affect as an Ever-Adapting, Autonomic Heuristic 
A “heuristic” is a process by which we assess a particular situation in order to distill a 
standardized metric—an indicator that can be used to inform a decision. A thermometer, 
for instance, is a piece of technology (a heuristic) that evaluates the situation at hand and 
delivers a “temperature”—a metric that informs our clothing decision for the day. For 
the schematic of the authenticating human I develop here, the term affect or affect-
heuristic refers to our own neurological technology of indication. In their article “The 
affect heuristic,” Paul Slovic et al. argue that our feelings, in any given moment, are 
together like the gauges and blinking lights on the dashboard of a cockpit, granting us 
the means to make quick judgement calls: “Using an overall, readily available affective 
impression can be far easier—more efficient—than weighing the pros and cons or 
retrieving from memory many relevant examples, especially when the required judgment 
or decision is complex or mental resources are limited. This characterization of a mental 
short-cut leads to labeling the use of affect a ‘heuristic’” (1336). This sentiment is 
echoed in Sianne Ngai’s monograph Ugly Feelings, in which she deems it “entirely 
appropriate” to think of “emotive or affective qualities […] as compressed assessments 
of complex ‘situations’” (42). I would trouble, however, the distinction that Slovic draws 
between what he calls an “affective impression” and the more conventionally 
“cognitive” task of “weighing the pros and cons.” This distinction reifies the 
conventional notion that our “mind” is somehow separate from our “feelings.” The 




makes sense to consider cognition separate from feeling—cognition, under the aegis of 
this model, is better thought of as a focus on our feelings over time, for reasons I will be 
elaborating upon later. 
Of importance to my readings of Wallace and Smith, however, is the fact that 
these heuristics are trained. One of Wallace’s conceits is the notion that there exists a 
heuristic (or set of heuristics) for detecting deceit. It’s what Wallace refers to as our 
“bullshit antenna.”14 This particular heuristic is developed in response to (and in 
vigilance of) ulterior motives, and the results of this heuristic manifest as the emotion we 
typically refer to as suspicion. It is the same suspicion easily spooked fish have for the 
dangling lure. It benefits us, as savvy consumers, to develop a keen eye for the shine of 
the hook, to hold our private lives (and our wallets) close to the chest. This is because, 
under the regime of capitalism, Western culture condones the lure. In the West, we 
create entire business models which profit by the art of allurement. We allow massive 
social domains, like Facebook, to be entirely funded by the shine of the hook. So we 
watch for it. We learn to spot the catch, and in theory, the more we are subjected to 
identifiable instances of manipulation, the keener our bullshit antenna becomes. Beyond 
the mere detection of bullshit, however, my figuring of affect-as-heuristic performs the 
work of explaining how we determine what language-games are in play in a discursive 
context, and how we assign value to the various moves available to us in such language-
games. 
                                                
14 Most notably in Wallace’s description of Don Gately in Infinite Jest as “a gifted cynic, 




Another feature crucial to my understanding of affective heuristics is that they 
are autonomic. By autonomic, I mean that they are both autonomous and automatic. Our 
affects, in other words, happen to us. We register stimuli, and within microseconds, our 
emotional heuristics are firing. What this means is that every experience that was 
registered and enfolded as pure association while the affective heuristic was being 
“trained” over the course of our entire lives bears upon the situation at hand 
instantaneously. We have the capacity, in other words, to immediately leverage 
experiences obtained over decades of time. It also means that in any given moment of 
registering or speaking, there are likely thousands of affects evaluating and indicating at 
once—we have no control, in other words, of our emotional state, a state that gets 
enfolded associatively, whether we like it or not, with whatever else we’re registering at 
that moment. So, despite our ability to recognize, for instance, that the computer-
animated gecko we’re watching on the screen is a commercial ploy in service of an 
insurance company, despite our awareness of the gecko-as-lure, we often find ourselves 
laughing at its antics, and Geico finds its advertising dollars to be well-spent, as they 
have successfully associated within our neural forests the positive feeling of laughter 
with our recognition of their corporate brand. As Rachel Greenwald Smith points out, 
the functioning of neoliberal flows of capital depends in part on figuring “the individual 
as responsible for herself,” and in keeping with this requirement, there is currency in 
casting in turn “feeling as necessarily owned and managed by individual[s]” (2). The 
core argument of R. G. Smith’s Affect and American Literature in the Age of 




representing emotions as largely impersonal—by showing how individuals have no 
more control over their feelings than they do their immune systems, literature is able 
respond to the urgent call to undermine the neoliberal notion that feelings are able to be 
strategically reigned in or deployed by highly agentive subjects. For this same reason, 
when schematizing the authenticating human, I insist on the autonomous and automatic 
functioning of affect. Whether we like it or not, our bodies are responding to the world 
around us in ways that are out of our control, precisely because they were trained via 
experiences that happened to us in the past. 
At this level of abstraction, the affect as autonomic heuristic may register as 
overly cold or mechanistic, given that we’re ultimately discussing feelings. In 
Sedgwick’s Touching Feeling, she notes how in her earlier work in Between Men which 
concerns itself with revealing how male homosocial behavior is driven ultimately by 
erotic desire, her modeling of homoerotics 
views emotion primarily as a vehicle or manifestation of an underlying 
libidinal drive. Excitement, rage, even indifference are seen as more or 
less equivalent transformations of ‘desire.’ The nature or quality of the 
affect itself, seemingly, is not of much more consequence than the color 
of the airplane used to speed a person to a destination. (Touching Feeling 
18). 
While it is certainly true that my own distillation of affect may be similarly understood 




which I will be getting to shortly, it is important to note the distinction between the 
affect-heuristic and what is more commonly thought of as “emotion.” 
The identification of an emotion is our attempt to affix a useful (because 
reproducibly identifiable) label, using the signifying power of language, to what may be 
thousands of affect-heuristics knotted together and indicating at once. A particularly 
orderly person named Jorge, for instance, may survey the desk he just cleaned and feel 
something he interprets as “satisfaction.” There may, however, be hundreds of affect-
heuristics indicating at once throughout the landscape of Jorge’s neurological system, 
such as an affect specialized in the detection of right angles, or an affect specialized in 
detecting the homogeneity of a flat surface, or one that indicates a lack of interruptions 
in a solid field of color, etc. The emotion of “satisfaction” is, to borrow Lacan’s 
metaphor, a “quilting button” that serves to suture and interpretively marshal a bevvy of 
unnamable (because uniquely inflected by Jorge’s experiences) affects. We can say, 
then, that affects are things that autonomically “happen” to Jorge, and that an emotion 
like satisfaction is something that Jorge “has” or “possesses” because he has done the 
interpretive work required to subsume a rich physiological field of sensations into 
something reproducibly identifiable, something nameable. 
Given that Jorge’s cognitive processes are constantly and iteratively registering 
not just external stimuli but also their own workings in the form of sensation, when Jorge 
reproducibly affixes the label “satisfaction” to what he is feeling, the clusters of neurons 
involved in his keeping-track-of the word “satisfaction” form synaptic connections to the 




the mundane way in which synapses form between clusters of neurons, one could argue 
that the way Jorge uses the word “satisfaction” to refer to his set of uniquely inflected 
affect-heuristics exists, on the level of pure association, as a real phenomenon, albeit one 
that mutates and adapts every time he uses it (or even hears someone else use the term). 
As a way to tie things together, and in the spirit of quilting buttons and Jorge’s 
satisfaction in orderliness, I should note that when using the word “feeling,” I am 
referring to the entire process that includes: (a): the registering of external stimuli (like 
Jorge’s desk); (b): the registering of the sensations (or indicators returned by affect-
heuristics) autonomically generated by (a); (c): the reproducible identification of these 
sensations as an emotion like satisfaction; and finally (d): the enfolding of (a) through 
(c) as the establishment or reconfiguration of pure association encoded as neurons and 
synapses in the brain. We can then say then, that to the extent that (d) constitutes, via 
neuroplasticity, an actual physiological change in Jorge, when Jorge feels, he becomes. 
We must take care, of course, not to get too caught up in the teleological allure of 
schematizing this process of feeling/becoming as a linear series of steps—from what I 
understand, if any of these steps are actually occurring as I’ve described them, they are 
occurring constantly and in parallel with each other at various levels of stratification in 








The Meme as an Ever-Evolving, Atomic Unit of Culture 
The term meme was coined by evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, and it is roughly 
synonymous with “human behavioral pattern.” He argues that when thinking along these 
lines, “cultural transmission is analogous to genetic transmission,” in that the economy 
of memes can give rise to a form of evolution by “non-genetic means, and at a rate 
which is orders of magnitude faster than genetic evolution” (Dawkins 189). According to 
Dawkins, memes encode “fashions in dress and diet, ceremonies and customs, art and 
architecture” as well as “tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making 
pots or of building arches” (190). Whereas biological replication and mutation takes 
place via the exchange of DNA, cultural replication and mutation takes place via the 
exchange of memes. 
The authenticating human considers language to be composed of (but not 
reduced to) memetic content. Mikhail Bakhtin, through his concept of speech genres, has 
already imagined language as a collection of patterns and sub-patterns subjected to a 
process similar to the accelerated evolutionary process proposed by Dawkins in his 
description of the meme. According to Bakhtin, “each separate utterance is individual, of 
course, but each sphere in which language is used develops its own relatively stable 
types of these utterances.  These we may call speech genres” (60).  While speech genres 
may stylistically pattern relatively large units of language such as “chronicles, contracts, 
texts of laws, clerical and other documents, various literary, scientific, and commentarial 
genres, official and personal letters,” they also pattern smaller units, such as “rejoinders 




new phenomenon (phonetic, lexical, or grammatical) that can enter the system of 
language without having traversed the long and complicated path of generic-stylistic 
testing and modification” (65). Along with Bakhtin, then, I believe memetic content to 
be patterned recursively in that memes become embedded within memes, with the 
outermost memes (think genres or language-games) ordering the more embedded 
patterns (think paragraphs, sentences, words, etc.). 
Indeed, many of the analytic methodologies employed within the digital 
humanities already assume a homology between language and genetic code. Michael 
Drout’s work on the transmission of traditions in medieval literature, for instance, 
applies the same kinds of algorithms that look for genetic patterns in biological 
organisms in order to provide evidence of influence in the texts of Anglo-Saxon authors 
and poets. With recourse to “memetics” as a theoretical approach, Drout claims “we can 
therefore explain the workings of various cultural phenomena the same way that 
evolutionary biologists explain the development of various morphological, 
physiological, or behavioral features in organisms: in terms of the combination of 
processes of selection and the contingent effects of history in a heterogeneous world” 
(1). Like Dawkins and Drout, I find the concept of the meme to be useful, and I find it 
more useful than a subsuming of human cultural expression under the concept of 
“language” for a variety of reasons, some of which are expressed by Sedgwick in 
Touching Feeling. While Sedgwick never employs the term meme, to my knowledge, 
she has “taken a distinct step to the side of the deconstructive project of analyzing 




analyzes a particular gestural style as a variety of performative utterance” (6). Her 
reasons for doing so are on the one hand to insist that “the line between words and things 
or between linguistic and nonlinguistic phenomena is endlessly changing,” and on the 
other to maintain that “many kinds of objects and events mean, in many heterogenous 
ways and contexts,” and she sees value in “not reifying or mystifying the linguistic kinds 
of meaning unnecessarily.” My own further reasons for preferring memetics over 
linguistics include the connotation of a polyvalence of meaning “meme” has acquired 
given its most common usage as “internet meme”—as my own 12-year-old son will tell 
you, the purpose of a given internet meme is not to convey a specific meaning, but rather 
to produce a range of effects in its audience. A meme exploits the immediate, ephemeral 
cultural context to produce a range of effects, and the study of these effects seems to fall 
more readily under the purview of the scholar of cultural studies rather than the 
hermeneuticist. My final reason for preferring the meme is because, again, thanks to the 
connotation it has acquired via the internet, memes are inherently assumed to evolve via 
the very iterative process of playing with its constituent parts that Butler describes in her 
consideration of the performative utterance.    
 
The Economy of Memes and the Memetic Transfer 
A model of the brain as a topologically distributed network of pure association allows us 
to imagine it as the scene for the accelerated evolutionary process by which memes are 
made more “fit for use” in culture, particularly if we consider our affective heuristics to 




content makes us feel helps determine the frequency and context with which we use it. If 
we can imagine our cognitive processes as being limited, in that there are only so many 
associations and so much in the way of affective heuristic “power” that can be 
efficaciously brought to bear at any given moment, then we can open the way to thinking 
through an economy of memes. Because the cognitive scene where this economy plays 
out is so complex, however, I will attempt to explore it initially via narrative. 
Jane is sitting at the dinner table, engrossed by the meal in front of her. She takes 
the next bite, and as she looks up, she sees Shawn, her boyfriend, down on one knee 
beside her chair, proffering a sparkling object in a black velvet box. Jane’s optical 
pathways send these signals to her brain and her affective heuristics begin the task of 
pattern matching to determine the broad strokes of the language-game (ordering meme) 
in play here. Before a single microsecond has passed, her heuristics have ruled out entire 
swaths of human cultural genres, identifying “a proposal” as the most immediate 
context, a context which, given the deafening intensity of Jane’s affective response as 
she registers and enfolds it, has suddenly trumped all other language-game contexts, 
such as “being in a restaurant” or “eating food.” Like all language-games, the ordering 
meme of the proposal establishes the players (the proposer and the proposee), as well as 
a field of recognizable positions each player might occupy (the sincere-hearted, aspiring 
proposer; the emotionally overwhelmed proposee; the defeated proposer who has been 
turned down; the elated fiancé; etc.). Now that the game is in play, the field has been 
charged with value. Certain positions become more pleasurable to occupy than others, 




move in this game. The grist of any move available to Jane lives as pure association in 
her head, and her affective-heuristics are now spinning madly, evaluating memetic 
content that might be strung together and deployed in such as way as to produce a vector 
that will move her in the direction of a position she’d like to occupy. Very little (if any) 
of this drama, this economic scene has risen to the level of consciousness for Jane. The 
blood that rushes to her cheeks, the trembling in her hands as she sets down the fork, the 
composure with which she folds her hands in her lap, and the tears that fill her eyes—
each of these “moves” are deployed as the outcome of autonomic processes. Before 
Shawn can open his mouth to speak, in other words, Jane has already registered and 
enfolded many times over a context made new by her own deployment of memetic 
content, and she is always-autonomically evaluating and re-evaluating the efficacy of her 
moves based on how they have made her feel. 
 Under the aegis of this economy of memes, affect plays an inextricable role in 
the way behavioral patterns are associatively and evaluatively retrieved, performed, 
registered, and enfolded. If we are to place under the auspices of the humanities a study 
of this “accelerated evolutionary process” which shapes language, or indeed any aspect 
of human culture that consists in the trafficking of behavioral patterns, it behooves us to 
pay close attention to how feelings are the forces that inflect memetic content as it is 
transferred in and out of the topologically distributed associations in the human brain—
feelings construed as heuristic processes emerging from the same neural forest of 
associations they inflect. Shawn’s own affective-heuristics, the ones that have been 




and in movies, are now filling him with something like “warmth” or “encouragement” as 
he registers the tears forming in Jane’s eyes. In the speech he has prepared and 
memorized for this occasion, there is a clause that reads something like, “I know we 
haven’t really talked about marriage yet,” a clause he included as a way to mitigate the 
risk of springing this proposal on Jane. Now that his heuristics are sending him the green 
light in the form of encouragement, however, the autonomic, affect-mediated means by 
which Shawn is able to string together memetic content (what I refer to as the memetic 
transfer) compel him to drop this clause from his speech. Thanks to his affective 
evaluation of Jane’s tears, its inclusion now somehow “feels wrong,” perhaps because 
such a gesture might slow down this welcome momentum, and maybe even introduce 
the risk of drawing attention to his foolhardiness. Should Shawn’s proposal-as-speech-
act be felicitous, one effect of his registering and enfolding of the event will be perhaps a 
devaluing of the meme “I know we haven’t really talked yet” in future instances of 
speech. The felicity or infelicity of a speech act factors, in other words, in our 
subsequent use of the specific memetic content we chose to deploy (or not deploy in this 
case). 
 The effect of conceiving of this proposal, and indeed any form of human 
expression in terms of an economy of memes, is a de-privileging of the conveyance of 
meaning as the primary goal of communication, placing in its stead the acquisition of a 
desired position in whatever language-games are in play. Similarly, we can conceive of 
the failure of communication to be less about some kind of descriptive inaccuracy (or 




part of the speaker’s affective-heuristics to adequately evaluate, in the moment of 
speaking, the riskiness of a given move. In this way, the model of the authenticating 
human, with its consideration of the economy of memes as instantiated within the 
memetic transfer (or moment of utterance), fits naturally within a theoretic context that 
conceives of the subject as a node in a flowing network of power. 
The decentering of meaning is not a new theoretic impulse. In J.L. Austin’s How 
to Do Things with Words, for instance, he distinguishes among the various ways we 
“use” an utterance, and refers to the way we use speech to convey meaning via 
constative statements as “locutionary.” He then argues that the locutionary is ultimately 
driven or ordered by the “illocutionary,” or the way we use language to achieve specific 
effects in the world. While I agree with Austin that the illocutionary dimension of 
language orders locutionary content, I am uneasy with the level of agency he seems 
willing to ascribe to the speaking subject. When describing the locutionary act, he 
writes: “Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential 
effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of 
other persons: and it may be done with the design, intention, or purpose of producing 
them” (101). While I’m willing to grant that certain more formalized language-games 
like “writing a dissertation” or “performing a wedding ceremony” privilege the act of 
composition and editing and thus reify the notion that a speaker is intentional in 
choosing the memes that comprise their performance, this notion is a dangerous one in 
that it implies a kind of rationality that simply doesn’t exist at the level of the memetic 




positions on the field, of the evaluation of those positions, and of which memes comprise 
our best move toward the best position are all mediated by our affect-heuristics, and thus 
are things that “happen to us.” If the authenticating human can be said to “choose our 
words carefully” or “engage in composition,” it is due to the rapid, iterative nature of the 
memetic transfer. In the act of composing a written sentence, for instance, we take 
several stabs at making our next move in the language-game, and then subject those 
various attempts to the same heuristic processes that gave rise to them in the first place 
in order to establish which articulation (or combination of articulations) best moves us in 
our intended direction. 
One of the major implications, then, for a more affect-centered model of 
subjectivity is the question of agency. Where does it lie? This question haunts many of 
the characters in the fiction of Wallace and Smith. In Wallace’s Infinite Jest, the addicts 
that participate in Alcoholics Anonymous are informed that a drug addiction is like a 
spider that weaves its web of influence throughout the brain, insinuating its agenda to 
secure the next dose in every aspect of the addict’s life. In Smith’s NW, one of the main 
protagonists (Natalie/Keisha) finds herself answering classified ads for sexual 
encounters due to “a strong desire to slip into the lives of other people” despite the fact 
that she is a successful barrister, wife, and mother (334). These characters also feel a 
sense of discord, suggesting that there are various affects vying for influence at once on 
the character’s behavior. It would seem, then, that agency “happens” at two levels: at the 
level of the individual affect itself, and then again at the level of the “economic scene” of 




evaluated and inflected to form an amalgamated vector. In this way, we can conceive of 
a kind of “affective mathematics” much like the kind used in physics to predict the 
velocity and direction of an object in motion given the various forces (like gravity and 
air-friction) acting upon it. 
This imagining of the process of human decision-making as an autonomous, 
economic scene with its own, idiosyncratic “mathematics” for ascribing value to 
language-game moves suggests a further homology between the neurological and the 
workings of capital. This particular homology has been explored by the philosopher 
Slavoj Žižek, though strictly in the psychoanalytic terms initially defined by Freud and 
then elaborated upon by Lacan. Žižek argues that the way dream-work translates latent 
dream-content into a legible dream-text is homologous to the “secret” process by which 
commodities and labor are assigned value under the aegis of capitalism. It is from this 
vantage point that Žižek is able to support claims like this one, made by Alfred Sohn-
Rethel in Intellectual and Manual Labour: “[T]he formal analysis of the commodity 
holds the key not only to the critique of political economy, but also to the historical 
explanation of the abstract conceptual mode of thinking and the division of intellectual 
and manual labor which came into existence with it” (qtd. in Žižek 8). In other words, 
Žižek is willing to claim that the same, hidden mechanisms by which capital assigns 
value to commodities are homologous to the mechanisms by which the unconscious 
charges certain “thoughts” or mental associations with affective-intensity, always 
considered in psychoanalytic terms as desire. Put in the simplest of terms, the study of 




what I’m calling the “affective mathematics” of the subject’s decision-making process. 
 This homologous relation between the memetic-transfer and the ascription of 
value to commodities in a capitalist system serves to further complicate the question of 
where agency lies. By way of illustrating this complication, I turn to the philosopher 
W.E.B. Du Bois, who similarly complicates questions of agency by way of thinking 
about culpability. In The World and Africa, Du Bois writes about “a young woman, well 
trained and well dressed, intelligent and high-minded” who lives in “a lovely British 
home, with green lawns, appropriate furnishings and a retinue of well-trained servants” 
(41). “How far is such a person responsible for the crimes of colonialism?” he asks. 
It will in all probability not occur to her that she has any responsibility 
whatsoever, and that may well be true. Equally, it may be true that her 
income is the result of starvation, theft, and murder; that it involves 
ignorance, disease, and crime on the part of thousands; that the system 
which sustains the security, leisure, and comfort she enjoys is based on 
the suppression, exploitation, and slavery of the majority of mankind. 
[…] For this someone is guilty as hell. Who? (42). 
In the starkest terms, Du Bois lays his finger on the problem of ascribing blame to the 
high-minded consumer for the atrocities committed in order to secure the means of 
production. Ultimately, for Du Bois, “the sin of capitalism is secrecy: the deliberate 
concealing of the character, methods, and result of efforts to satisfy human want” (257). 
The troubling thing about the homology I allude to above, then, is the implication that 




the gruesome provenance of a given product is obscured, the human decision-making 
process is largely opaque because mediated by affect-heuristics that “happen to us.” 
 My point is not to suggest that people can’t be held accountable for their 
behavior, or that it is fruitless to unveil the secret injustices of capitalism. It is rather to 
suggest that in view of a more affect-centered model of subjectivity, attempts to identify 
an agent, assign blame, or “carry out justice” must ceaselessly attend to the conditions 
that enabled or “vectorized” the unethical behavior to begin with. The specific “event” 
wherein the subject engages in unethical behavior is, according to this model, likely the 
culmination thousands of mundane experiences registered and enfolded by that subject 
in the past. For this reason, I believe authors like Smith and Wallace fictionally represent 
people who are lonely, suffering from anhedonia, bored to death, hopelessly addicted, 
disenchanted, misread by their communities, overwhelmed by anxiety, or falling out of 
love; but never people who are evil. There are no villains in the fiction of affect-realism, 
and if so many of these characters are victims of something, they are victims of a toxic, 
unjust culture whose dominant language-games shape and mold their feelings. 
 
Self-Authentication and the Establishment of a Sense-of-Self 
I have so far spoken briefly of “an economy of memes” whereby one or more organizing 
memes, perhaps best understood as language-game(s), become recognized by our 
affective-heuristics as being “in play,” thereby charging positions on the discursive 
playing field with value—positions we then attempt to occupy via the deployment of 




affect-heuristics as being more or less efficacious (or strategically valuable) according to 
the ordering power of the game. Having now sketched out the scene of this economy of 
memes, I now turn my attention to the phenomenon I refer to as authentication, which 
can be thought of as the process by which we evaluate our positioning (or the positioning 
of others) on the field of play. Returning to the predicament Jane finds herself in, with 
Shawn on one knee beside her chair at the restaurant, let’s assume that the words now 
issuing from Shawn’s mouth, organized under the memetic rubric of “a proposal” by the 
affective heuristics in his mind, arrive at the auditory signal gates of Jane’s neurological 
system. As these signals (along with everything else she is registering) solicit a series of 
recursive associative responses, particular neural clusters light up with varying intensity, 
spreading out and lighting up other clusters over synaptic pathways. This “lighting up” 
washes back and forth over Jane’s body in the form of signal feedback loops (these are 
Jane’s affects), and this washing back and forth nuances and modulates itself as it solicits 
its own set of associative responses. As Shawn’s words tumble like rocks into a pond, 
Jane’s registering of them sets off new ripples that course their way through her body. 
Shawn finishes speaking, and the memetic structure of the language-game of “a 
proposal,” infused with the new situational context updated by Shawn’s utterance, 
begins to charge the playing field, building as a kind of pressure on Jane to open her 
mouth and respond. 
 Let’s assume, hypothetically, that most of the feelings stirred up in Jane by 
Shawn’s words are negative. Let’s assume that Jane has been on the lookout for a good 




that both includes him long-term and also feels right. The pressure exerted by the 
language-game, however, is intense—other people in the restaurant have noticed, have 
turned their heads to see what happens—and it is a pressure that privileges, via the 
economy of memes, an affirmative response on her part. For this reason, a pit of fear 
forms in Jane’s stomach as she realizes she must deliver among a cloud of witnesses 
what will be recognizable by Shawn as a rejection of his proposal. The playing field for 
Jane is now charged with sites of intensity. There is a negative intensity, coming from 
her need to decline Shawn’s proposal, that forms like a repulsing magnetic field around 
the position of the “elated fiancée.” Similar negative, repulsing forces form around other 
positions, like the “cruel person” who would humiliate Shawn in front of all these people 
by informing him of all his shortcomings, or the “causer of a scene” who would draw 
unwanted attention from the other restaurant patrons. Emerging like a life-raft in a 
violently coursing stream is the position of the “blameworthy decliner,” the person who 
takes the burden quietly upon herself, the person who claims “it’s me, not you.” Jane’s 
affect-heuristics have identified, more or less below the level of consciousness, the 
position she wishes to occupy, and these same heuristics begin to sculpt and deploy 
memetic content able to move her in a vector toward this position. While this move 
certainly involves the speaking of statements like “I’m sorry,” and “you’re a wonderful 
person who deserves happiness,” and “I’m just not in a place right now to get married,” 
etc., it is also of course composed of nonverbal memetic components—she takes his 




she feels that manifests as a trembling in her voice and the accumulation of sweat in her 
palms. 
As the words issue from Jane’s mouth, they too are registered by Jane, and in the 
affective feedback that washes back and forth, she recognizes something like guilt or 
failure—this proposal will not be a felicitous speech act on Shawn’s part, and perhaps 
she feels it is her fault. Let’s assume, however, that she also feels guilty for another 
reason: as indicated by the “leakage” of fear and anxiety produced by the torrent of her 
feelings, what she is saying to Shawn is not an accurate representation of her feelings. 
Her “bullshit antenna” is going off. There is a subset of the field of memetic content 
selected by her affective-heuristics which, should she have articulated it, would have 
resembled a litany of reasons why Shawn isn’t right for her, reasons which, particularly 
in this context, would have been humiliating for Shawn to hear, and despite her 
unwillingness to build a life together with him, she nevertheless feels care and affection 
toward Shawn, and does not wish to cause a scene. While her utterance has satisfied the 
rules of the language-game in play, placing her on the field in the position of the 
blameworthy decliner (it’s me, not you), she does not feel authorized by her feelings to 
be occupying the “it’s me, not you” position, and therefore the opportunity for “self-
authentication,” or sincerity, has been foreclosed. 
 In offering this neurologically inflected model of subjectivity that foregrounds 
the role affect plays in the selection, ordering, and transfer of memes, I hope to identify a 
cleft between affective-heuristics that indicate the pressures and positions of the 




from) those positions (the mimetic), and to suggest that there are moments when we 
articulate something and, unlike with Jane in this instance, something clicks, something 
feels right about what we have said, and we experience little if any “leakage” from our 
affect-heuristics. In these moments, our affective-heuristics have evaluated and 
authorized our words. In these moments, we are sincere. This model assumes, in other 
words, that sincerity, when construed as self-authentication, is a real phenomenon in the 
world. While in my third chapter I will be providing an account of sincerity’s origin and 
development in the West, culminating with its consignment to the rubbish bin along with 
other Western “virtues” tainted by essentialism, it’s important to note here that this 
conception of sincerity attempts to unmoor itself from its past commitments to a fixed, 
essentialized self whose emotions make themselves available for being solicited and 
reported on. 
Toward what end, however, would we want to rescue and retool the phenomenon 
of sincerity? As I stated earlier in the case of Jorge who feels something like satisfaction 
when he surveys his clean desk, this moment of feeling results, however minutely, in a 
moment of becoming for Jorge: when we feel, we become. Building off of this principle, 
then, sincerity’s role in this model of subjectivity is as a growth accelerant—the 
associations we enfold are made stronger in moments of self-authentication because the 
interpretive work we’ve performed in surveying and articulating our feelings about them 
felicitously aligns with the position we’d like to occupy. In the simplest terms, when we 




As I mentioned above, there was a cleft between what Jane actually felt about 
Shawn on the one hand, and what her affect-heuristics compelled her to say to him on 
the other. During the memetic transfer (the moment of speaking), her evaluative 
heuristics compelled her to occupy the position of the “blameworthy decliner” when 
responding to Shawn. Jane’s “bullshit detector,” however, has identified a remainder, a 
field of unarticulated affective content surrounding her decision about Shawn, and on her 
drive home from the restaurant, she finds herself ruminating about the things she left 
unsaid. This rumination builds inside her like a kind of pressure, such that when she 
walks into her apartment and finds her roommate Alisha watching Netflix on the couch, 
she is compelled by her feelings to initiate a new language-game, perhaps best described 
as “catharsis,” one which positions Alisha as the confidant; one in which Jane wishes to 
move from the position of the troubled friend to the position of the unburdened comrade. 
While the economy of memes that orders this cathartic language-game certainly 
values as a kind of currency the sensationalizing of Jane’s retelling, on the whole it is a 
game that privileges sincerity. Thus, within the context of certain language-games, 
sincerity is figured as a kind of speech act, the felicity of which depends at least in part 
on Jane functioning as both speaker and audience, such that as Jane strings together her 
utterances via the memetic transfer, she is also registering and evaluating her own 
words—should her affect-heuristics fail to mark them as bullshit, should there, in other 
words, be little if any affective “leakage,” the speech act is felicitous, and Jane is able to 
enfold her own retelling as a “true” story about herself. In other words, as Jane confesses 




she not only comes to occupy the position of the unburdened comrade in the immediate 
language-game of catharsis, but is also enfolding new associations about herself that 
form the grist of her positioning in future relationship endeavors—grist that establishes 
for her a kind of “hereness” that will serve in the capacity of more-readily locating 
herself in language-games to come. In this way, then, sincerity-as-speech-act does 
something in the world, and that something is the growth of Jane’s sense-of-self. 
A sense-of-self, then, according to this model of the authenticating human, exists 
as a cluster within the larger network of pure association which, while uniquely 
instantiated in any moment of speaking, also serves as a kind of template, readily 
providing a rough approximation of our position in whatever language-games are in 
play. This rough approximation of our position, this “hereness” serves as a kind of 
shortcut, an efficacious starting position from which our affect-heuristics begin 
calculating our next best move. Rather than considering a “self” as some kind of 
essential kernel of our being, however, a sense-of-self is more like a piece of equipment 
that is constantly under construction, being inevitably shaped by our experiences and 
modified according to how effectively, or how felicitously we are able to deploy it. And 
despite the way in which, for instance, the pronoun “I” may invoke or instantiate for us a 
singular subject in a moment of speaking, there are likely as many inchoate senses-of-
self as there are language-games which we find ourselves habitually playing. 
Nonetheless, when considering the economic limits of the cognitive labor we perform 
during the memetic transfer, it is likely that just as a single neuron “responds robustly” 




neural associations so as to efficiently route our soliciting of them in a moment of 
registering or performing likely ensure that these senses-of-self are marshalled under as 
few “routing hubs” as possible—it may even be the case that the neurons that light up 
when we consider the pronoun “I” act in precisely the same way as Lacan’s quilting 
button, subsuming a field of “selves” under a single network of associations. For this 
reason, throughout the project at hand, I most often refer to one’s efficiently routed 
senses-of-self as a singular entity. 
In a bid to bolster my claim that sincerity (self-authentication) helps establish for 
us a sense of “hereness” or sense-of-self, I will take here a brief detour into the via 
negativa by exploring the implications of deceit. Neurological studies of deceit reveal 
that, when we lie, our prefrontal cortex, which is chiefly responsible for complex 
executive functioning (i.e. playing chess), lights up like a Christmas tree.15 It costs us 
more, in terms of cognitive resources, when we lie—it places us under so much 
cognitive-load that it takes more time to construct our utterances. Interestingly, with so 
many resources tied up in trying to craft utterances that will fly under the deceit-radar of 
our interlocutors, we allocate less resources to other areas of the brain, such as the 
amygdala, which is largely responsible for our ability to empathize.16 If feeling is 
                                                
15 In “The neurobiology of deception: evidence from neuroimaging and loss-of-function 
studies,” neurologist Nobuhito Abe refers to fMRI scans of the brains of study 
volunteers who are lying, noting that while lying, frontal regions of the brain responsible 
for executive decision making are intensely “lit up.” According to Abe, Similar studies 
have shown that patients with Parkinson’s disease, which involves frontal executive 
dysfunction, have greater difficulty in forming intentionally deceptive responses. 
16 From “Empathy and helping: effects of racial group membership and cognitive load” 




becoming, then when we register our own deceitful utterances, what exactly is getting 
“enfolded”? What are we becoming when we deceive? The answer, I believe, is not 
here. Depending on the success of our bid to deceive, we may be enfolding new 
associations into the same networks of neurons that keep track of good chess moves. We 
are becoming more strategic. We are not, however, enfolding associations that locate us, 
that potentially authorize us. Moreover, by registering utterances which are spoken in 
order to fool another, the associations we enfold into the associative trees we use to keep 
track of the other are not empathetic ones—the other, once deceived, also becomes not 
here. What we become when we deceive is dislocated. Alienated. In effect, we trade a 
stronger sense-of-self and a potential empathetic point of connection for an 
advantageous position in the language game. 
One of the most effective ways in which we misrepresent ourselves as players in 
the language game involves invoking the rhetoric of sincerity in order to patch up the 
fissures in our deceitful utterances. When composing deceitful utterances,17 we may 
attempt to manipulate “the small movements of eyebrows and contractions of facial 
muscles that serve to express emotion” in a bid to gain the assent of our audience, to 
convince them of our authenticity as speaker (Bennet 195). In other words, we may 
                                                
responding, however: The high cognitive–load condition was associated with increased 
vagal efference and reduced sympathetic output, which we interpret as increased 
attentional allocation at the expense of empathic arousal” (436). 
17 In Jill Bennett’s “A Feeling of Insincerity,” she draws from the work of Denise Riley 
to argue that we often engage in a kind of “ventriloquy of inner speech” where we 
affectively respond to an inner dialogue, attempting to deduce via our own affective 




deploy sincere-seeming memetic content as a rhetorical strategy, as an attempt to “hack” 
the authentication protocols of our audience.18 Because there is simply no way to verify 
whether a speaker’s statements are self-authorized, and because the West so readily 
condones the art of allurement, we feel more comfortable reducing our discussions of 
sincerity to rhetoric, as though sincerity exclusively belongs in the domain of 
manipulation.19 For this reason, we must take care to maintain the difference between 
sincerity (self-authentication) and the rhetoric of sincerity (the crafting of sincere-
seeming statements). This dichotomy is perhaps most famously embodied by 
Shakespeare’s Iago. Iago is a character so adept at imitating sincerity that he becomes 
the epitome of a relatively new category of person at the turn of the 17th century: the 
villain. According to Lionel Trilling, the term villain originally “referred to the man who 
stood lowest in the scale of feudal society […] who seeks to rise above the station to 
which he was born” via acts of guile and deceit (16). Iago, the only character in the First 
Folio explicitly designated as “a villain,” is Othello’s most trusted advisor. His 
performances in the play, however, are covertly deceitful—he wishes to rise in rank and 
power, and in order to do so he masterfully imitates the quality of sincerity. According to 
Beatrix Busse, Iago is a “rhetorician of politeness” who constantly employs “vocative 
                                                
18 J.L. Austin goes to great lengths to classify the various infelicities that can occur in a 
speech act. He specifically refers to instances of insincerity as “abuses,” which do not 
always manifest as misfires (18). 
19 As Bennett writes, “the discussion of sincerity has [refocused] on the semiotics of 
appearances, not just on an academic but also on a popular level.  Sincerity is readily 
understood as an effect of speech or performance, rather than something that is inhabited 




terms that refer to Othello’s ranks, both social and military and seem to be compliant 
with Iago’s social roles” in order to “add to the sincerity” he exudes (373, 365, 371). 
Iago is an early example of the kind of arms race between those who employ the rhetoric 
of sincerity for ulterior motives, and the heuristics of deceit which seek to detect such 
motives. The point is that regardless of how sophisticated one’s heuristics of deceit 
become, the more that same heuristic can be employed as a litmus test for the 
development of effectively manipulative performances. 
The dichotomy I’ve drawn here between sincerity and deceit can be thought of 
along the lines of the mimetic (when being sincere our affect-heuristics act like 
cartographers, attempting to draw a memetic map of the associations in our brain lit up 
by stimuli) vs. the strategic (when being deceitful we are like chess players attempting to 
make the most advantageous move in the language game). It is, of course, impossible to 
be entirely mimetic for several reasons. The first is that there’s simply no “outside” of a 
language-game. Even language-games that are conducive to sincerity, such as the ones 
we play when we recline on the psychologist’s couch, sit in the confession booth, write 
in our private journal, or get down on our knees to pray, have teleological structures to 
them. They are commodified, in a sense, by the end goal, whether it be to manage our 
anxieties, to rid ourselves of guilt, to cathartically narrate our experiences, or to become 
externally authorized by the divine. The second reason is that the signs we have at our 
disposal cannot possibly correspond to what gets encoded in the brain as pure 
association. In order for our “moves” to remain legible as code, they must be comprised 




cultural milieu—the memetic vocabulary we have at our disposal is, in other words, “one 
size fits many.” There are no memetic expressions capable of directly representing the 
synesthetic and uniquely inflected associations that light up across our neurological 
systems. Our affect-heuristics make do with the memes that resonate most. The third 
reason why self-mimesis is impossible is because the associations in our brains and the 
affective heuristics that “light them up” are emergent properties of the sum total of our 
registered experiences. Our affective heuristics are thus trans-temporal.20 By virtue of 
the way the brain encodes our perceptions over time into pure association, our affective 
heuristics provide near-instant indicators, though the conditions for those indications 
were built over a lifetime. We are violently compressed or stretched out when we are 
represented in narrative time. Finally, there’s no separating out the ways in which our 
heuristics are shaped by the moment of the telling. We may be any combination of 
hungry, hungover, tired, enraptured, emotionally wounded, or wired on caffeine. We are, 
in other words, not anything like an essentialized self performing an act of detached self-
reporting. We are always writing fiction. And so the strategic is always mixed up in the 
mimetic. No matter how strenuously we try to fashion in language an exact 
representation of our feelings, we are always, to a certain extent, misrepresenting 
ourselves. 
                                                
20 In his monograph Parables for the Virtual, Brian Massumi considers affect to be 
“outside expectation and adaptation, as disconnected from meaningful sequencing, from 
narration, as it is from vital function. It is narratively delocalized, spreading over the 
generalized body surface like a lateral backwash from the function-meaning interloops 




For this reason, I find value in defining sincerity as apart from simply “telling the 
truth.” By construing sincerity as an affect-mediated speech act in which the speaker and 
audience occupy the same body, we can sidestep the trap of a meaning-focused approach 
to language that fixates on the “accuracy” of our words, and instead focus on whether we 
register our own memetic expressions as bullshit—whether, in Austin’s words, we “get 
away with it” (30). This shift in emphasis also saves us from falling into the moral trap 
of vilifying deceit. Rather than consider sincerity the moral opposite of deceit, we can 
construe sincerity as an opportunity to build a more robust sense-of-self. And just as 
Jane chose to be more strategic than mimetic in declining Shawn’s marriage proposal, 
sometimes the positions we need to occupy in a particular language-game demand that 
we set aside that opportunity in order to maintain healthy relationships. 
In the fiction of Smith and Wallace, sincerity is more often than not referred to in 
its absence, as an opportunity missed out on by a character. As I will go at lengths to 
show in my subsequent chapter, sincerity is most strongly associated in the story-world 
of Infinite Jest with the language-games played by participants of the Alcoholics 
Anonymous 12-step recovery program, and the protagonist, Hal Incandenza, suffers 
from an extreme case of an emaciated sense-of-self. As the plot ends with Hal being 
wheeled away on a gurney, the reader is left with a sense of frustration over the fact that, 
instead of being given the opportunity to articulate his feelings in the context of AA, he 
accidentally attends the wrong meeting, and the opportunity is foreclosed. Similarly, 




disclose the closely guarded secrets that keep them apart—a schism which drives much 
of the novel’s plot: 
With what was left of clarity [Natalie] offered her friend a selection of 
aphorisms, axioms and proverbs the truth content of which she could only 
assume from their common circulation, the way one puts one’s faith in 
the face value of paper money. Honesty is always the best policy. Love 
conquers all. […] She spoke and Leah did not stop her, but Natalie was 
wasting her time. She was in breach of that feminine law that states no 
weakness may be shown by a woman to another woman without a 
sacrifice of equal value in return. Until Natalie paid up, in the form of a 
newly minted story, preferably intimate, hopefully secret, she wouldn’t be 
told anything in return… (398) 
In both cases, the inability for the protagonists to engage in sincere articulation is 
attributed to dominant language-games which devalue or preclude such openness. In 
NW, Smith’s reference to “that feminine law” alludes to larger cultural patterns, what she 
calls “the system of images” that alienate characters from each other and also from 
themselves throughout the novel (322). In Infinite Jest, Hal’s younger brother Mario 
notes that 
the older Mario gets, the more confused he gets about the fact that 
everyone at E.T.A. over the age of about Kent Blott finds stuff that is 




rule that real stuff can only get mentioned if everybody rolls their eyes or 
laughs in a way that isn’t happy. (592) 
Indeed, the cynicism that saturates the dominant language-games of Infinite Jest is one 
of its most striking dystopic elements, and as I argue in my next chapter, the novel 
designates it as the primary culprit for Hal’s emaciated sense-of-self. 
 One of the features, then, that mark the logic of the fiction of Smith and Wallace 
is this portrayal of hegemonic Western culture as always limiting the subject in its ability 
to express itself sincerely, position itself viably, and form healthy relationships with 
others. In Wallace’s words, 
“in dark times, the definition of good art would seem to be art that locates 
and applies CPR to those elements of what’s human and magical that still 
live and glow despite the times’ darkness. Really good fiction could have 
as dark a worldview as it wishes, but it’d find a way both to depict this 
dark world and to illuminate the possibilities for being alive and human 
in it” (McCaffery 131). 
This portrayal of the West as a dark, suffocating, disenchanting force not only further 
problematizes the question of agency by suggesting that the subject is largely bereft of 
opportunities to express itself at all within the confines of hegemonic culture, but also 
serves to position “good art” as being somehow remedial or curative—an assumption 
which, I argue, provides further evidence for the notion that authors like Smith and 
Wallace see their projects at least in part as ethical interventions. While this framing of 




literary imaginary (i.e. J.D. Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye, the poetry of the Beat 
Generation), these affect-realists are the first to figure culture as predominantly 
‘postmodern’ without also being ideologically opposed to postmodern tenets. To further 
distinguish this literature from the literature immediately preceding it then, whereas 
much postmodern literature treated the reader as a seeker of esoteric, ontological 
revelations, the logic of affect-realism renders the reader a kind of patient to be treated 
for the ailments contracted from exposure to culture. 
 
Other-Authentication and the Establishment of a Sense-of-Community 
In this schematizing of the authenticating human, I have so far largely emphasized the 
performing subject—so what happens when we witness a performance? When, as 
witnesses, we register the memetic content deployed by the performer, we autonomously 
employ a subset of affect-heuristics attuned to treating that performance as an 
authentication token.21 I posit that among the chorus of affective indicators are certain 
                                                
21 I borrow the conceit of the ‘authentication token’ from terminology surrounding the 
secure socket layer (SSL) authentication protocol of the internet. In order for a server’s 
internet traffic to be considered secure, that server’s administrator must request an SSL 
certificate from a trusted institution referred to as a certificate authority. Once the 
certificate authority issues the SSL certificate, the administrator installs it on the server 
in the form of a private encryption key, and from that point on, any web traffic coming 
from that server is encrypted using that key. When, for instance, a web browser solicits 
data from this server, the encrypted data is sent along with an authentication token for 
the client to scrutinize. The client then verifies this token of authenticity by checking 
with the same certificate authority that issued the SSL certificate to make sure the 
encrypted data is coming from a trusted source. Should the token pass scrutiny, the client 
proceeds as though the server were authentic, and this “authenticity” is most often 




“bullshit detectors” whose purpose is to determine something like the “authenticity” of 
the speaker. These heuristics indicate a degree of authority in the performer’s ability to 
represent communities in the mind of a witness. We have feelings, in other words, that 
ascribe a context-dependent level of ethos to the performer, and I refer to the feeling of 
ascribing a high level of ethos to a speaker as other-authentication (as opposed to 
sincerity, or self-authentication). 
 In order to elaborate on other-authentication, I must first establish that a “sense-
of-community” exists as a cluster of associations made about an arbitrary grouping of 
people that are registered and enfolded in idiosyncratic ways in the mind of a witness. 
By way of illustration, consider an island populated with a random assortment of human 
beings who, for the sake of argument, have no sense of any kind of community. For any 
one resident of this island, as they go about meeting and interacting with the other 
residents, they begin to form associations—associations they then use to efficiently 
classify both themselves and the other residents. At first, any one resident may group the 
other residents according to their own idiosyncratic logic. They may, for instance, 
classify residents according to the style of their clothes, the timbre of their voice, etc. 
Over time, however, certain attributes become more “important” than others, given the 
exigencies of life on the island. Let’s assume, for instance, that the main food source on 
the island is coconuts, and so it becomes important to be able to efficiently identify lithe, 
tall residents. A subset of the island’s residents soon become easily classified at a glance 
                                                
assuage the anxieties, for instance, of a user as they enter sensitive information into the 




as “tree-climbers,” and a bevy of idiosyncratic memes beyond being lithe and tall begin 
to cluster with these attributes. Let’s say, for instance, that climbing palm trees is a 
particularly dangerous task, and so it becomes beneficial for the island’s residents to 
associate bravery, strength, and selflessness with the arbitrary physical attributes of 
being lithe and tall, as a way to encourage tree-climbers to risk their lives. Indeed—it 
becomes so beneficial to the island’s residents to associate bravery, strength, and 
selflessness to the arbitrary physical attributes of litheness and tallness, that their affect-
heuristics value language-game moves that make it seem as though it were an 
ontologically based, material fact that there exists a class of residents called “tree-
climbers,” and that tree-climbers are, ontologically, brave and happy to risk their lives. 
Once enough speakers iteratively perform these kinds of statements over time, culture on 
the island begins to homogenize, such that new residents are born into a system whose 
flows of power instill in their affect-heuristics, via the iterative performance of memes, a 
sense-of-community for tree-climbers—one that has the effect of inscribing a cluster of 
attributes on the bodies of residents depending on an arbitrary feature of their skeletal 
structure. 
 This crystallization of memes on the site of a speaker’s body is, I believe, what 
Butler means by sedimentation: “The process of that sedimentation or what we might 
call materialization will be a kind of citationality, the acquisition of being through the 
citing of power” (Bodies That Matter 15). Earlier, in Gender Trouble, Butler writes: 
Consider that a sedimentation of gender norms produces the peculiar 




prevalent and compelling social fictions, and that this is a sedimentation 
that over time has produced a set of corporeal styles which, in reified 
form, appear as the natural configuration of bodies into sexes existing in 
binary relation to one another. (140) 
For Butler, this sedimentation via the iterative performance of memes over time explains 
how “power relations” come to “contour bodies” (Bodies That Matter 17). W.E.B. Du 
Bois argues along the same lines in The World and Africa: 
A system at first conscious and then unconscious of lying about history 
and distorting it to the disadvantage of the Negroids became so 
widespread that the history of Africa ceased to be taught, the color of 
Memnon was forgotten, and every effort was made in archaeology, 
history and biography, in biology, psychology, and sociology to prove the 
all but universal assumption that the color line had a scientific basis. (20) 
By associating the arbitrary feature of skin color with a cluster of memes and instilling, 
via iterative performance, those associations as a sense-of-community in the Western 
subject, the great majority of the world comes to fall beneath a color line that enables 
their violent exploitation by those who come to authenticate as “white.” As Butler 
consistently argues throughout her work, however, despite how deeply embedded in 
purportedly “empiricist” discourses like biology the prioritization of certain markers on 
the body become for classifying people, it is the very iterative nature by which our 




retrained—a process I refer to throughout this project as adjusting the protocols of 
authentication. 
 Having established the nature of a sense-of-community as a cluster of 
associations used for efficiently classifying speakers, I should note that any one 
performer is often classified by a witness as belonging to multiple communities at once. 
For a member of the white working-class, for instance, Donald Trump might 
“authenticate” as belonging to the communities of “presidents,” “business men,” and 
“reality television stars.” Further complicating this process is the fact that other-
authentication is, unlike the SSL protocol of the internet, never an “all or nothing” affair. 
When a speaker is authenticated by a listener’s affective-heuristics as belonging to a 
community, the speaker is also ascribed a level or degree of authority in representing 
that community. The affect-heuristics of a supporter of Hillary Clinton in the last 
presidential election may, for instance, ascribe a very low degree of authority to Trump 
in representing the community of “presidents.” Whereas the classical notion of ethos 
more or less amounts to the authority a speaker has to persuade the audience to their 
point of view, for my purposes here, what gets ascribed to the performer in moments of 
other-authentication is restricted to the degree of authority a speaker has to instill in their 
audience, via the enfolding of their performance, the association of new memetic content 
with the various senses-of-community into which a witness classified them in the first 
place. 
In other words, when Trump mocked the differently-abled reporter Serge 




members with whom Trump authenticated as a member of the community of 
“presidents” with a high degree of authority, that behavior, in the form of memetic 
content encoded as pure association, became associated more strongly with “presidents” 
than it did for audience members whose affect-heuristics granted him a low degree of 
authority in representing “presidents.” For audience members whose affect-heuristics 
strongly authenticate Trump as a president, Trump’s mocking behavior has been 
enfolded into the memetic warehouse available for citation for future performers who 
would attempt to authenticate as a president with these audience members. This moment 
of enfolding constitutes, for my purposes, an adjustment of the protocols of 
authentication. By “getting away with” mocking behavior as an authenticated president, 
Trump has adjusted what it takes to “pass” as president, at least with certain audience 
members. In this way, according to this model of the authenticating human, if self-
authentication (sincerity) is a growth-agent for a sense-of-self, then other-authentication 
is a growth-agent for a sense-of-community in the minds of individual audience 
members. Just as a sense-of-self is composed of pure association acquired in moments of 
registering and enfolding—association that amounts to “a way of feeling” about oneself, 
so too is a sense-of-community composed of pure association, amounting to “a way of 
feeling” about groups of people. 
 We must be careful, however, not to reduce the “witness” to the role of passive 
receiver. When in the physical presence of a performer, there exists a field of memetic 
conventions available for witnesses to cite as a way of granting assent to the performer, 




interaction, assent often takes the form of a molding of the body and the face so as to 
convey “attentiveness,” perhaps punctuated by polite acknowledgement in the form 
nodding the head, or raising an eyebrow, or issuing slight, affirming vocalizations 
appropriate to the tone adopted by the performer. In other language-games, such as a 
“political rally,” there exists in Western culture a much more bombastic range of 
memetic content available for citation in the granting of assent, such as whooping and 
hollering or frenetic applause. And with the advent of social media, new, asynchronous 
ways of granting assent present themselves, such as the clicking of the like button, or the 
sharing or “retweeting” of posts. The granting of assent, according to this model, has 
“growth-agent” effects in both the witness and performer. When participating in a 
political rally, for instance, the affect-heuristics of audience members begin to bleed 
together, amplifying and building momentum. Should a large, noisy contingent of 
audience members engage in a bombastic granting of assent, it increases the probability 
that, for other audience members, the performer will authenticate strongly, thus 
cementing any adjustments of the protocols of authentication implicit in the 
performance. For the performer registering the assent of their audience, assent functions 
to increase the probability that the memetic content deployed by the performer will be 
deployed by that performer again. More importantly for our purposes, should the 
performer be attempting to occupy a position contingent in their mind upon their 
membership in a particular community, the registering and enfolding of assent amounts 




 To tie all of this together, then, we can consider identity to be the frequency with 
which a performer is authenticated by audiences as having a high degree of authority to 
represent a community. While this community will always index a slightly different 
cluster of memetic content given the idiosyncratic nature of any one witness’s sense of 
that community, the phenomenon of sedimentation often produces enough 
homogeneity/stability for it to be reproducibly identifiable my multiple subjects. To the 
extent that a performer is able to felicitously occupy positions in language-games that 
are contingent upon being able to authenticate in a community, the performer can be said 
to possess a sense-of-belonging in that community, and this sense-of-belonging comes to 
inflect their sense-of-self. To the extent, however, that a performer either has an identity 
imposed upon them that hinders or prohibits them from occupying the language-game 
positions their feelings compel them toward, or to the extent a performer wishes to 
establish a sense-of-belonging in a community in which they largely fail to authenticate, 
we can identify potential sites of social injustice, and work toward adjusting the 
protocols of authentication.  
 
Adjusting the Protocols of Authentication 
There are any number of strategies for adjusting the protocols of authentication, and 
many of these strategies involve interventions in the broader memescape of culture, such 
as Butler’s proffering of drag in the last chapter of Gender Trouble as a way to 
destabilize gender binaries and draw attention to the phantasmatic nature of the category 




targeted at African-American children for the purpose of making “colored children 
realize that being ‘colored’ is a normal, beautiful thing” (“True Brownies”). According 
to the model I am schematizing here, the effectiveness of these interventions depends on 
the way an audience member or reader registers and enfolds new memetic associations 
with the communities represented by these performances, thus affecting the sense-of-
community the audience will then go on to use when self-authenticating or 
authenticating the performances of others. As I will demonstrate in my fourth chapter, 
however, Smith emphasizes in her work a more “bottom up” approach, emphasizing 
opportunities in our mundane, everyday interactions to “only connect” with the 
unknowable other—a connection forged via two kinds of risk taking: the risk of 
sincerely articulating something about oneself despite the inevitable and unbridgeable 
gap of understanding, and the risk of granting assent to an other with whom one might 
not agree. 
The risks involved are real. Sincere articulation often “costs” more in terms of 
the cognitive labor required to solicit and articulate one’s feelings, and often the 
investment of this labor leaves one more vulnerable to the pain of rejection. The risks 
involved in the granting of assent are even more fraught. By insisting on the layered 
nature of communication, however, the granting of assent in a bid for authentication 
does not entail something like agreeing with the locutionary content of a performer’s 
words. In fact, the whole point of granting assent in this way is to establish a sense-of-
belonging that bypasses the locutionary altogether. “Connection,” in the way I mean it 




of a sense-of-belonging in a highly localized sense-of-community (you and me). Part of 
the value of this connection lies in its potential to either arc across the gaps of power or 
highlight the places where such connections are fraught. The assent granted by one to 
another in moments of connection, then, is more or less equivalent to a decision to grant 
the most generous assumption to the other, an assumption which, at its core, is a choice 
to believe that “should I have been in the same shoes as you, experientially speaking, I 
would have turned out exactly the same as you.” In many ways, then, granting assent in 
a moment of connection potentially requires even more cognitive labor than the act of 
speaking sincerely, because it requires an act of imagination, an attempt to perform the 
calculus that solves for the x of one’s interlocutor. And of course, there’s always a risk 
that the performer will register this kind of assent as a condoning of their potentially 
unjust speech, and so in cases where a connection is made with someone whose affect-
heuristics compel them to occupy positions in language-games that exploit or 
marginalize, “connection” is merely the precondition for the difficult work of dialogue. 
It seems to me, however, that the “curative” value of a propensity or openness to 
connection would be short-circuited by an expectation of reciprocity on the part of the 
other. The moment the investment of cognitive labor required of being sincere and 
granting assent is registered as a “courtesy” that ought to be returned in kind, it ceases to 
be about trying to forge an uncanny connection and becomes something like the 
enforcement of “civility,” and civility is often a tool of empire, a way of insisting upon 
the marginalization or erasure of someone else’s way of being in the world via “polite” 




for connection is always the mundane. It would seem like a misapplication of this ethic, 
for instance, to grant assent to someone like Trump at a political rally in hopes that a 
connection will be made, or to suggest that having a sincere conversation with Roger 
Ailes would be better than firing him for sexual harassment, or to critique members of 
the Black Lives Matter campaign for not sitting down and being nice to more white 
people. Instead, the effectiveness of connection in adjusting the protocols of 
authentication seems to lie in the ubiquity of the mundane, in the everyday work of 
offering oneself up as a singular human being to be idiosyncratically registered and 
enfolded by the other, and of granting to the unknowable other the most generous 
assumption, in hopes that by establishing a feeling of belonging, we will open new 
avenues for becoming. 
 
Toward an Affect-Mediated Dialectic of Becoming 
The authenticating human attempts to take seriously Butler’s declaration in Senses of the 
Subject that “the senses are primary and [we] feel things, undergo impressions, prior to 
forming any thoughts, including any thoughts we might have about ourselves” (2). I 
have attempted to respond to her call “to discern how the subject is initially animated by 
what affects it and how these transitive processes are reiterated in the animated life that 
follows” (4). I have done so, however, with the parallel agenda of presuming the merit of 
the respective prescriptions of Wallace and Smith to “be sincere” and “only connect,” 
and for this reason I have foregrounded the phenomenon of authentication as an affect-




“vetting” ultimately determines how strongly we enfold certain associations about 
ourselves (self-authentication) and about other people (other-authentication) into the 
“pure association” of the topologically configured neuro-synaptic networks of our 
singular brains. We can consider, then, that this enfolding is how we become, and we can 
consider the two “poles” of this becoming (associations we make about ourselves and 
associations we make about others) as components for a dialectic whose end result is a 
suturing of our sense-of-self onto a sense-of-community, a suturing best thought of as a 
sense-of-belonging. As I argue in my introduction, while Wallace’s fiction makes a 
strong case for the crucial role a sense-of-self plays in our ability to locate ourselves in 
language-games, this amounts to only one pole of the dialectic I schematize here. 
Smith’s work constitutes, then, a much more comprehensive imagining of the dialectic 
of becoming for the authenticating human, and for this reason I have relegated further 
elaboration on this dialectic, including a discussion of how it fits more comfortably 
within a Deleuzian rather than Hegelian philosophical framework, to the fourth chapter 
of this project. 
 Indeed, I hope to show the kind of interpretive work this model of the 
authenticating human can do for us in reading Wallace and Smith in the chapters that 
follow, thus intervening in the scholarship surrounding these authors to situate them as 
forerunners, as participating in the “in-breaking” of the affective turn in literature in the 
way they attempt to “make room” for affect via the character-function in literature. 
Beyond this, I believe the authenticating human to be useful as equipment for reading 




postures. We might use this model, for instance, to explore Du Bois’ conception of 
“double-consciousness” by considering the “vast veil” of the color-line as the collective 
protocols of authentication enforced by the white communities of the Jim Crow South 
(Souls of Black Folk 3). When speaking of the black youth in these communities, Du 
Bois notes how 
their youth shrunk into tasteless sycophancy, or into silent hatred of the 
pale world about them and mocking distrust of everything white; or 
wasted itself in a bitter cry, Why did God make me an outcast and a 
stranger in mine own house? The shades of the prison-house closed round 
about us all: walls strait and stubborn to the whitest, but relentlessly 
narrow, tall, and unscalable to sons of night who must plod darkly on in 
resignation, or beat unavailing palms against the stone, or steadily, half 
hopelessly, watch the streak of blue above. (3) 
By conceiving of the walls that are “strait and stubborn” to white people yet “relentlessly 
narrow, tall, and unscalable” to the black community as the memetic field of associations 
that comprise the sense-of-community corresponding to “good American citizen,” we 
can argue that the true “site” of these barriers lies in the feelings of white people—
feelings that are trained and sedimented via the iterative performance of memes made 
efficient over time for the purpose of exploiting black labor. We can also point out how, 
insidiously, these same memes are registered and enfolded by the very people they have 
evolved to exploit, thus producing similar feelings in black people about themselves, a 




writes that “the history of the American Negro is the history of this strife,–this longing to 
attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self” (3). 
In the terms provided by this model, the dialectic that places a black sense-of-self in 
tension with the white sense-of-community precludes this merging, this suturing of a 
sense-of-self onto a sense-of-belonging. In light of this, the onus for creating a more just 
society lies with white people who must attend to the kinds of memetic content they are 
willing to cite when attempting to authenticate as “good American citizens,” and to the 
kinds of people to which they are willing to grant assent. 
 This model also, however, problematizes words like “willing.” To be willing to 
do something, according to this model, is to already possess strong feelings that indicate 
in the direction of that behavior. Assuming, then, that the recent election of Donald 
Trump in the United States and the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom is in part a 
reaction of the white working class who feels increasingly unable to authenticate in the 
ways they are accustomed, an opportunity for adjusting the protocols of authentication 
for that community presents itself. We might conceive of an intervention in the cultural 
memescape not unlike the aforementioned projects of Butler and Du Bois, but which 
targets the white working class for the purpose of portraying them authenticating as 
“good Americans” without having to define themselves in contrast with communities of 
color. Such a project would have to take careful inventory of the authenticating memes 
often cited in white working-class communities, and to creatively imagine alternatives 
for the subset of memes, like the Confederate Battle Flag of the South, which have 




such a project would entirely depend on the degree to which working class audience 
members are iteratively exposed to this imagining (thus informing the kind of medium 
appropriate for such an intervention), as well as the degree to which they are able to 
authenticate its protagonists as indeed members of the white working class. Such a 
project, then, calls for creative work like that of Smith and Wallace in that it must pass 
beyond critique and into the realm of imagining new worlds. 
 Setting aside for the moment the parameters of such a project, I should point out 
that it is difficult to distinguish such a targeted cultural intervention from other kinds of 
political interventions more commonly referred to as “propaganda.” Indeed, meddling in 
the memescape with the intention of shaping feelings is precisely the accusation levelled 
by the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence against the Putin 
administration of Russia, which is reported to have carried out a massive social media 
campaign to influence white working-class Americans to vote for Trump.22 What are the 
ethics of such interventions? It is perhaps precisely for the purpose of sidestepping issues 
like this that Smith implies the domain for “only connecting” be most appropriately 
considered the everyday mundane. This posture on Smith’s part amounts to a bottom-up 
model for cultural intervention—a “trickle-up economics” for memes. Given these 
ethical concerns, it would seem that such a project would only be viable given the 
participation of (or even better, ownership by) actual members of the white working 
class. Regardless of the feasibility of such a project, my point is to illustrate how more 
                                                
22 The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has made its findings on this matter 




affect-centered models of subjectivity might inform our reading and responding to issues 
of social injustice. 
 On a closing note, it seems appropriate to point out that the authenticating human 
is, like all of culture, a field of memetic content which is made efficient at doing certain 
work. There are limits to a model which insists on the value of speaking sincerely and 
connecting with others, particularly for those whose speech is frequently labelled 
subversive, dangerous, and “unpatriotic,” and whose attempts to connect are met with 
discomfort, fear, and often hatred. I will be exploring those limits in greater detail in the 
third and concluding chapters of this project. While I have attempted to show how such a 
model might be useful in reading and responding to issues of social injustice, I am wary 
of its (mis)use as a justification for elevating sincerity and connection to the level of 
virtue in service of the policing of civility. And like all models of subjectivity, it risks 
rhetorically installing itself (particularly given its neurological trappings) as a universal 
subject, which as Gayatri Spivak makes clear in “Can the subaltern speak?”, undermines 
Derrida’s own prescription to render delirious “that interior voice that is the voice of the 
other in us” (308). Thus, I must be adamant in insisting that if the authenticating human 
describes something like a dialectic of becoming, it does so primarily as a way of 
explaining how it might be possible for Wallace’s and Smith’s respective prescriptions 
to “be sincere” and “only connect” to be considered efficaciously curative. For this 
reason, if the piece of equipment I have built in this chapter proves useful, I hope its use 
remains primarily restricted to providing a compelling reading of Smith and Wallace, 




arguments about periodization, or perhaps as a pedagogical tool for exploring the 
implications for the Western literary subject on the eve of the affective turn.
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CHAPTER III  
BE SINCERE: HAL INCANDENZA AND THE MYSTERIOUS CASE OF THE 
DISAPPEARING SELF IN DAVID FOSTER WALLACE’S INFINITE JEST  
 
I argue here that David Foster Wallace wrote Infinite Jest with the purpose, in part, of 
diagnosing and treating an ailment afflicting the Western subject at the turn of the 
millennium, an ailment that engenders feelings of abstraction, isolation, paralysis, and 
meaninglessness, and one whose etiology is prolonged exposure to dominant cultural 
language-games Wallace figures as postmodern. The treatment for this ailment, 
according to the logic of the novel, is the playing of language-games that privilege 
sincerity. These claims about the text are largely consonant with scholarship by Marshall 
Boswell, Adam Kelly, Lee Konstantinou, Nicoline Timmer, and others, and such claims 
are typically employed by these scholars in the service of periodizing Wallace’s fiction 
as coming ‘after’ postmodernism. While the project at hand certainly participates in this 
discussion, it distinguishes itself by being most interested in the kind of subject assumed 
by these claims about the dangers of postmodern irony and the curative value of 
sincerity, arguing that such a subject is radically affect-centered. As such, rather than 
considering Infinite Jest as “post-postmodern” the way Boswell does, or as characterized 
by “New Sincerity” as Kelly does, this chapter figures the novel as participating in a 
broader literary trend at the turn of the millennium which seeks to “make room for 
affect” in the stylistics of postmodernism. 




the authenticating human, which I schematize in the previous chapter. Employing the 
authenticating human as a piece of equipment, I argue that in order to account for 
postmodern irony as an affliction (and sincerity as that affliction’s cure), its “site of 
attack” is best considered the subject’s sense(s)-of-self. In the broader context of my 
dissertation, then, this chapter serves to establish the subject’s sense(s)-of-self as but one 
pole in a larger dialectic of becoming—the second pole of this dialectic being the 
subject’s sense(s)-of-belonging, which I explore in my subsequent chapter on the fiction 
of Zadie Smith. Taken together, then, this project not only proffers the fiction of Wallace 
and Smith as exemplary of what I refer to as the affect-realism after postmodernism, but 
also attempts to synthesize their respective prescriptions to “be sincere” and “only 
connect” as an “ethics of authentication” particularly suited to aiding the subject of the 
neoliberal West. 
There is a preponderance of evidence to suggest that Wallace indeed had designs 
on diagnosing and treating Western culture in the writing of Infinite Jest. In a letter 
Wallace wrote to Don DeLillo in 1992, he confesses that DeLillo’s books “inform my 
heart and my work, inspire me in the very best sense of ‘inspire’” (Letter). It is likely 
that one of the ways in which DeLillo’s work informs Wallace’s is in the cultural 
analytic focus of much of DeLillo’s work.23 Indeed, DeLillo is often credited with 
crafting fictional worlds that foretell of cultural phenomena before they actually occur—
Wallace himself refers to DeLillo as a “true prophet” (“E Unibus” 169), and DeLillo’s 
                                                
23 See, for instance, Jayne Anne Phillips’ 1985 review of White Noise where she writes 




reputation as prophet continues unabated.24 Within the same letter Wallace writes to 
DeLillo, Wallace goes on to confess that he did not love Libra: “I read it in galleys when 
I was trying to do some fiction-work of my own in the transfiguration of real U.S. fact 
and myth, and jealousy kept me from being able to love Libra, and I’ve been afraid to 
reread it.” Given that Libra was published in 1988, there is a decent chance that the “real 
U.S. fact and myth” Wallace was working on was indeed some incipient form of Infinite 
Jest. When asked by Boswell when he’d started working on the novel, Wallace replied 
“It doesn’t work like that for me. I started IJ or somethin’ like it several times. 
’86,’88,’89. None of it worked or was alive. And then in ’91–’92 all of a sudden it did” 
(qtd in Max 318). If Wallace felt something like jealousy toward DeLillo in the late 
‘80’s over the foundering state of Infinite Jest, it is interesting to consider that the timing 
for when Wallace’s novel is jolted to life coincides was his foray into cultural analysis in 
the form of his now infamous essay, “E Unibus Plurum: Television and U.S. Fiction,” 
published in the Summer 1993 edition of Review of Contemporary Ficition alongside an 
interview with Wallace conducted by Larry McCaffery. 
Indeed, much has been made of the connection between “E Unibus Plurum,” the 
                                                
24 In Michiko Kakutani’s 2007 review of DeLillo’s Falling Man, she claims that “no 
writer has been as prescient and eerily prophetic about 21st-century America,” at least in 
part due to the way DeLillo “managed to anticipate the shock and horror of Sept. 11” via 
White Noise. Cornel Bonca helps to reify DeLillo-as-prophet in his revisiting of 
Cosmopolis in the LA Review of Books nearly a decade after its publication: “Re-
reading Cosmopolis now, however, in the light of David Cronenberg’s new film 
adaptation, and given the context of the 2007 global economic meltdown and the 
Occupy Movement that followed, it appears to me that Don DeLillo has once again 
taken on the mantle of the artist-prophet.” For more on DeLillo as prophet, see 




McCaffery interview, and Infinite Jest. As Adam Kelly notes, the first two critical 
monographs on Wallace’s work (Boswell’s Understanding David Foster Wallace and 
Stephen Burn’s Infinite Jest, A Reader’s Guide) both privilege what Kelly terms “the 
essay-interview nexus” as a kind of skeleton key for unlocking Infinite Jest, and much 
subsequent scholarship has continued in this vein (“Death of the Author”). While I 
would like to avoid centering Wallace’s essay and interview from 1993 in my own 
reading of Infinite Jest, I nonetheless feel that a few details from “E Unibus Plurum” are 
relevant for teasing out the kind of subject the novel assumes. These details appear 
within the context of a rather meandering argument in which Wallace claims that 
television is a particular kind of cultural technology that has evolved to become efficient 
at being “malignantly addictive” for its viewers, and the effects of the average six hour 
daily dose of television are that it creates difficulties for “relationships, communities, 
and the addict’s very sense of their self” (163). He suggests that postmodern literature 
often ironically invokes the “pop images” disseminated by television in order to “make 
the familiar strange,” a strategy he believes is intended to critique television, to “restore 
what’s (mis)taken for ‘real’ to three whole dimensions” (172-173). He goes on to argue, 
however, that he finds this strategy misguided, as television has “beaten the imagists to 
the punch” by “absorbing, homogenizing, and re-presenting the very cynical postmodern 
aesthetic that was once the best alternative to the appeal of low, over-easy, mass-
marketed narrative” (173). He finds irony, in other words, to be a dead-end when it 
comes to resisting the effects of television, given that television has already appropriated 




might well emerge as some weird bunch of ‘aint-rebels,’ born oglers who dare to back 
away from ironic watching,” who would be “outdated” because they are “too sincere” 
(192-193). “E Unibus Plurum” is Wallace’s first attempt, in other words, to position 
sincerity as a therapeutic intervention intended to treat certain maladies arising from the 
postmodern condition. 
One of the essay’s assumptions relevant to my project is that “television 
somehow trains or conditions our viewership” in that our experience of it “inform[s] our 
deepest responses to what’s watched” (164). He argues that high dosages of daily TV 
watching overdetermines the “system of conflicting whispers” within “an average, 
workable brain.” This assumption about the constitution of the subject renders it 
radically susceptible to mundane, everyday activity like watching TV. The 
authenticating human accounts for this radical susceptibility by considering the subject’s 
feelings to be agentive—they are like autonomic, magnetic forces pulling the subject in 
the direction of certain language-game moves. These feelings are like “the system of 
conflicting whispers” to which Wallace refers. Those feelings are also trained by virtue 
of the way the subject is always registering and enfolding mundane experience (like 
watching a commercial on TV). The “memes” or memetic content comprising these 
experiences, when registered by the subject, become enfolded as pure association into 
the same neuro-synaptic networks solicited to produce those feelings in the first place. In 
this way, the subject is always becoming, even while watching reruns.  
As a final note on “E Unibus Pluram,” I wanted to point out some of Wallace’s 




argument about the homogenizing effects of television, Wallace notes that of “new 
importance” for post-WWII “mass commercial culture” is that “Americans seemed no 
longer united so much by common feelings as by common images” (166). While I’m not 
entirely sure when the U.S. was “united by common feelings,” it is interesting that, for 
Wallace, exposure to common images does not necessarily give rise to common 
feelings. While television has certainly has a homogenizing effect in terms of the field of 
memetic content made available to the subject for citation, he implicitly maintains the 
power of our singular experiences of the world to guarantee that the feelings evoked by a 
given image will remain uniquely inflected. The persistence of singularity in the face of 
a somewhat homogeneous flow of televisual images helps explain why he feels the 
ironic citation of the pop image in literature is ultimately a dead end for his purposes. 
The problem, for Wallace, is not that the pop image needs to be revealed as such by 
making the familiar strange—this effect is already built-in to a postmodern culture in 
which an image can be granted new currency by qualifying it with the knowing and 
mischievous wink of irony. The problem is that the pop image is by nature “one size fits 
many,” and therefore its expression, regardless of how qualified by irony, will be largely 
ineffective at representing rich and uniquely inflected affective responses. For Wallace, 
then, sincerity indexes the gulf between what the pop image is efficient at conveying and 
what the subject actually feels. Contrary to claims that Wallace is somehow interested in 
returning to a moment before postmodernism, I would argue that modernism’s concern 
with how we come to know the world fetishizes a different gulf: the gulf between images 




Wallace is suggesting that the mimetic project of literature becomes less about 
accurately representing the world and more about accurately representing how the world 
makes us feel. Given these assumptions about the subject, then, the meat of this chapter 
is an attempt to read Infinite Jest for a more thorough working-out of how he believes 
Western culture’s infatuation with irony at the turn of the millennium leads to problems 
with human relationships and an emaciated sense-of-self, and how he sees playing 
language-games that privilege sincerity as serving a therapeutic function for these 
ailments. Before moving into this reading, however, given sincerity’s importance for my 
reading of Wallace, it behooves me provide a brief genealogy for the term. 
Like all words, sincerity is subjected to the evolutionary nature of memes—our 
use of the term changes over time so as to be well-adapted to its context. Most 
discussions of sincerity in the humanities cite Lionel Trilling, who states that sincerity, 
“as we now use it,” means a “congruence between avowal and actual feeling” (Trilling 
2). For Trilling, sincerity is best articulated by Shakespeare’s Polonius, who exhorts his 
audience to be true to one’s own self such that one cannot then be false to any man. For 
scholars in the humanities after the heyday of postmodernism, it is untrendy indeed to 
consider being “true to one’s own self” a virtue, given that having a discernable self at 
all is a fantasy that underwrites the Western worldview and its attendant structures of 
power. Authors like David McNeill, for instance, tell us that “the concept [of sincerity] 
seems of little use in a world in which Cartesian assumptions concerning the subject 
have well and truly passed their use-by date. Postmodernism’s decade-long 




lexical rubbish bin, and ‘sincerity’ appears a fine candidate for such treatment” (McNeill 
157). Given that sincerity has been “tainted with essentialism,” most recent scholarship 
dealing with sincerity has qualified the term by relegating it to the rhetorical domain as 
merely another technique in the art of persuasion. 
Consider Susan B. Rosenbaum, whose monograph Professing Sincerity begins 
not by defining sincerity as such, but by defining the rhetoric of sincerity as “the range 
of expressive conventions used to mark the voice, figure, and experience of the first-
person speaker as that of the author, including claims to originality, spontaneity, 
authenticity, artlessness, and immediacy” (2). Right out of the gate, for Rosenbaum, 
sincerity is the parlor trick by which a performer attempts to cash-in on the fallacy of 
logocentrism by participating in “the self-interested performances of a profit-driven 
society” (4). The subtitle for R. Jay Magill, Jr.’s monograph Sincerity declares that 
sincerity inspires “the curious notion that we all have something to say (no matter how 
dull).” Magill’s definition for the term is “confronting one’s innermost thoughts or 
emotions and relaying them to others straightforwardly, no matter how relevant to the 
topic, injurious to one’s own reputation, or embarrassing—or however correct or 
incorrect” (13). Despite Magill’s admission that sincerity can sometimes “inspire human 
beings to lessen the pain of others” and provide “a counterweight to some constant 
political or consumerist values” such as “domination, deception, envy, [and] greed,” he 
finds “unvaryingly sincere people” to be “the most annoying” (225-227). Perhaps it is 
precisely the imperiled state of sincerity that Wallace is referring to when he claims that 




 There are various competing etymologies for the term sincerity. Perhaps the most 
widely cited (and most frequently disputed) etymology considers sincerity to be derived 
from the Latin words sine cera (without wax). Magill recounts the tale of Roman 
merchants who used sine cera to advertise the quality of raw marble or marble 
sculptures, as “lesser-quality marble contained cracks that were patched with wax to 
disguise natural impurities” and deceitful sculptors used wax to hide mistakes (29). 
Magill is quick to refer to the OED, however, which argues the improbability of this 
origin. Perhaps Trilling’s own denouncement of this etymology as “merely fanciful” is 
due to the same reason (Trilling 12). Nevertheless, both Magill and Trilling agree that, 
regardless of its origin, the term originally referred “to things rather than to persons,” 
and more specifically to the pure, untainted, homogenous, or integral quality of a 
product (Trilling 12). Given the improbability of the sine cera origin of sincerity, why 
does the etymology show up so frequently in discourse surrounding the term? Magill 
includes this unlikely etymology because “it is a great story” (29). What makes it so 
great? 
I believe there is something particularly haunting about the image of a marble 
statue, perhaps a mimetic representation of the human being, whose cracks and 
imperfections are convincingly hidden by the skillful application of wax as a response to 
the profit-making pressures of the marketplace. The marble statue of a human being 
covertly patched by wax serves as a kind of distilled metaphor for the ways in which the 
total field of our affect-heuristics in any given moment of registering the world around 




by the pressures of the language-game. The metaphor brings to mind the fast-paced 
bustle surrounding an open-air market stall, the high stakes placed on one’s ability to 
occupy the positions of the astute buyer and the shrewd seller, as well as the pressure to 
see through what may be the manipulative performances of others. Perhaps the Roman 
marketplace becomes, in the imagination of those contemplating the origin of the term 
sincerity, the birthplace of a kind of fetish for encounters with the other that do not 
require the expenditure of so much angst. According to the tale told by Magill, the 
practice of hiding imperfections with wax became so prevalent that the Roman Senate 
“passed a law declaring that any marble bought by the government be flawless and 
therefore sine cera” (29). While this fabled origin for the term sincerity is unlikely, I 
believe that the Roman law which insists on the purity of its government’s purchased 
commodities fulfills a function similar to the function the term sincerity eventually came 
to fulfill during the Reformation, a time characterized by the new ascendancy of 
capitalism in the wake of the waning of feudalism. 
  The waning of feudalism gave rise to new anxieties surrounding the protocols of 
authentication. Whereas feudal English sumptuary laws attempted to reify, via one’s 
physical appearance, the “partitioning of society into precise social categories to which 
legislators assigned specific articles of clothing and jewelry defined according to kind, 
number, and value,” the decline of these laws opened up new possibilities for people to 
misrepresent their positioning (Muzzarelli 600). How do you determine a speaker’s level 
of authority when you can no longer trust in the authenticating protocol of dress? 




and purgatory often adopted rhetorical strategies which characterized Catholic priests as 
deceivers who, while appearing to be channels of the divine, were in reality interested in 
wealth and power.25 How can you determine your metaphysical standing when you can 
no longer trust in the authenticating assent of the Catholic clergy? By the 16th century, 
England became “preoccupied to an extreme degree with dissimulation, feigning, and 
pretence” (Trilling 13). An argument can be made that the reason behind this 
preoccupation, wherein “so many values [were replaced] with the one supreme value of 
sincerity” (Roberts 553), is that people no longer knew where to put their trust. It may 
be, in other words, that tectonic cultural shifts, especially those that undermine existing 
protocols of authentication, give rise to a fascination with sincerity. 
 It may be plausible, then, to consider the West at the end of the millennium to be 
                                                
25 Martin Luther, for instance, railed against those that committed “barefaced robbery, 
trickery, and tyranny appropriate to the nether regions” (qtd. in Magill 32). Luther was 
referring to various popes such as Pope Innocent VIII who “fathered sixteen illegitimate 
children, sold Church offices, bribed cardinals,” and “established a Vatican bank for the 
sale of pardons” (Magill 32). William Tyndale’s autobiographical work, The Obedience 
of a Christian Man, drips with vitriol for Catholic clergymen who “a thousand things 
forbid … which Christ made free; and dispense with them again for money” (18). 
Perhaps motivated by the persecution Tyndale suffered for promoting his translation of 
the Bible (the first English translation from the original Greek and Hebrew), he accuses 
the clergy of what amounts to deceit: “They will not let the lay-man have the word of 
God in his mother tongue, yet let the priests have it; which for a great part of them do 
understand no Latin at all, but sing, and say, and patter all day, with the lips only, that 
which the heart understandeth not” (17). More interestingly, however, the Reformation 
“heuristics of deceit” began to associate with these foibles a set of memes, especially 
those which may have originally become “fit for use” for conveying awe and grandeur. 
William Tyndale rails against the Catholic “conjuring” of “churches, chapels, altars, 
super-altars, chalice, vestments, […] bell, candlestick, organs, chalice, vestments, copes, 
altar-cloths, surplices, towels, basins, ewers, ship, censer, and all manner [of] ornament” 
(92). The gilded attire of Catholic priests who “in three or four years shall […] in those 




in a crisis of authentication similar to the one experienced by English subjects during the 
Reformation. In the dystopic world of Infinite Jest, the lines of the nation-state have 
been coopted and blurred via corporate merger. Nations have been “incorporated” under 
ONAN, a rather masturbatory acronym for the Organization of North American Nations, 
and even time itself has become subsidized—each calendar year is “sponsored by” a 
consumerist product, such that much of the novel’s plot unfolds during the “Year of the 
Depend Adult Undergarment.” These grim yet comedic elements make it clear the 
dystopia is intended to function as a parody of the neoliberal impulse to commodify 
everything. This impulse is largely figured as a deterritorializing force in its undermining 
of national and temporal boundaries. In a disturbingly prescient way, the novel also 
features a “pissed-off American electorate” who, in “a spasm of panicked rage,” elected 
a television star (Johnny Gentle) to the nation’s highest office (382). My point here is to 
suggest that the novel is parodying feelings of fear and unease in response to the 
destabilizing wiles of the free-market, and to further suggest that we can read both the 
English Reformation and the neoliberal West as a time when those same wiles reach 
deep into authenticating cultural infrastructures, causing widespread anxieties and a 
fetishization, in turn, of sincerity. In this way, then, perhaps Wallace’s work constitutes 
less of a “New Sincerity” and more of an “Old Anxiety,” and for this reason I find it 
compelling to decenter his work in efforts to look for a literary shift at the turn of the 
millennium—a decentering I attempt to effect by reading his work in relation to Smith’s 





Despite Wallace’s contempt for much of the cultural manifestations of 
postmodernism, he leans heavily in his writing craft on postmodern aesthetic 
sensibilities—the narrative structure of the novel is fragmented and scattered such that 
the narrator hops in time and space with every scene. There is nonetheless an identifiable 
nexus of plots and characters, and the Incandenza family occupies center stage. The 
youngest of the three sons of Avril and James Incandenza is Mario, who attends the 
Enfield Tennis Academy along with his older brother Hal (the oldest brother Orin has 
already graduated and is playing college football). Unlike the rest of the characters in the 
novel who are adept at playing the sardonic language-games of postmodernism, Mario’s 
sensibilities are attuned differently: 
The older Mario gets, the more confused he gets about the fact that 
everyone at E.T.A. over the age of about Kent Blott finds stuff that is 
really real uncomfortable and they get embarrassed. It’s like there’s some 
rule that real stuff can only get mentioned if everybody rolls their eyes or 
laughs in a way that isn’t happy. (592) 
Mario’s sensibilities, in other words, allow the reader to categorize postmodern cynicism 
alongside the other dystopic elements in the novel. Suddenly bereft of clear national 
boundaries, of the explicit sequencing of time, and of affirming ways to express oneself, 
Wallace’s characters find themselves in a crisis of authentication—the protocols by 
which they anchor and evaluate themselves are in dire need of renegotiation. 
This sentiment is perhaps expressed most explicitly in the novel by Rémy 




group called “the Wheelchair Assassins” who engages in dark political intrigue 
alongside his enemy and comrade, Hugh Steeply, an Agent for O.N.A.N.’s Office of 
Unspecified Services. In one of his many secretive conversations with Steeply, Marathe 
ruminates on the special brand of “freedom” espoused by global neoliberal capital: 
No one tells your precious individual U.S.A. selves what they must do. It 
is this meaning only, this freedom from constraint and forced duress. […] 
But what of the freedom-to? Not just free-from. […] How for the person 
to freely choose? How to choose any but a child’s greedy choices if there 
is no loving-filled father to guide, inform, teach the person how to 
choose? (320) 
Marathe here identifies, if in rather patriarchal, anthropomorphic terms, the absence of 
traditionally relied-upon protocols of authentication. It seems that, for Wallace, 
postmodernism’s default posture of incredulity toward metanarratives has chased the 
“loving-filled father” out of the room, and corporations have seized upon the opportunity 
to cash-in on America’s inability to resist the allure of “a child’s greedy choices.” One of 
the ways, then, to periodize Infinite Jest, and particularly Wallace’s emphasis on 
sincerity in the novel, is to find a parallel in terms of a crisis of authentication in the 
Early Modern period: when the ideological underpinnings of a culture’s protocols of 
authentication are under attack, subjects who would otherwise find themselves 
automatically relying upon those protocols begin to feel anxious about how to 





 Having now situated Infinite Jest within my understanding of Wallace’s 
ambitions for the novel as being in-line with the tradition of authors like DeLillo who 
seek to use literature as a way to perform cultural analysis, within Wallace’s early 
assumptions about the subject as they manifest in “E Unibus Plurum,” and within the 
larger historical context of the West’s tendency to respond to crises of authentication by 
recourse to the notion of sincerity, I turn my attention to the main goal of this chapter, 
which is to employ the authenticating human as a piece of equipment for tracing “what 
happens” to Hal Incandenza and Joelle Van Dyne—protagonists whose function in the 
novel, according to my reading, is to show the difference sincerity can make with regard 
to the health of the subject within the context of postmodern culture. Of the two 
protagonists, Wallace allocates the most narrative space to Hal. 
 Despite the emphasis placed on Hal throughout the novel, it becomes 
frustratingly difficult, given the leaps in time and perspective, to reassemble a cogent 
narrative about what happens to him. In what follows, however, I will treat the very 
opening scene of the novel as a jumping-off point, as it presents to the reader a curious 
mystery about Hal which is never explicitly resolved in the text. We find Hal, who will 
soon be going to college, being interviewed by an admissions committee at Arizona 
State University. While the committee is highly impressed with Hal’s athletic prowess, 
and feels motivated to find a way to admit him on a tennis scholarship, there are some 
issues with his application portfolio. Most distressing is the incongruity between the 




charts,26 and the scores he received on his standardized tests, which were “quite a bit 
closer to zero than [the committee is] comfortable with” (6). The committee’s suspicion 
is that Hal is a kind of idiot savant, a tennis genius who is otherwise incapable of 
performing academically, and that his mother, who is the director of the Enfield Tennis 
Academy, has doctored Hal’s transcript and purchased falsified admissions essays. 
Throughout the interview, Hal is asked repeatedly by the committee to explain himself. 
As the admissions interview continues, however, Hal remains silent, despite the 
increasingly insistent solicitations of the committee for him to speak. This is in part due 
to the coaching Hal has received—Hal has been advised to avoid speaking at all if 
possible, and “people have promised to get [Hal] through this” (8). Indeed, Hal’s uncle 
(C.T. deLint) is present in the room, and attempts to speak on Hal’s behalf, acting in the 
role as the Enfield Tennis Academy’s varsity tennis coach and Prorector. However, the 
true reason for Hal’s silence, for why deLint is having to speak on his behalf, is because 
Hal is suffering from a mysterious ailment, an ailment that renders all of his 
communicative performances not only entirely unintelligible but in fact disturbing to 
behold. Hal “compose[s] what [he] project[s] will be seen as a smile,” and what the 
committee perceives is a grimace, prompting them to ask, “Is he in pain? Are you in 
pain, son?” (5). DeLint, in his role as intercessor and salesman, responds accordingly: 
“‘Hal’s right as rain,’ smiles [his] uncle, soothing the air with a casual hand” (5). Tiring 
of deLint’s intercessions on Hal’s behalf, the committee asks deLint to leave the room, 
                                                
26 As the Director of Composition puts it, “Most institutions do not even have grades of 




at which point Hal is directly confronted and asked to give an account of himself. 
When Hal attempts to respond, the committee is horrified by “the sounds he 
made” which are registered as “subanimalistic noises.” Hal’s physical gestures are 
registered by the committee as being like “a stick of butter being hit with a mallet” or a 
“writhing animal with a knife it its eye” (14). The committee reacts strongly to Hal’s 
unexplainable behavior, and he is “pinioned from behind by the Director of 
Comp[osition]” and wrestled to the floor (12). He is held until an ambulance can arrive, 
and is then taken to a hospital where he can ostensibly find professional help for his 
ailment. Strangely, however, the narrator provides us, in the form of perfectly legible 
dialogue, with what Hal has purportedly said. Portions of Hal’s response bear close 
scrutiny: 
“My applications’s not bought,” I am telling them… “I am not just a boy 
who plays tennis. I have an intricate history. Experiences and feelings. 
I’m complex.” … “I’m not a machine. I feel and believe.” … “I’m not 
just a creātus, manufactured, conditioned, bred for a function.” … “Please 
don’t think I don’t care.” (11-12) 
Throughout his speech, Hal is responding to a failure to authenticate as anything beyond 
“just a boy who plays tennis.” He seems aware, in other words, of the committee’s 
misidentification of him as something not quite human, as a forgery of a human being 
crafted for manipulative purposes. For Hal, to be human is to be complex, to have 
agency, to have feelings, to believe in things, to care. Yet in this room, he is reduced to a 




on the tennis court for a scholarship) to occur without his interference. The exchange, 
however, has broken down. Hal can no longer passively assume the role of the marble 
statue in the Roman marketplace—the wax has been spotted, his flaws have been 
revealed. He has been asked to speak for himself-as-commodity. Unfortunately, Hal’s 
ailment, which can be thought of as an involuntary incongruence between avowal and 
actual feeling, precludes him from doing so. 
 Curiously, this opening scene occurs, chronologically speaking, as the very last 
event in the complex and interwoven teleology of Wallace’s mammoth text. As the 
curtain closes on this teleology and thus our knowledge of “what happens to Hal,” the 
last event available to us in the plot is Hal being wheeled away on a gurney. Squirreled 
away within the narration of this last event is the foretelling of an inevitable future event, 
one which only occurs hypothetically within the text: “It will start in the E.R., at the 
intake desk if C.T.’s late in following the ambulance, or in the green-tiled room after the 
room with the invasive-digital machines; or, given this special M.D.-supplied 
ambulance, maybe on the ride itself…” (17, emphasis mine). Wallace refuses to be 
explicit about what it is that will be starting. Our best clue as to the nature of this 
foretold event is given at the very end of the scene: 
It will be someone blue-collar and unlicensed, though, inevitably—a 
nurse’s aide with quick-bit nails, a hospital security guy, a tired Cuban 
orderly who addresses [Hal] as jou—who will, looking down in the 
middle of some kind of bustled task, catch what he sees as [his] eye and 




What is the significance of this foretold event, which will presumably be Hal’s response, 
in the form of a narrative, about what happened to him? Do we write it off as a kind of 
metafictional ploy, an announcement at the beginning of the novel that what follows is 
precisely Hal’s story, a ploy which structures the narrative, in high postmodern style, as 
a Möbius strip? If so, then what becomes conspicuous about the rest of the novel is how 
little we learn of Hal’s story. And what we do learn about Hal’s story tends to come 
from other characters—indeed, in only one brief moment in this giant text does Hal open 
his mouth and articulate a story about himself.27 Perhaps, then, this foretold event is not 
so much found within the text of Infinite Jest as it is the “start” of the treatment for Hal’s 
ailment, figured here as an act of self-narration, one that can only occur outside of the 
text, as a labor to be performed by the reader who is entrusted to answer the question, 
“What’s your story?” It is not uncommon for Wallace to have written an ending that 
calls for the reader to act in this way. As Jeffrey Severs writes: 
Wallace designed texts that lead up to the precipice of this … choice to 
accept birth and be born a second time. His fictions therefore not 
infrequently end with a greeting to this new self that can only now begin 
the real struggle, rather than walk off into a presumed state of maturity 
that obviates the reader’s action. (7) 
I agree with Severs, with the caveat that in this case the “end” of Infinite Jest is 
encountered by the reader as a curious beginning, one which begins to propel the reader 
                                                
27 This scene occurs during a brief conversation between Hal and his brother Mario on 




through the text, motored at least initially by the question, “What happened to Hal?” 
 It is my contention that the provenance and nature of Hal’s ailment in the 
opening scene of Infinite Jest has not received the critical attention it deserves. In order 
to account for Hal’s strange behavior during the admissions committee interview, 
Marshall Boswell believes that Hal has either “ingested the lethal drug DMZ” or 
“accidentally viewed the Entertainment” (Boswell 139). While either of these are 
certainly options for the reader to gravitate toward,28 I believe them to be red herrings. 
                                                
28 Michael Pemulis, who is at once Hal’s closest (non-family related) friend and drug 
dealer, has scored six tablets of DMZ, which Pemulis describes as the “Great White 
Shark of organo-synthesized hallucinogens” (IJ 211). Pemulis warns that the drug, if 
taken in high dosages, can cause the user to lose one’s mind, which was the case with a 
particular Army convict who was given too much of it, and who was “found later in his 
Army cell, in some impossible lotus position, singing show tunes in a scary deadly-
accurate Ethel-Merman-impression voice” (214). Later, Hal confesses to Pemulis that he 
had a terrible dream in which he’d been given a massive dose of DMZ: “‘In the dream 
the horror was that I wasn’t really singing “There’s No Business Like Show Business.”  
I was really screaming for help. I was screaming like “Help! I’m screaming for help and 
everybody’s acting as if I’m singing Ethel Merman covers! It’s me! It’s me, screaming 
for help!”’” (1063). Toward the end of the novel, Pemulis’ stash goes missing, and there 
is a scene where Hal falls asleep holding his toothbrush. It is within the realm of 
possibility (though never explicitly stated within the text) that the mysterious 
disappearance of Pemulis’ DMZ and the curious detail of Hal’s toothbrush are related, 
and that while Hal was sleeping, someone dosed his toothbrush with DMZ. One could 
alternatively support the DMZ argument by reference to a strange interlude in the 
opening scene of Infinite Jest, wherein Hal recalls having eaten a strange mold as a 
child. This interlude occurs directly after the first part of Hal’s response to the 
admissions committee, which ends with: “I cannot make myself understood now… Call 
it something I ate” (10). As for the possibility of Hal having “viewed the Entertainment,” 
the Entertainment here refers to the last film created by the auteur James Incandenza 
(Hal’s father) before he committed suicide. The film, titled “Infinite Jest,” is so 
mesmerizing, so potent in its capacity to entertain that all who view it succumb to a fatal 
paralysis, entirely unable to stop watching. There are a few moments in the text that 
suggest Hal had access to the film toward the end of the narrative. The first is during an 
early scene where, in a flashback, Hal’s father impersonates a therapist and tells Hal that 




By reducing “what’s happened to Hal” to an off-the-page dosing incident involving one 
potent substance or another, the reader ignores all of the symptoms that indicate a 
progressive decline in Hal’s ability to communicate with others throughout the rest of 
the text.29 In other words, while there is evidence to suggest that either DMZ or the 
Entertainment served as a final accelerant or catalyst, Hal had been moving along an 
increasingly alienating trajectory well before either of those substances could have come 
into play. As such, what follows is an attempt to construct an etiology that instead 
considers the culturally dominant posture of postmodern irony as the chief vector for 
Hal’s disease, a posture which, when adopted over long periods of time, results in a state 
of anhedonia and paralysis, in an overabundance of unarticulated affective “leakage,” 
and ultimately in an emaciated sense-of-self, rendering Hal unable to locate his own 
positioning in language-games such as the one imposed by the admissions committee. 
I begin my foray into figuring the posture of postmodern irony as a vector for 
Hal’s ailment by pointing out the tendency for the denizens of the story-world of Infinite 
Jest to rely almost exclusively on the ironic invocation of memes, often in the form of a 
running gag, and always for the purpose of both offloading cognitive labor and 
mitigating the risk of having to express one’s feelings. This tendency is distilled via the 
                                                
anaplastic cerebrum” (31). Toward the end of the novel, Gately is experiencing a series 
of fever dreams, and in one of them, “he’s with a very sad kid and they’re in a graveyard 
digging some dead guy’s head up” (934). Finally, just before the end of the opening 
scene in question here, Hal recalls that one of his tennis academy comrades was 
“standing watch in a mask as Donald Gately and I dig up my father’s head” (17). 
29 For a fan-based exploration of the etiology of Hal’s ailment beyond drug dosing or 





metaphor of mask-wearing that Wallace invokes in three different contexts within the 
text. The first instance of mask-wearing we encounter is found in an account of the rise 
and fall of “videophony,” a technology whereby household telephones are replaced by 
devices that can only send or receive calls via video (think Skype, Facetime, etc.). 
Wallace’s account of the phenomenon of videophony largely centers on the evolution of 
the memetic conventions used to answer a videophone call, and as such functions as a 
kind of parable for thinking through the complex interplay between the innovative 
technological cycle of capitalism, and how our “use” of these innovations, in the form of 
memetic conventions, evolves according to the ways we use feelings to evaluate and 
mitigate risk. 
After the early enthusiasm and wide adoption of videophony, consumers realized 
that whereas “good old aural telephone calls could be fielded without makeup, toupee, 
surgical prostheses, etc.,” 
there was no such answer-as-you-are informality about visual-video 
telephone calls, which consumers began to see were less like having the 
good old phone ring than having the doorbell ring and having to throw on 
clothes and attach prostheses and do hair-checks in the foyer mirror 
before answering the door. (147) 
Videophony’s broadening of the memetic scope to include the visual suddenly triggers a 
field of anxieties surrounding the mundane act of answering the phone. These anxieties, 
for Wallace, seem to have their root in the desire to be “liked” in our encounters with the 




Unibus Plurum,” our imagined protocols for the granting of assent are trained via 
television: “if we want to know what American normality is—what Americans want to 
regard as normal—we can trust television” (“E Unibus” 152). This is because television 
functions like a mirror, but “not the Stendhalian mirror reflecting the blue sky and mud 
puddle. More like the overlit bathroom mirror before which the teenager monitors his 
biceps and determines his better profile.” The solution to this problem of over-exposure 
in communication became “the advent of High-Definition Masking,” which provided a 
“wildly attractive high-def broadcastable composite of a face wearing an earnest, slightly 
overintense expression of complete attention” in the form of a “form-fitting 
polybutylene-resin mask” which videophony users would wear while making calls 
(Infinite Jest 147-8). As the market for these masks evolved, consumers “began 
preferring and then outright demanding videophone masks that were really quite a lot 
better-looking than they themselves were in person” (148). This humorous account of 
the evolution of videophony serves, for my purposes, to highlight a perceived cleft on 
the part of the videophone user between what they feel the protocols of authentication 
call for (in order for me to be granted assent, I must have an attractive, attentive face), 
and what they themselves feel willing to perform in the mundane act of answering the 
phone. While Wallace never explicitly denotes videophony mask-wearing as a metaphor 
for postmodern irony, its presence in the text serves to reveal the logic behind mask-
wearing as a way to off-load the emotional labor of presenting oneself, of mitigating the 
risk of “being liked” by deploying ready-made memetic content that serves to perform 




 The second instance of mask-wearing we find in Wallace’s dystopian near-future 
occurs as a protocol for the UHID (Union of the Hideously and Improbably 
Deformed)—an organization formed “to afford the scopophobic empathic fellowship 
and the genesis of sturdy inner resources through shame-free and unconstrained 
concealment” (226). Members of UHID wear a face-concealing veil “both in solitude 
and before other’s gaze” such that “no mortal eye will see it withdrawn” in an attempt to 
“be reduced to nothing but a voice among other voices, invisible, equal, no different, 
hidden” (534). The most prominent member of UHID within the narrative of Infinite Jest 
is Joelle van Dyne, and in a conversation with Don Gately about UHID, Gately asks 
whether the veil of UHID is like “people hating their faces on videophones” (534). Joelle 
responds that the veil is due to being “so desperate to feel some kind of control that you 
settle for the appearance of control” (535). The veil grants UHID members the power to 
“appear to other people as if you have the strength not to care how you appear to 
others.” In other words, the affective-heuristic economy that evaluates mask-wearing in 
Infinite Jest also values performances that project indifference—the mask must be at 
once “likeable” but also recognizable, in its nonchalance, as being worn “indifferently.”  
 What the prevalence of mask-wearing in the novel reveals is that the dominant 
language-games in Wallace’s parody of the 90’s do not consider the expression of 
emotion to be a valid move. The purpose of the deployment of ready-made memetic 
content is to mask feelings which are inherently unlikeable. And so, an air of 
indifference must be maintained to mitigate the risk of allowing any affective “leakage” 




emotion is accounted for as “sentimentality.” These neuroses about what the other might 
perceive “under the mask” have been internalized by Wallace’s characters, to the point 
that Hal, for instance, is brimming with them in his private reflections: 
Hal, who’s empty but not dumb, theorizes privately that what passes for 
hip cynical transcendence of sentiment is really some kind of fear of 
being really human, since to be really human (at least as he 
conceptualizes it) is probably to be unavoidably sentimental and naïve 
and goo-prone and generally pathetic, is to be in some basic interior way 
forever infantile, some sort of not-quite-right-looking infant dragging 
itself anaclitically around the map, with big wet eyes and froggy-soft 
skin, huge skull, gooey drool. (694-695) 
Hal’s anxieties about being “really human” are hidden behind his blank-faced stare, his 
indifferent tone-of-voice. Thus, Hal’s “hip empty mask” is the third instance of mask-
wearing, and it borrows the same logic of “likeability” from the rubber videophony mask 
and the “indifference” of the UHID veil (695). What the model of the authenticating 
human allows us to insist upon, however, is that the deployment of the mask does not 
rise to the level of a conscious decision on the part of the wearer. Rather, it is the 
wearer’s affect-heuristics that compel them, via the memetic transfer, to don the mask in 
a bid to authenticate with the other. Mask-wearing is behavior that arises from feelings 
that, paradoxically, have been trained to devalue the interpretive work of discerning, 
accounting for, and expressing one’s emotions. 




account of how Hal came to wear his “hip empty mask.” Wallace’s account posits 
something universal about human education, namely that there comes a point where “we 
enter a spiritual puberty where we snap to the fact that the great transcendent horror is 
loneliness, excluded encagement in the self” (694). One way to account for this moment 
is to consider that a sense-of-self is nothing but pure association, and to posit that once 
Hal’s association with his parents and home-life no longer benefits him among his peer 
group, the sense-of-belonging Hal established over iterative encounters with family 
members begins to feel outdated, and the memetic content he might have strung together 
based off of those feelings no longer seems to position him felicitously when playing 
language-games with his peers. Bereft of this sense-of-belonging, Hal’s sense-of-self 
(again, this roughly means position-in-the-world) perhaps feels emaciated, and this 
results in loneliness. This moment of vulnerability after childhood is not a unique 
phenomenon to postmodern culture. According to Charles Guignon, 
Ever since the time of Rousseau, the inner/outer dichotomy has been 
interpreted in terms of the distinction between the child and the adult. 
What is characteristic of the inner self is that it is childlike, spontaneous, 
in touch with its own true feelings, and capable of an intuitive 
understanding of what things are all about. In contrast to the child, the 
adult self is perceived as hardened and artificial. The adult’s feelings are 
muffled and deformed by playing socially approved games; his or her 
perceptions are forced into the grids of standardized interpretations. (On 




While the authenticating human does not conceive of something like a fixed, “inner” self 
due to the nature of neuroplasticity, childhood may still be considered a particularly 
formative moment, given that this is when one’s neurological “routing hubs” are initially 
established, forming the deep infrastructure of our associative pathways. For this reason, 
perhaps, the feeling of being unmoored or lonely during the transition to adulthood may 
be particularly acute. Nonetheless, Wallace believes that this moment culminates in a 
desire to be “admired and accepted and included,” or what he calls “peer-hunger” (IJ 
694). Given how acute this peer-hunger becomes, “we will now give or take anything, 
wear any mask, to fit, be part-of, not be Alone, we young.” And in this state, Wallace 
argues, “the U.S. arts are our guide to inclusion. A how-to.” It is from the “U.S. arts,” 
then, that Hal is “shown how to fashion masks of ennui and jaded irony at a young age 
where the face is fictile enough to assume the shape of whatever it wears. And then it’s 
stuck there, the weary cynicism that saves us from gooey sentiment and unsophisticated 
naïveté.” Wallace is speaking, here, of sedimentation, of the way felicitous performances 
of memetic content get enfolded into our sense-of-self iteratively over time. 
As for how the U.S. arts come to be saturated with “jaded irony,” Wallace writes 
that “most of the arts here are produced by world-weary and sophisticated older people” 
(IJ 694). We find, in “E Unibus Pluram,” a hint of who he might mean by these 
“sophisticated older people.” In a survey of what The New York Times has to say about 
television in 1990, he refers to “a breathless article on how lots of Ivy League graduates 
are now flying straight from school to New York and Los Angeles to become television 




harried clip-boarded production status” (“E Unibus” 156). Assuming, then, that the 
graduate programs at Ivy League schools in the 80’s and 90’s were steeped in high 
postmodern/post-structuralist theory, Wallace seems to posit a kind of “trickle-down” 
postmodern irony whereby French theory taught by humanities professors is internalized 
by graduate students who then write the television shows that young adults internalize in 
turn. Perhaps this explains why he makes statements like these in the McCaffery 
interview accompanying “E Unibus Plurum”: 
However misprised it’s been, what’s been passed down from the 
postmodern heyday is sarcasm, cynicism, a manic ennui, suspicion of all 
authority, suspicion of all constraints on conduct, and a terrible penchant 
for ironic diagnosis of unpleasantness instead of an ambition not just to 
diagnose and ridicule but to redeem. You’ve got to understand that this 
stuff has permeated the culture. It’s become our language; we’re so in it 
we don’t even see that it’s one perspective, one among many possible 
ways of seeing. Postmodern irony’s become our environment. (147-148) 
While it lies outside the scope of my project to evaluate Wallace’s account of how 
postmodern irony comes to permeate culture, this account is of interest for my purposes 
because of the kind of subject it assumes. This is no longer a subject that becomes 
interpellated exclusively by ideological state apparata or the technologies of discipline 
exercised in schools or prisons—this is a subject whose body (figured here as a mask-
wearing face) is sculpted by power as it flows in from the mundane act of watching 




which is to cover “the whole surface that lies between the organic and the biological, 
between body and population” (“Society Must be Defended” 243). 
 Having identified Hal as particularly susceptible, due to “peer-hunger,” to the 
television conditioning Wallace figures as a kind of disease vector for instilling a toxic 
posture of irony, I want to consider, using the rhetoric and logic of the authenticating 
human, how it is that irony could be considered so toxic. Before going into the 
mechanics of irony in this way, however, it’s important to consider the particular brand 
of American irony Wallace rails against as arising out of a historical moment and tied to 
a specific type of identity: the post-WWII hipster. In his monograph Cool Characters, 
Lee Konstantinou narrates the emergence of this figure by first drawing attention to 
Norman Mailer’s troublingly racialized, 1957 essay “The White Negro: Superficial 
Reflections on the Hipster,” wherein Mailer defines the hipster as 
the man who knows that if our collective condition is to live with instant 
death by atomic war … then the only life-giving answer is to accept the 
terms of death, to live with death as immediate danger, to divorce oneself 
from society, to exist without roots, to set out on that uncharted journey 
into the rebellious imperative of the self. (“White Negro”) 
For Mailer, “it is no accident that the source of Hip is the Negro for he has been living 
on the margin between totalitarianism and democracy for two centuries,” and as such 
Mailer’s tracing of the provenance of the American hipster falls in line with a tradition 
of appropriating and then patronizing African-American culture. Regardless, 




of irony as a strategy to acknowledge “the pressures of context” on poetic meaning to 
form a new kind of identity available to the white liberal intellectual, one which “fused a 
specific social ontology (society as the arena of symbolic struggle), a hermeneutic 
strategy (close reading), and a normative attitude (irony)” (53-54). It seems natural, then, 
for close reading and a penchant for irony to evolve into what Paul Ricoeur comes to 
term the “hermeneutic of suspicion” in his 1970 volume Freud and Philosophy (33). My 
point in this brief account of the hipster is to suggest that postmodern irony is part and 
parcel of a larger network of associations which come to form the protocols of 
authentication for belonging to a sense-of-community made most available to white male 
intellectuals. For Hal, in other words, to establish a sense-of-belonging among his peers, 
he must authenticate by felicitously deploying ironic performances. 
 As for the mechanics of irony, we can see it functioning as the antithesis of 
something like sincerity. If for the authenticating human sincerity is a growth agent for 
more intensely forming the associations that comprise a sense-of-self (I am here), irony 
is our affect-heuristics’ strategic way of deploying memetic content so as to flag it as no 
longer fit for use, to dis-associate the meme from a sense-of-self (I am not here). To 
ironically cite a meme is to at once claim that (a) there exists a community of people 
who actively cite the meme in question in order to authenticate, and (b) I myself (the 
performer) transcend this community. By transcend, I mean to say that the performer 
understands “all too well” what it takes to authenticate within a particular community, 
while at the same time claiming that precisely because of this thorough understanding, 




in question. The effect of felicitous ironic citation, then, is the enfolding of negative 
associations regarding both the meme and any communities which actively cite it. For 
this reason, irony is chiefly a tool of detachment, it is the opposite of a growth agent—it 
is the assertion of boundary. In this light, then, it is reductive to claim that sincerity is 
“good” and irony is “bad,” as reductive as saying that, when tending a garden, fertilizing 
is good and de-weeding is bad. 
According to Wallace, however, when irony becomes so deeply embedded 
within the protocols for authenticating within Western communities that it must be 
deployed when speaking about virtually anything, it has a bevy of debilitating effects. 
When always detaching oneself from all roots, when always positioning oneself as 
transcending all communities, one develops what Wallace calls “the Romantic 
glorification of Weltschmerz, which means world-weariness or hip ennui” (IJ 694). 
When a hipster’s affect-heuristics compel them to inflect their memetic content with 
ennui, the purpose is to move the speaker toward occupying the position of “the 
sophisticated person.” When irony-cum-ennui becomes embedded within the protocols 
for authentication, it gives rise to “that queerly persistent U.S. myth that cynicism and 
naïveté are mutually exclusive.” Over time, these performances of world-weariness 
become internalized, and give rise to “one of the really American things about Hal”: 
anhedonia (693). For Wallace, “standard U.S. anhedonia” is a low-grade depression, a 
“spiritual torpor in which one loses the ability to feel pleasure or attachment to things 
formerly important,” a “radical abstracting of everything, a hollowing out of stuff that 




Objects become schemata. The world becomes a map of the world” (692-3). As we 
account for what happened to Hal in order to trace the etiology of his “really American” 
ailment, we can say that chief among his symptoms is anhedonia, and it results from an 
overreliance upon the “hip empty mask”30—a mask that is “likeable” because it 
authenticates as sophisticated and indifferent, and dangerous when adopted as a default 
posture due to the mechanics of irony, as it precludes the reification of “hereness,” and 
                                                
30 Interestingly, a confluence of the themes of mask-wearing, television, and 
psychological well-being can be found in Wallace’s first novel, The Broom of the 
System.  The protagonist of the novel, Lenore Beadsman, is the daughter of a wealthy 
baby food tycoon, and her sister Clarice is married and has two young children. As a 
family self-help exercise, Clarice has her family stand in front of a large television which 
projects an image of a theater audience (in this exercise, the normal configuration of 
television and audience is reversed). She then passes out masks to each member of the 
family—masks which “were very good and very lifelike,” each one made to resemble 
the face of the family member who wears it (166). After the family dons these masks, 
Clarice then passes out a second set of masks, masks “that had just generic features and 
the words FAMILY-MEMBER stamped in white across the forehead,” and which the 
family also donned (on-top of the lifelike masks) (167). Clarice’s family members step 
forward and recite memorized speeches as though speaking to the “audience” on TV, 
explaining that while identifying chiefly as a family member granted them each a feeling 
of security and belonging, when anything threatened the stability of the family, “it also 
made the people in the family not as much people anymore, and then they were alone 
and invisible and unhappy” (167-8). After another round of mask-wearing involving 
each family member depending upon an external, physical object or pursuit for their 
identity formation which leaves them equally unhappy and disoriented, Clarice’s family 
consulted with “an outside party whose whole life was directed toward helping family-
members grow and see themselves clearly both as selves and members, and so come to a 
fuller and happier sense of self” (172). This outside party facilitated a process in which 
family members “talked with one another, and aired the things they weren’t comfortable 
with as people right then.” At this point in the exercise, the family members remove their 
masks and ritualistically (with dancing) declare their therapy to have been successful.  
Prefigured, then, in The Broom of the System is this matrix where mask-wearing is 
indicative of an atrophied sense of self, and where the practice of a language-game 





may in fact erode the associative grist of a sense-of-self. 
In his article “Beyond Endless ‘Aesthetic’ Irony,” Allard den Dulk provides 
further insight into why Wallace finds irony so dangerous. In correspondence with Dulk, 
Wallace writes that “most of the problems of what might be called ‘the tyranny of irony’ 
in today’s West can be explained almost perfectly in terms of Kierkegaard’s distinction 
between the aesthetic and the ethical life” (325). For Kierkegaard, it is not so much any 
particular deployment of ironic language that constitutes unhealthy irony. It is rather the 
adoption of irony as an attitude toward existence that results in what he refers to as an 
“aesthete,” or someone who has “the courage to doubt everything,” to “fight against 
everything,” but is lacking “the courage to acknowledge anything, the courage to 
possess, to own, anything,” including a sense of self (332). When an aesthete’s “life-
project founders, this is seen not as evidence that he has made an unwise choice of life-
projects but as evidence that no life can be meaningful[.] Therefore, the ironist 
frequently becomes nothing.” The result of this long-term adoption of irony as an 
attitude toward existence is what Kierdegaard refers to as boredom. “Boredom in the 
Kierkegaardian sense is the result of the negative freedom of the aesthete’s irony: it 
follows from the conclusion that there is nothing left in the world with which the 
aesthete is connected, which is of value to him. The term boredom is used to describe the 
individual’s basic, languid state of apathy, as well as the frenetic attempts that he might 
undertake, ‘out of boredom,’ to distract himself from that boredom” (335). The path out 
of the trap of existential irony is what Kierkegaard refers to as a “leap,” or “a 




own and from there give shape to himself, ‘he can just as well be said to produce 
himself’—it becomes his ‘task.’ The self is not some pre-existing ‘core’ that the 
individual always already has, and that unifies his existence; instead, the individual’s 
existence is fragmented and has to be made whole—that is what it means to become a 
self” (339). As I will be showing shortly, Hal’s predominantly ironic posture very much 
undermines his ability to ascribe meaning to any conceivable life project, and the 
Kierkegaardian “boredom” that results compounds this inability by driving Hal to 
engage in paralyzing self-medication. 
In my attempt to trace what happens to Hal in order to make sense of the opening 
scene of Infinite Jest, I have so far explored Wallace’s use of the metaphor of mask-
wearing for representing his characters’ adoption of the default posture of irony in 
language-games, and have attempted to show that this mask-wearing leads, according to 
the logic of the text, to a de-privileging of the expression of emotion (figuring it as 
“sentimentality”) and a “hollowing out,” or a brand of depression Wallace refers to as 
anhedonia. If Hal’s anhedonia is a symptom that arises from mask-wearing, I now turn 
to paralysis as a symptom which is most frequently associated in the novel with 
addiction. Infinite Jest is rife with representations of addiction, ranging from Hal’s 
mostly harmless addiction to marijuana, to Joelle’s near-fatal addiction to free-base 
cocaine. Hal and the other drug users at the tennis academy he attends see it as a way to 
“help manage the intra-psychic storms” of their high-stress, competitive environment 
(53). The theory behind this stress-management is that it is beneficial to “basically short 




almost neurologically reborn.” Hal’s justification of drug use as stress management is 
but one variation on the reasons explicitly given by characters in novel, all of which tend 
to fall into the categories of “release or relief or fun” (22). 
Despite the reasons articulated by a given character, however, drug use is largely 
figured in the text as a self-reinforcing habit that requires and promotes secrecy. Hal, for 
instance, “likes to get high in secret, but a bigger secret is that he’s as attached to the 
secrecy as he is to getting high” (49). This secrecy, then, functions on two levels. Most 
trivially, there is secrecy in the sense that no one is around to witness the use of the drug 
or its aftermath. Ken Erdedy, another marijuana addict in the novel, has “long ago 
forbidden himself to smoke dope around anyone else,” and in fact “he couldn’t even be 
around anyone else if he’d smoked marijuana that same day, it made him so self-
conscious” (21). Aside from secrecy in the form of physical isolation, however, there is a 
second and more interesting secrecy. Hal doesn’t know “why he likes [the secrecy] so 
much” (51), and Erdedy “didn’t even know what [the marijuana’s] draw was anymore” 
(21). In other words, while a character will often articulate a reason for initially using a 
drug, the character eventually loses track of the reason why they continue to use it—the 
reason why they are compelled to use the drug, in other words, has become a secret. 
While this may seem like a mundane observation about how drug users often become 
psychologically dependent on their drug of choice, Wallace’s exploration of the 
mechanism of this dependency reveals a particular kind of subject I find most readily 
described by the authenticating human. 




place in the context of the Ennet halfway recovery house managed by Don Gately, a 
recovering opioid addict who used to fund his addiction via burglary. Gately has 
developed, during his time as a burglar, the ability to “turn his attention on and off like a 
light” (273). In the course of his recovery at the Ennet halfway house, it was brought to 
Gately’s attention that “his special burglar’s selective attention … could be dangerous 
because how can you be sure it’s you doing the screening and not The Spider” (274). 
“The Spider” here refers precisely to the kind of psychological dependence one develops 
while addicted to a substance. In terms of the authenticating human, The Spider is a 
subset of affect-heuristics trained during iterative drug use to value any performances 
that will eventually result in further use of the drug. At the halfway house, Gately is 
made wary of the use of his selective attention because there is no consciously 
identifiable cleft between “you” and “The Spider.” Because our affects are things that 
“happen to us” and are therefore layered beneath the level of consciousness, and because 
we inevitably rely on these affects to make decisions in the world (our affects are 
agentive), then the degree to which The Spider makes certain phenomena available to 
Gately’s “attention” while filtering out others is entirely unknown to him. The Spider is 
largely hidden, in other words, beneath a veil of secrecy, and for this reason the addict 
finds it difficult to articulate, even to themselves, why they continue to use the drug. 
Given this inability to self-authenticate when it comes to explaining their behavior, the 
path of least resistance for the addict is to hide the behavior, to shield themselves from 
the emotional labor of trying to authenticate with the other. In this way, addiction in 




Beyond the isolating effect of drug use in the novel, which could itself be 
construed as a kind of paralysis (you can’t treat what you can’t articulate to yourself or 
to others), drug use is portrayed by Wallace as leading to paralyzing thought-patterns. 
The narrator refers to Hal’s habit as leading to “marijuana thinking,” which is the 
tendency to get lost “in a paralytic thought-helix” (335). This paralyzing effect is not 
limited to the use of marijuana. In one of the many Gately-centered scenes where the 
narrator muses on the nature of addiction, it is noted that “most Substance-addicted 
people are also addicted to thinking, meaning they have a compulsive and unhealthy 
relationship with their own thinking. That the cute Boston AA term for addictive-type 
thinking is: Analysis-Paralysis” (203). With recourse to the authenticating human, we 
might sketch out the mechanics of how drug use might result in paralytic thinking. 
As I argue in my second chapter, “the memetic transfer” is the economic scene in 
which our affect-heuristics solicit and evaluate our pure associative responses to stimuli 
in order to calculate, via “affective mathematics,” our best move in the language-
game(s) in play. The frequency with which we use memetic content in our performances, 
then, depends on the felicity of these moves, i.e. whether they allow us to successfully 
occupy desired positions in language-games. We might make a few assumptions, then, 
about the “language-game” of drug use in Infinite Jest. The first is that, due to the 
isolating effects of the behavior, it is an inward-facing game played by oneself. The 
implication here is that whatever “moves” actually being performed or registered by the 
drug user, beyond the physical imbibing of the drug, are largely taking place inside the 




the drug, there are neurochemical effects which warp and skew the user’s affect-
heuristics—for Erdedy, marijuana “made his thoughts jut out crazily in jagged 
directions” (22). In accordance with the model of the authenticating human, we are 
always registering and enfolding our experiences such that when we feel, we become. 
Therefore, when drugs make us feel differently, we become differently. The last 
assumption we can make about the language-game of drug use in the novel is that the 
felicity of any performance while playing the game depends on whether it moves one 
toward occupying the position of “the blissful person” or “the person who forgets.” 
Given that the bulk of this work in moving toward these positions is accomplished via 
the drug-induced release of serotonin, dopamine, etc., then the “thoughts jutting out in 
crazy directions,” figured here as moves in a language-game played by oneself, come to 
be evaluated as more or less equally felicitous by the user’s affect-heuristics, 
independent of the actual memetic content of the thought. The result is a kind of 
evaluative flattening of thought-moves, such that any one thought may be as felicitous as 
the rest. Based on these assumptions, the opportunity to reify a sense-of-self via the 
economic scene of memetic trial and error governed by our affect-heuristics is hijacked 
by drug use in the novel, a hijacking that may in fact work toward the opposite of 
reification, toward the dispersal of a sense-of-self, potentially resulting in long-term 
paralysis.31 
                                                
31 Hal’s best friend Michael Pemulis describes the way marijuana will “paralyze you 
over time,” recounting as evidence “once-promising stand-up guys spending their lives 
in front of the TP [teleputer, or the equivalent of Netflix], eating Nutter Butters and 




 One of the core anxieties of Infinite Jest, then, is the degree to which our 
mundane experiences, while under the long-term influence of certain drugs, lead toward 
the attenuation or even dispersal of a sense-of-self, and this anxiety is carried over by 
Wallace into his consideration of the effects of media consumption. If television is 
figured in the novel as a kind of disease vector for infecting its viewers with toxic, ironic 
postures, it is also figured as a paralytic in the same way as drug use. The most extreme 
example of TV-as-paralytic is “The Entertainment,” which refers to the last film created 
by the auteur James Incandenza (Hal’s father) before he committed suicide. The film, 
titled “Infinite Jest,” is so mesmerizing, so potent in its capacity to entertain that all who 
view it succumb to a fatal paralysis, entirely unable to stop watching. 
The existence of this deadly film is the impetus behind the high-level spy 
interactions between the aforementioned Hugh Steeply and Remy Marathe. These two 
spies serve as a conduit of information about the nature and whereabouts of the 
Entertainment, and during one of their secret rendezvous, Steeply offers as an “analogy 
with the Entertainment” an anecdote about an experimental biomedical research project 
wherein electrodes were implanted in the brain which allowed, with the press of a 
button, for electrical current to stimulate the pleasure centers of the brain. The resulting 
sensation was the “neural distillate of, say, orgasm, religious enlightenment, ecstatic 
drugs, shiatsu, a crackling fire on a winter night—the sum of all possible pleasures 
refined into pure current and deliverable at the flip of a hand-held lever” (473-4). When 
the experiment was performed on rats, “the rat would press the lever to stimulate his 




in heat, […] stopping only when the rat finally died of dehydration or simple fatigue” 
(471). When word of the electrode implant experiment got out, there were “human 
volunteers lining up literally around the block” who were mostly “young” and “able-
bodied” (472). Steeply’s analogy of The Entertainment as a set of electrodes implanted 
in the brain assumes a particular kind of subject, one whose decision-making is 
ultimately driven by feelings that happen to them, and in the broader scope of the novel, 
these feelings are shaped by the kinds of interactions they have, by the drugs they take, 
by the television they watch. 
The Entertainment is an extreme manifestation of the anxieties surrounding 
media consumption articulated by Wallace in “E Unibus Plurum,” and as I argued 
earlier, I find it unlikely that Hal was ever exposed to the film. An account of the effects 
of Hal’s own media consumption, however, is provided by the wraith of his father James 
who appears to Gately in one of his fever dreams.32 James speaks of figurants, which are 
the “human furniture” in the background of shows like Cheers, in that they are 
“nameless patrons always at tables, filling out the bar’s crowd, concessions to realism, 
always relegated to back- and foreground; and always having utterly silent 
conversations: their faces would animate and mouths move realistically, but without 
sound” (834). The wraith of James recounts how, toward the end of his life, he saw “his 
own personal youngest offspring [Hal], a son, the one most like him, the one most 
                                                
32 The appearance of the wraith of Hal’s father is, as Marshall Boswell notes, one of the 
many “intricate allusions” to Shakespeare’s Hamlet (Understanding 165). According to 
the logic of this relationship between Infinite Jest and Hamlet, Hal is Prince Hamlet and 




marvelous and frightening to him, becoming a figurant,” and that “no horror on earth or 
elsewhere could equal watching your own offspring open his mouth and have nothing 
come out” (837).33 James’ own accounting for his son’s transformation into a figurant 
involves what he calls “the fifth wall.” James’ own father “would sit, cough, open that 
bloody issue of the Tuscon Citizen, and […] turn that newspaper into the room’s fifth 
wall” (31). He sees the same behavior in his son Hal, who has “lived his whole ruddy 
bloody cruddy life in five-walled rooms,” referring to the giant swaths of time Hal 
spends either reading books, watching TV, or using the computer (31). In the dystopic 
world that Hal inhabits, much like in ours, being a member of the middle-class more or 
less guarantees access to interfaces (like computers) that allow Hal to erect this fifth 
wall, an act that has the paradoxical effect of at once closing oneself off to others and 
opening oneself up to seemingly limitless knowledge of the world. Hal’s head is 
brimming with things to say, and yet he is entirely unequipped to establish a position 
from which to speak them. 
 There is a cruel, cyclical nature to Hal’s insatiable appetite for 
information/entertainment consumption. From an early age, Hal believes that “life 
                                                
33 This fear on James’ part of his son becoming mute manifests elsewhere in the text. In 
a flashback near the beginning of the book, we encounter a scene in which James, who is 
still alive at this point, is impersonating a therapist in order to have a conversation with 
Hal. Throughout their conversation, Hal wonders whether his father is “still having this 
hallucination I never speak,” and the scene ends with the father “praying for just one 
conversation, amateur or no, that does not end … like all the others: you staring, me 
swallowing” (31). Later, well after his father had died, Hal recounts that “Himself, for 
two years before his death, had had this delusion of silence when I spoke: I believed I 




depended on seeming gifted or precocious,” and would thus become “maniacally 
obsessive” about “commit[ing] to memory entire dictionaries” so that he could attend 
spelling-bees which proved for Hal “a public turkey-shoot and approval-fest” (999). 
Unfortunately for Hal, the more he dedicates himself to consuming information and 
thinking through problems behind the fifth wall, the less able he finds himself to engage 
with the very living, breathing interlocutors from which he is seeking approval. The apex 
of this trajectory of isolation occurs toward the end of the novel, where Hal is lying on 
the floor of his room, paralyzed by depression. He imagines “a broad cool well-lit room 
piled floor to ceiling with nothing but the lightly breaded chicken fillets [he] was going 
to consume over the next sixty years,” as well as “another, dimmer room, filled with the 
rising mass of the excrement [he’d] produce, the room’s double-locked steel door 
gradually bowing outward with the mounting pressure” (897). Hal seems unable to 
ascribe value to any life-projects beyond an accumulation of meat and excrement: 
it seemed like a kind of black miracle to [Hal] that people could actually 
care deeply about a subject or pursuit, and could go on caring this way for 
years on end. Could dedicate their entire lives to it. It seemed admirable 
and at the same time pathetic. We are all dying to give our lives away to 
something, maybe. God or Satan, politics or grammar, topology or 
philately—the object seemed incidental to this will to give oneself away, 
utterly… A flight-from in the form of plunging-into. Flight from exactly 





This inability to ascribe value to things extends beyond life-projects, affecting 
Hal’s mundane interactions with other people as well. When Michael Pemulis, Hal’s 
closest friend, finds him lying on the floor, Pemulis asks him what’s up, and Hal “could 
see [his] asking [Pemulis] where he’d been all week leading to so many different 
possible responses and further questions that the prospect was almost overwhelming, so 
enervating [Hal] could barely get out that [he]’d just been lying here on the floor” (907). 
The resulting relationship between Hal and Pemulis (his closest friend) is such that the 
sum of Pemulis’ knowledge of Hal’s biggest, most recent trauma (the suicide of his 
father) “could be inscribed with a blunt crayon along the rim of a shot glass” (1065). 
Hal’s ailment, in other words, is at once a head brimming with things to say, pressurized 
by an excess of information; and a sense-of-self so atrophied from a lack of human 
connection that he has no purchase, no “hereness,” no position from which to 
communicate. 
Tying all of this together in terms of “what happens to Hal,” Hal finds himself at 
an early age in the grip of peer-hunger. He then turns to the “U.S. arts” in order to learn 
how to fit in, and is consequently exposed, behind “the fifth wall,” to a high volume of 
experiences which train his affect-heuristics to privilege the language-game position of 
“the sophisticated, world-weary person.” In his bids to authenticate in that position, he 
routinely wears a jaded mask of hip ennui, and through iterative performances while 
wearing that mask, he internalizes the postmodern aversion to sentimentality. When 
faced with the trauma of his father’s suicide and the stress of his highly competitive 




and articulating his feelings, so instead he deals with his trauma and stress by self-
medicating with drugs that further compound his inability to express himself by inducing 
paralytic thought patterns. Over time and under these conditions, Hal’s sense-of-self 
atrophies to the point that he is no longer able to readily position himself in mundane 
language-games, and without that reference point, his affect-heuristics are unable to 
soberly calculate his next best move in everyday conversation. 
As for Wallace’s proposed treatment for this ailment, we must turn to the 
members of AA in the novel, for whom sincerity is the precondition for recovery. In 
order to participate in the program, one must be willing to perform a “Commitment 
speech” in which the speaker is encouraged to tell the story of their addiction. As Gately 
recounts, 
it can’t be a calculated crowd-pleaser, and it has to be the truth unslanted, 
unfortified. And maximally unironic. An ironist in a Boston AA meeting 
is a witch in church. Irony-free zone. Same with sly disingenuous 
manipulative pseudo-sincerity. Sincerity with an ulterior motive is 
something these tough ravaged people know and fear, all of them trained 
to remember the coyly sincere, ironic, self-presenting fortifications they’d 
had to construct in order to carry on Out There, under the ceaseless neon 
bottle. (369)34 
                                                
34 This idea of the “maximally unironic” also appears in the short story “Octet,” in which 
the narrator declares that his metafictional ploy to ask the reader whether the short story 




Conversely, the AA program is, as Gately describes it, a “goofy slapdash anarchic 
system of low-rent gatherings and corny slogans and saccharin grins and hideous coffee 
so lame you just know there’s no way it could ever possibly work except for the utterest 
morons” (350). Indeed, there is a sheen of mysticism surrounding the functioning of the 
AA program—the addicts who have experienced recovery through the program describe 
it as “almost magic,” and are in fact are encouraged not to attempt to make sense of it, to 
“check your head at the door” of the halfway recovery house (271, 374). 
  How can one be expected to be sincere when reciting eye-roll inducing corny 
slogans? The answer, for Gately, is that the slogans become meaningful over time, 
having been ascribed value within the context of the meetings, and more significantly, 
within the context of one’s own recovery. For Gately, “the vapider the AA cliché, the 
sharper the canines of the real truth it covers” (446). Ostensibly, while playing the 
language-game of AA, a game which feels foreign and corny initially, one is engaging in 
the construction of a sense-of-self that isn’t so fully dependent on the object of one’s 
addiction. The idea is that, upon entering the program, the participant’s dominant sense-
of-self is “substance user,” such that when ascribing value to the best moves in a 
language-game, the participant’s affect-heuristics incentivize language-game moves that 
guarantee their next fix. After the AA process has begun to work its magic, however, a 
new reference point is established, a new cluster of memetic content has become 
associated with the self over time and in moments of authentication. And it is only under 
                                                





the auspices of this new sense-of-self that the cheesy clichés of AA acquire enough 
personal meaning to become recited sincerely. As Gately notes, “You're encouraged to 
keep saying stuff like this until you start to believe it, just like if you ask somebody with 
serious sober time how long you'll have to keep schlepping to all these goddamn 
meetings he’ll smile that infuriating smile and tell you just until you start to want to go 
to all these goddamn meetings” (369).35 
Perhaps the most fleshed-out example of the AA program’s success within the 
novel is in the case of Joelle Van Dyne, a freebase cocaine user who, up until her 
participation in the program, would attempt to quit by “throw[ing] away the pipe and 
shak[ing] [her] fist at the sky and say[ing] As God is my fucking witness NEVER AGAIN, 
as of this minute right here I QUIT FOR ALL TIME” (859). Once provided the forced 
abstinence of the program and given weekly opportunities to articulate her story, 
however, she begins to ascribe personal meaning to the once trite phrase “One Day at a 
Time,” realizing that rather than attempting to quit for all time, all she needs to do is 
                                                
35 This “fake it until you make it” road to sincerity appears elsewhere in Wallace’s work. 
Consider, for instance, the short story “Octet” in which a man struggles with feelings of 
hatred toward his father-in-law—feelings which make the man feel horribly guilty, given 
that his father-in-law is dying of cancer. The man feels obligated to show up on a regular 
basis at the father-in-law’s bedside with his wife in order to show support, yet each visit 
leaves the man feeling even more hatred/guilt. Upon confessing these feelings to his 
closest friend, the man’s friend’s advice is “to make it his secret penance and gift to the 
[father-in-law] to just hang in there and silently to suffer the feelings of loathing…, but 
not to stop accompanying his wife…, in other words for [the man] simply to reduce 
himself to bare physical actions and processes, to get off his heart’s back and stop 
worrying about his makeup and simply Show Up” (Brief Interviews 142). By the time 
the father-in-law passes away, the man “weeps longer and louder than anyone,” and his 




resist for one day—or for what she articulates in her own terms as “one endless day” 
(860). I would like to suggest, then, that there are two ways in which time works in 
relation to sincerity to (re)establish a subject’s sense-of-self. The first and most mundane 
of these is the way time provides iterative opportunities to articulate oneself. Not only 
does each iteration further ensconce a purely associative sense-of-self for efficient 
solicitation and retrieval by our affect-heuristics, but each iteration is also building upon 
and inflecting the enfolding of previous iterations, such that the subject is provided 
space-over-time to engage in the trial-and-error required to subject those articulations to 
the vetting power of self- and other-authentication. 
Further emphasizing the role time plays in providing the space for the effective 
fashioning of a sense-of-self is a single scene in which Hal confesses to his brother 
Mario that he smokes marijuana, and that he’s terrified of his mother finding out because 
“it’d kill the Moms, Mario. It’d be a terrible kertwang on the Moms. Not so much the 
[marijuana]. The secrecy of it. That I hid it from her” (784). Hal is also frightened 
because it has been announced that there will be drug screening before the next match, 
and so he has to spend the next 30 days not smoking the marijuana he’s come to depend 
on. He says, “I feel a hole. It’s going to be a huge hole, in a month. A way more than 
Hal-sized hole” (785). He asks his brother, “So what do you think I should do?” (785). 
Mario’s telling response is, “I think you just did it. What you should do. I think you just 
did” (785). What Hal “just did” was play a language-game (confession) that privileges 
sincerity. Unfortunately, not enough time-as-space was afforded to Hal to fashion a 




For the second and perhaps more interesting relation between time and sincerity, 
I will turn to the philosopher Paul Ricoeur, who in Oneself as Another, speaks of 
“attestation” as “the capacity to designate oneself” as the agent of an action (94). For 
Ricoeur, what the self has at its disposal via the power of attestation is the ability to 
temporally configure past experiences via the mechanism of narrative emplotment. 
Having done so, we are able to “stabilize the real beginnings formed by the initiatives 
[…] we take,” and among those beginnings narrated in the past tense, “we find projects, 
expectations, and anticipations” toward which we find ourselves oriented (162-163). For 
Joelle, her ability to attest to day-long successes with abstinence, and to do so with what 
Ricoeur refers to as veracity (a concept he employs in a way mostly analogous to what I 
mean by sincerity), provides her the means to imagine “one endless day” filled with 
meaningful life-projects. In other words, when the AA participant is provided the space 
and language-game pressures to engage in sincere self-expression, particularly in the 
form of a self-narrative, the associations enfolded back into the participant’s affect-
heuristics, thanks to the power of emplotment, have the effect of devaluing certain 
behavioral “moves” by associating them with a past sense-of-self, conversely 
incentivizing those moves that position them more firmly in the direction of a sense-of-
self now tantalizingly existing in an imagined future. 
As a final note about the efficacy of language-games that privilege sincerity for 
the establishment of a sense-of-self, I should draw attention to the power of being 
granted assent by the witnesses of a participant’s performance. As I argue in my second 




pole being a sense-of-community. By spending time at AA recovery meetings, the 
participant establishes a network of associations about “those who recover,” associations 
which must be felicitously cited by the participant in order for them to authenticate. 
These associations, as they exist idiosyncratically in a given subject’s mind, form what I 
mean by a sense-of-community. According to Wallace, the convention for audience 
members upon hearing a performer speak is to respond by saying “Good to hear you” 
(362). This speech-act constitutes a granting-of-assent. When registered by a performer, 
particularly by a performer who registered their own speech as sincere, the effect is a 
suturing of the participant’s newly formed sense-of-self onto that sense-of-community, 
resulting in a sense-of-belonging. In this way, then, we can say the way in which an 
“addict” becomes “in recovery” is via this dialectic, where a sense-of-belonging emerges 
in the interplay between a sense-of-self and a sense-of-community—an interplay itself 
mediated by the affective phenomena of self- and other-authentication. 
I have done my best, via the reading above, to attempt to convey how sincerity 
might have curative value at the turn of the millennium. There is, however, some critical 
distance warranted in considering Wallace’s prescription to “be sincere,” and I will now 
explore the limitations of this prescription by considering the kind of “hero” his fiction 
implicitly engenders. This hero is always male, and always a WASP. This hero has 
transformed himself, through a continuing practice of ruthless self-interrogation and 
disclosure, into a “quietly iron-spined [person] who [is] internally strong enough not to 
let any kind of abuse or humiliation get to them,” whose sense-of-self, however mutable 




unassailable (Brief Interviews 132).36 For the self-knowing hero, however, there is a cost 
paid in terms of human connection. In the short story “Octet,” the narrator speaks of 
“some nameless but inescapable ‘price’ that all human beings are faced with having to 
pay at some point if they ever want truly ‘to be with’ another person instead of just using 
that person somehow” (Brief Interviews 155). While Wallace deems this price 
“nameless,” he goes on to describe it as “giving up something (either a thing or a person 
or a precious long-held ‘feeling’ or some certain idea of yourself and your own 
virtue/worth/identity) whose loss will feel, in a true and urgent way, like a kind of 
death.” For Wallace, in other words, the unassailable self is also a lonely self, for in its 
ceaseless self-regard, it also becomes (perhaps unwittingly) a zealous guardian, 
unwilling to contaminate itself through challenging interaction with the other. 
 I believe Wallace’s fear of self-contamination and his concerns about the 
                                                
36 Perhaps the most vivid example of this hero in Wallace’s fiction is “[t]his one 
particular boy” in The Pale King who has made it his life’s goal to “press his lips to 
every last micrometer of his own individual body,” despite there being areas of his body 
with “impossible unavailability to his own lip” (403, 408). Over the course of several 
years of this daily practice, the boy is transformed. He develops “along unusual physical 
lines” with his lips “markedly large and protrusive,” but physical transformations aside, 
his teachers at school come to describe him as a “calm,” “unusually poised,” and “self-
containing” child who remains, socially speaking, on the margin (402-3). It seems in 
keeping with Wallace that this conceit of self-kissing might act as a poignant (yet subtly 
ridiculing) metaphor for the act of self-interrogation. While this boy’s identity is never 
revealed, I believe Wallace may have intended for this boy and the tax examiner Shane 
Drinion to be the same character. Drinion is “a very odd bird” who “tends to sit very 
quiet and self-contained” while “his mouth hangs slightly open” (450-452). His “posture 
is very good without being stiff or rigid” and he “looks like a man whose back and neck 
never hurt” (454). Problematizing my theory that the self-kissing boy and Drinion are 
one and the same, however, is the fact that Drinion claims to have “spent much of his 




postmodern condition to be cut from the same cloth—both are manifestations of an 
anxiety about the dispersal of the self, the hijacking of one’s language (and therefore 
one’s agency) by the voice of the other. I also believe that Wallace is not alone in having 
these anxieties, and that his readership (which also skews male and WASP) identifies 
deeply with these fears. As I have already argued, I believe these anxieties to have an 
origin similar to those experienced by the same Early Modern British subjects who first 
used the term sincere to refer to the quality of a human being (and not just a 
commodity). Just as the Reformation undermined a great center of cultural authority by 
tearing down the institution of the Catholic church in England, so too have the wiles of 
the Western neoliberal free-market encroached upon the authority of virtually every 
institution. What follows in the wake of such wholesale undermining of authority is a 
crisis of authentication—the protocols of authentication must be renegotiated. We must 
develop more equitable, decentralized ways of establishing authority. And those who 
feel unmoored by this decentering begin to fetishize a world in which selves are on the 
inside what they claim to be on the outside. During a crisis of authentication, sincerity 
becomes a sought-after quality, not just because of the reassurance it offers that not 
every human interaction is about people using each other, but because if it is indeed 
possible to more faithfully disclose one’s innermost thoughts and feelings, then a 
tantalizing possibility presents itself: the possibility of giving a true account of oneself 
and then having that account be fully assented to by the other. This, I believe, is what 
Wallace may have ultimately been after in his fiction: to say something true about 




 I find Wallace compelling in his suggestion that massive doses of entertainment 
ingested behind the fifth wall engorges one’s warehouse of citable memes, making it 
dangerously easy to offload the risk of self-expression by wearing masks which have 
been already vetted by the mega-gaze of TV viewership. Without a healthy dose of the 
feeling of felicitous self-expression, it may be that one’s sense-of-self can become 
emaciated, making it difficult to locate oneself, and therefore difficult to soberly assign 
values to possible moves in the language games in play. Where I depart from Wallace, 
however, is in his suggestion that the antidote to this potential ailment is to become the 
self-contained hero who must vigilantly attend to the boundaries of the self, who must 
count any significant influence emanating from the other as a kind of cost, a kind of 
death. Such influence from without is an inescapable feature of belonging in 
community—it happens in the most mundane adherences to the communal protocols of 
authentication: I attempt to make conversation; you politely listen or appear bored; I 
enfold your response in the form of pure association. When you speak, I become. This 
does not always have to be counted as a cost. In my estimation, when those possessed of 
the kind of hegemonically distributed and deeply sedimented privilege that belongs to 
white men like myself do count outside influence as a cost, what we may ultimately be 
defending is not a healthy sense-of-self but precisely the kind of subject who is 
incapable of empathizing, and therefore prone to suppressing information about the 
suffering of those around us. If we’re not careful, in other words, establishing sincerity 
as the only road out of world-weary cynicism may only serve to perpetuate Western 




Finally, for those who (by virtue of their subject-position in the Western 
neoliberal matrix) are not able to authenticate as male or even WASP the way people 
like me can do so effortlessly, there is an error in the calculus that assumes they too 
experience(d) postmodern culture as a crisis of authentication. For them (the majority of 
human beings), the road to becoming a more “healthy” human being may not be paved 
with felicitous moments of self-expression. Under the auspices of hegemonic Western 
culture, they may be all too aware of their location in the dominant language-games in 
play, and may even find their attempts at sincerity to be met with violence, not assent. 
For this reason, I feel it is important that, when speaking of the “literary generation” of 
Wallace and his peers, we not foreground Wallace’s work by referring to this literary 
movement as “New Sincerity.” By speaking instead of the kind of affective subject I 
have schematized in my second chapter, we make room not only for Wallace’s 
prescription of sincerity for the resuscitation of a sense-of-self, but also for Smith’s 
prescription of connectedness. In my subsequent chapter, I will be exploring, through her 
fiction, how a posture of openness toward the influence of the other, one that doesn’t 




CHAPTER IV  
“ONLY CONNECT”: THE PASSION IN THE PROSE OF ZADIE SMITH 
 
Something about the fiction of Zadie Smith resists classification. Many critics, like 
Maeve Tynan, claim for instance that “Smith’s writing concerns itself with themes such 
as ethnic (dis)orientation, identity politics, and the latter-day consequences of 
colonialism, thus firmly locating her within a postcolonial paradigm” (73). Having 
“firmly located” Smith’s work, however, when trying to read On Beauty as a 
postcolonial rewriting of E.M. Forster’s Howard’s End, Tynan finds that unlike more 
“politically or ethically minded” rewritings such as Jean Rhys’ Wide Sargasso Sea 
which is a feminist and postcolonial re-writing of Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre, On 
Beauty reads more like “a peaceful negotiation of the source text rather than a hostile 
takeover” (83, 77). According to Tynan, in a typical postcolonial rewriting, “gaps, 
silences, and omissions are sounded out, and priorities are weighted in toward the 
disadvantaged” (83). In On Beauty, however, Smith supplements “Forster’s analysis on 
class relations with an investigation of racial dynamics in contemporary society,” thus 
updating rather than challenging the concerns of Howard’s End (78). Tynan concedes 
that “On Beauty veers from the traditional format of a typical postcolonial rewriting,” 
due in part to the fact that “the central appeal to Forster’s writing for Smith would 
appear to be his character’s lack of a single, coherent identity” (78, 83). Indeed, while 
considering the character Kiki Belsey, Tynan notes that despite “the blackness of Kiki’s 




and must “negotiate a plurality of centers, weaving a self from intersecting discourses of 
race, gender, and class” (84-85). While consonant with postructuralist tendencies to 
decenter the subject, characters with no fixed identity to strategically marshal in 
opposition to hegemonic discourse prove awkward in postcolonial readings. 
Tynan concludes her essay by claiming that for Smith, “existence is not the 
successful resolution of conflicting thoughts, histories, cultures, and ideologies; 
existence resides in the chaos of a constant becoming” (86). In claiming that Smith’s 
fiction largely concerns itself with the subject that becomes, Tynan’s concluding remark 
proves most effective, for my purposes here, in classifying Smith’s work. As I argue 
throughout my project, Smith belongs to a generation of authors who attain degrees in 
the humanities at a time when postmodern/post-structuralist theory was at its height, and 
as these authors establish their literary careers at the turn of the millennium, they find 
something restrictive about the stylistics of postmodernism, particularly when it comes 
to the expression of emotion. In response to the postmodern aversion to sentimentality, 
Smith’s fiction “makes room for affect” by assuming a model of subjectivity for her 
fictional characters that emphasizes the role feelings play in the establishment of a 
locatable position on the Western neoliberal cultural landscape. For this reason (along 
with others stated in my introduction), I feel that her work can be fruitfully read 
alongside David Foster Wallace’s as dealing with contemporary anxieties surrounding 
the nature of self and identity. Where in my third chapter I show that Wallace’s response 
to the problematic of the self—particularly a self subjected to a late 20th century cultural 




sincere”; here I will be employing the model of the authenticating human laid out in my 
second chapter in order to show how Smith’s own homiletic prescription in response to 
the problematic of the self and identity is to “only connect.” 
In Smith’s acknowledgements for On Beauty, she writes that “it should be 
obvious from the first line that this is a novel inspired by a love of E.M. Forster, to 
whom all my fiction is indebted, one way or the other.” The first line of the novel echoes 
that of Howard’s End, and the epigraph of Howard’s End is “Only connect…” (xxxvii). 
The ellipses after the epigraph function like a hyperlink. They refer to a moment in 
Forster’s novel shortly after the first kiss between Margaret Schlegel, the novel’s chief 
protagonist, and Henry Wilcox: 
Only connect! That was the whole of [Margaret’s] sermon. Only connect 
the prose and the passion, and both will be exalted, and human love will 
be seen at its highest. Live in fragments no longer. Only connect, and the 
beast and the monk, robbed of the isolation that is life to either, will die. 
(168) 
The remainder of the following chapter will be structured according to the various 
valences I feel that “only connect” accumulates throughout Smith’s work. As such, I am 
implicitly arguing that the motto comprises a significant part of Smith’s own sermon, 







The Strategic and the Mimetic 
Maurice Chittenden leverages a critique of Smith’s first novel White Teeth in The 
Sunday Times, quoting Haider Rahman, who is purportedly the inspiration for the 
character Millat Iqbal in the novel: “I recognised myself in White Teeth but I also 
recognize that it is a work of fiction.”37 He goes on to say that the novel is full of 
“wishful thinking” in its portrayal of British race relations, because unlike the ease with 
which Millat is able to pass between the worlds of his radical Islamic friends and the 
home of the upper-middle class Chalfens, “what we’re seeing in the East End of London 
is ghettoization… The kids lead lives with one foot in the airport. They don’t want to 
belong. They don’t want to become part of the British story.” If White Teeth “was 
celebrated for its optimistic portrait of a ‘post-racial’ country,” Smith’s fourth novel NW 
is much less cheery on the subject. In her “Notes on NW,” she writes that she was 
inspired by the notion of the “problem play,” where “not everyone ends up happy and 
married, nor everyone bleeding and dead” (Feel Free 249). NW provides for London a 
kind of topological map of privilege, and on this map “someone is always left behind. 
And in the London I grew up in—as it is today—that someone is more often than not a 
young black man” (250). 
There are several young black men in the novel she is likely referring to, one of 
whom being Felix Cooper, who I will return to later, but suffice it to say that he very 
much ends up “bleeding and dead” from a knife wound over something as trivial as his 
                                                




phone and a pair of cubic zirconia earrings. Another black man left behind is Nathan 
Bogle. As a child, Nathan was “good with everything” in school (366). Indeed, Leah 
Hanwell, one of the two main protagonists (and one of the few white characters in the 
novel) confesses to have had a crush on him when they were children. Fast-forward to 
the present of the novel, and Nathan is a homeless man in his thirties doing what he can 
on the street to survive. 
One night on Willesden Lane, Nathan encounters Natalie Blake, the other main 
protagonist of the novel, who went to school with Nathan and Leah. When they were 
schoolchildren, Natalie was referred to by her given name “Keisha,” a name she has 
since discarded in order to be successful in her career as a lawyer. Nathan confides in 
Natalie, telling her “I done some bad things Keisha I’m not gonna lie. But you know that 
ain’t really me. You know me from back in the day” (366). In this moment, Nathan 
appeals to his “real me,” a person “most people don’t know.” Throughout the novel, we 
catch glimpses of what has happened to Nathan since he was his “real self.” He had 
apparently been so talented at soccer that he dropped out of school and played for the 
Queen’s Park Rangers. Unfortunately, his stint as a professional athlete didn’t last long: 
“Bad tendons. I played on. No-one told me. Lot of things would be different, Keisha. Lot 
of things. That’s how it is” (366). Since then he had purportedly “beat his father to a 
pulp,” and is now running a gang of scam artists (49). Nathan gives his own account of 
how he ends up on the street: 
Everyone loves up a bredren when he’s ten. With his lickle ball’ead. All 




problem. Can’t stay ten always. […] There’s no way to live in this 
country when you’re grown. Not at all. They don’t want you, your own 
people don’t want you, no one wants you. Ain’t the same for girls, it’s a 
man ting. That’s the truth of it right there. (376) 
Nathan’s analysis of his predicament is clear: had he had enough people around him who 
didn’t see him as “a problem,” perhaps someone would have advised him not to drop out 
of school, or helped him save his athletic career by telling him not to play with bad 
tendons. Had the country he lived in been able to authenticate him in any other way, he 
would not have ended up on the street. If White Teeth holds out the tantalizing 
possibility of reinventing one’s identity in the churn of societal change, NW emphasizes 
the impossibility of occupying any viable positions in language-games when your 
identity as “a problem” has been overdetermined in the neoliberal West. 
 Whereas Nathan’s character serves as a kind of extreme example of what 
happens when there are so few livable language-game positions for a black man to 
occupy, Natalie’s character reveals the kind of contortions a black woman must perform 
in order to achieve success in the neoliberal marketplace. She recalls the “break” when 
she ceased to be “Keisha” and became someone else: “She became Natalie Blake in that 
brief pause in their long history, between sixteen and eighteen. Educated herself on the 
floor of Kensal Rise Library while Leah smoked weed all the live-long day” (80). 
Throughout the novel, moments like this make it clear that Natalie is not afforded the 
same latitude as white women like her best friend Leah. Along her way to becoming a 




who has mastered “the female barrister’s unofficial uniform” (283). Theodora’s advice 
to Natalie is not to bother with “human rights” cases like “police brutality” because 
“people tended to associate you with your clients” (284). Natalie is told to “avoid ghetto 
work” and to focus on schooling her face: 
When some floppy-haired chap from Surrey stands before these judges, 
all his passionate arguments read as “pure advocacy.” He and the Judge 
recognize each other. They are understood by each other. Very likely 
went to the same school. But Whaley’s passion, or mine, or yours, reads 
as ‘aggression.’ To the judge. This is his house and you are an interloper 
within it. And let me tell you, with a woman it’s worse: ‘Aggressive 
hysteria.’ The first lesson is: turn yourself down. One notch. Two. (285) 
The further Natalie goes down her career path, the narrower and more parameterized her 
identity choices become, and the more alienated she feels because of it. She begins to 
lose herself entirely among the various roles she inhabits: 
Daughter drag. Sister drag. Mother drag. Wife drag. Court drag. Rich 
drag. Poor drag. British drag. Jamaican drag. Each required a different 
wardrobe. But when considering these various attitudes she struggled to 
think what would be the most authentic, or perhaps the least inauthentic. 
(333) 
Bereft of the opportunity to both self-authenticate and belong, Natalie feels “a strong 
desire to slip into the lives of other people,” and finds herself answering classified ads 




unable to escape the imposition of identity: “Everyone’s seeking a [black female] 18-35. 
Why? What do they think we can do? What is it we have that they want?” (340). 
 It is Natalie who articulates what I believe to be the crux of the novel: 
There is an image system at work in the world. We wait for an experience 
large or brutal enough to disturb it or break it open completely, but this 
moment never quite arrives. Maybe it comes at the very end, when 
everything breaks and no more images are possible. In Africa, 
presumably, the images that give shape and meaning to a life, and into 
whose dimensions a person pours themselves—the journey from son to 
Chief, from daughter to protector—are drawn from the natural world and 
the collective imagination of the people. (When Natalie Blake said “In 
Africa” what she meant was “at an earlier point in time.”) In that 
circumstance there would probably be something beautiful in the 
alignment between the one and the many… To behave in accordance with 
these images bored [Natalie]. To deviate from them filled her with the old 
anxiety… Her very equanimity made her anxious. It didn’t seem to fit 
into the system of images. (322) 
Distilled in this instance of free indirect speech are the core concerns of the novel—
concerns which are never far from Smith’s writing in general. For my purposes, the 
“image system” referred to here maps roughly onto what I mean by “language-games” as 
both the positions available for certain people and the memetic content they must 




inauthenticity, Natalie fetishizes a moment “in the past” (which she projects onto 
Africa), a moment when the positions available for people to occupy were drawn from 
“the natural world and the collective imagination of the people”—a context in which one 
is able to both self-authenticate and belong. Implied here is a critique of the neoliberal 
West: the natural world has been apportioned, commodified, and made scarce; the 
collective imagination of the people has been colonized by a system of images which has 
evolved in order to perpetuate the conditions of production—conditions which make 
black women work twice as hard to earn a slice of the pie, and which preclude working 
class black men altogether. 
 What interests me most about this reading of Nathan and Natalie is the 
persistence of something like a sense-of-self, what Nathan refers to as “the real me” who 
was last recognized when he was ten years old, or what Natalie refers to chiefly as an 
absence, as an “inauthenticity.” There persists, in other words, something that feels 
bored or feels anxious when playing language-games. Here, Smith touches on one of the 
core problematics of the discourse surrounding identity, a problematic laid out by Stuart 
Hall in his introduction to Questions of Cultural Identity. Hall points to a critique of the 
Althusserian account of subject formation laid out by Paul Hirsch, wherein Hirsch 
argues that interpellation depended “on a recognition which, in effect, the subject would 
have been required to have the capacity to perform before it had been constituted, within 
discourse, as a subject” (7). Hall notes that Foucault’s archaeological works (Madness 
and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things, The Archaeology of 




construction of subject positions within discourse,” they still fail to explain “why it is 
that certain individuals occupy some subject positions rather than others,” thereby 
reinscribing “an antimony between subject positions and the individuals who occupy 
them” (10). In the volumes comprising Foucault’s later “History of Sexuality,” however, 
“he tacitly recognizes that it is not enough for the law to summon, discipline, produce 
and regulate, but there must also be the corresponding production of a response (and thus 
the capacity and apparatus of subjectivity) from the side of the subject” (12). For Hall, 
the best accounting for the production of the “capacity and apparatus of subjectivity” is 
found in Butler’s performativity. With recourse to “that reiterative power of discourse to 
produce the phenomena it regulates and constrains,” we can now think less in terms of 
“identity” and more in terms of the process of “identification,” whereby “an effective 
suturing of the subject to a subject-position requires, not only that the subject is ‘hailed’, 
but that the subject invests in the position” (6). According to Hall, this suturing “has to 
be thought of as an articulation, rather than a one-sided process.” Therefore, when 
accounting for how a subject comes to occupy a subject-position, it is not enough to 
have a “system of images.” In order for identity to be effective politically, it requires that 
the subject not only engage in iterative performances which “cite” previous, felicitous 
performances of the identity, but to do so while also feeling something like agency, or a 
sense that their strategic performances have been imbued with enough of a mimetic 





 What Smith reminds us of in NW is the fact that the performance of an identity 
can be felicitous for everyone but the performer. Natalie Blake can wear court drag and 
British drag and still feel misrecognized when hailed as a barrister. Thus we come to the 
first valence for Smith’s prescription to “only connect”: on the one hand there is the 
prose, the many, the system of images, the strategic moves one makes when playing 
language-games; on the other there is the passion, the one, the “authentic,” the mimesis 
we engage in when trying to survey and express how we feel. When we “only connect” 
the prose and the passion, when we are able to felicitously imbue the strategic with the 
mimetic, when we are able, in other words, to not only authenticate with others when 
attempting to occupy a recognizable identity but to also self-authenticate, to be sincere, 
we can begin to establish a sense of belonging, a space where the many and the one 
overlap, if only ephemerally. Hall is quick to point out that the process of identification 
“does not signal that stable core of the self, unfolding from beginning to end through all 
the vicissitudes of history without change” (3). Identification is a recurring process for 
“the endlessly performative self” (1). Nor are there ever guaranteed to be livable 
positions to occupy within a system of images, a fact we are grimly reminded of via the 
character of Nathan Bogle. But if we are to live in fragments no longer, according to 
Smith, we must try to at least articulate the ways we feel over/under determined by the 
positions available for us to occupy. 
 Through the character of Felix Cooper in NW, Smith provides an idea of what it 
might look like to attempt to imbue the strategic with the mimetic, to connect the prose 




bottom with drug problems, he has fallen in love with a woman who is helping him put 
his life back together. In NW, we are privy to the last hours of his life as he runs a few 
errands around London. On one of these errands, he is attempting to purchase a used car 
from a young middle-class white man named Tom. As they enter a pub to discuss the 
price of the car, Tom attempts to buy Felix a beer, but Felix confesses to Tom he is an 
alcoholic and must decline the offer. Tom assumes (for no discernable reason other than 
Felix’s skin tone) that Felix is carrying drugs, and asks for some weed. Felix responds by 
murmuring the Serenity Prayer under his breath, and otherwise lets this micro-
aggression go. Tom, who has been interrupted several times by phone calls from his 
girlfriend, asks about Felix’s own girlfriend, and Felix proceeds to tell him that his 
girlfriend has “Changed my life. I tell her all the time: you’re a lifesaver. And she is” 
(151). Tom’s phone rings again, and Tom declares that “I seem to be stuck with a life-
destroyer.” Felix responds: 
“Nobody can do that, Tom. Only you have the power to do that.” Felix 
was sincere, but saw he had provoked a sort of smirk in Tom, which in 
turn provoked in Felix a need to press his point home more strongly: 
“Listen, this girl changed my outlook totally. Globally. She sees my 
potential. And in the end, you just got to be the best you that you can 
be…” / [Tom] nodded at Felix deeply, satirically, samurai-style… He 
lifted his empty glass to clink against Felix’s, but Felix was not 




In bringing attention to this scene, I want first to point out that Felix is having to 
navigate some difficult terrain while maintaining the position of “shrewd negotiator” in 
the language-game of car buying. Perhaps the path of least resistance, when offered a 
beer, would be to accept it. Perhaps most people would have been offended at having 
been read as a drug dealer. Felix handles both situations with aplomb (read: 
strategically), and in the end, manages to haggle Tom down significantly from the asking 
price. More interesting, however, is the exchange quoted above, wherein Felix feels 
compelled to “press his point home.” In this, we are told, “Felix was sincere.” In the 
midst of a strategic exchange, Felix imbues it with a mimetic expression of his feelings. 
By doing so, Felix is implicitly making a bid for connection—he is offering to bridge a 
racial/class divide, and he takes this offer seriously, as indicated by his refusal to toast to 
Tom’s cynicism. 
I also want to point out, in defense of reading Smith alongside Wallace, that we 
find distilled in the scene above one of Wallace’s homiletic tropes: the humble hero who 
struggles with addiction, eschews irony, and plays language-games that privilege 
sincerity. Unlike Wallace, however, who rarely if ever explores the margins of the 
Western subject-position matrix in his fiction, Smith does not shy from the disheartening 
truth about Wallace’s prescription to “be sincere”: not every position benefits from 
sincerity equally. As a case-in-point, Felix is riding on the underground when “a white 
woman, hugely pregnant and sweating” asks if he can tell his friend to move his feet so 
she can sit down. His “friend” is a total stranger to Felix—another young black man, but 




down” (193). The stranger is offended that Felix would ask him to move on her behalf. 
Felix gives up his seat for the woman, and shortly after exiting the train, he is accosted 
by the stranger and his friend; robbed, stabbed, and left for dead halfway through the 
novel. In so doing, Smith reveals the limits of sincerity—articulating a robust sense-of-
self may be good medicine for the young, middle-class white man like Hal Incandenza in 
Infinite Jest, who is likely to find opportunities for his sense-of-self and his senses-of-
community to overlap. For the young, working-class black man like Felix, however, 
there is no room in the Western neoliberal system of images for him to be recognized as 
anything but a problem, no matter how persistently he attempts to imbue his strategic 
performances with mimetic expressions of how he feels. 
  
To Belong with Others is to Become 
If for Wallace much of his characterization in fiction feels like a pushing outward, like a 
sense-of-self that must be located beneath the rotting detritus of culture and fostered 
back to life through the playing of language-games that privilege sincerity; Smith is 
much more interested in the way a messy topology of cultural milieux flow in and leak 
out via her character’s relationships. Consider Clara Bowden, an Afro-Caribbean woman 
who, when introduced to the story-world of Smith’s White Teeth, does not “descend … 
from on high, attached to nothing other than wings” (23). In order for the reader to come 
to know Clara, they must travel from the outside in: 
And there is no getting away from Ryan Topps. Just as a good historian 




comprehend his reluctance to invade the British in the west, so Ryan 
Topps is essential to any understanding of why Clara did what she did. 
(23)  
Smith’s characters-as-subjects are inextricably embedded—they are like organs whose 
functioning cannot be discerned outside the body. Swing Time is her fifth and most 
recent novel, and unlike the rest of her fiction, it is narrated in the first-person. While the 
reader is certainly granted access to the narrator’s affective interior, the narrator remains 
unnamed, leaving the reader bereft of any way to address the narrator except by proxy—
she is the daughter of a feminist Jamaican intellectual, the best friend of a dancer named 
Tracey. In the absence of such anchoring relationships, the narrator feels unmoored: 
“That autumn, in my first term at my new school, I found what I was without my friend: 
a body without a distinct outline” (Swing Time 213). In comparison with Wallace, in 
other words, the kind of subject Smith assumes is far more decentered, reconfigured 
such that her narrative lens attends more diligently to the spaces between characters. 
 There is a strong ethical dimension to Smith’s attending to the spaces in-between. 
In her essay “Middlemarch and Everybody,” she openly admires George Eliot as a writer 
of ideas, claiming that Eliot, inspired by Spinoza’s concept of conatus, “replaced 
metaphysics with human relationships” (Changing My Mind 39). Smith draws attention 
to the character of Fred Vincy, who “of all the people striving in Middlemarch,” is the 
only one “striving for a thing worth striving for” because he is “in love with a good girl, 
a girl who does not love him because he is not worthy” (36). Despite the unrequited 




in the absence of God, all our moral tests must take place on this earth and have as their 
rewards and punishments here. We are one another’s lesson, one another’s duty” (38). 
Taking the via-negativa in order to drive home her point, Smith highlights another 
moment in Middlemarch: “‘The theatre of all my actions is fallen,’ said an antique 
personage when his chief friend was dead; and they are fortunate who get a theatre 
where the audience demands their best” (qtd in Smith 37). As is the case with the 
narrator of Swing Time who is “a body without a distinct outline” without her best 
friend, Smith implicitly argues with Eliot that a sense-of-self, however robustly 
articulated, has no valuable function, no ‘worth’ without the stage provided by human 
relationships. 
Earlier in Changing My Mind in her essay on Forster, Smith writes that 
“connection, as everyone knows, was Forster’s great theme; between people, nations, 
heart and head, labor and art” (17). As I survey the various valences “only connect” 
accumulates throughout her work, I find the one at hand most clearly articulated by 
Christian Moraru in his essay “The Forster Connection or, Cosmopolitanism Redux”: 
In Smith, the world is world of relations rather than an assemblage of 
separate entities. We live fully, she suggests, to the extent that we make 
connections and relate to one another. In her view, relationality is world 
rationality, the very formula of being. To be is to be with others. (133) 
If I were to amend Moraru’s articulation for the purposes of my project, however, I 




In Howard’s End, we find Margaret Schlegel’s admonition to “Only connect!” 
contrasted with Henry Wilcox’s own philosophy: “My motto is Concentrate. I’ve no 
intention of frittering away my strength on that sort of thing” (Forster 168). Margaret’s 
response resonates here: “‘It isn’t frittering away the strength,’ she protested. ‘It’s 
enlarging the space in which you may be strong’.” In my amendment of Moraru (to 
belong with others is to become), the word “become” serves to capture Margaret’s sense 
of trajectory, the possibility of “enlarging the space” of being. Of Smith’s novels, White 
Teeth most demonstrates how connection serves to extend the horizon of becoming. 
Consider Millat, who has become the ringleader of a crew of misfits who call themselves 
the Raggastanis: 
Raggastanis spoke a strange mix of Jamaican patois, Bengali, Gujarati, 
and English. Their ethos, their manifesto, if it could be called that, was 
equally a hybrid thing: Allah featured, but more as a collective big 
brother than a supreme being, a hard-as-fuck geezer who would fight in 
their corner if necessary; kung fu and the works of Bruce Lee were also 
central to the philosophy; added to this was a smattering of Black Power 
(as embodied by the album Fear of a Black Planet, Public Enemy); but 
mainly their mission was to put the Invincible back in Indian, the Bad-
aaaass back in Bengali, the P-Funk back in Pakistani. (192)  
Parsing this passage using the terminology I establish in my second chapter, what Smith 
is describing is a language-game, which is comprised of memes (Allah, kung fu, Black 




patterns these memes, allowing a given performer’s affective heuristics to attribute value 
to the deployment of certain memes under certain conditions, with “value” here 
understood as the efficacy with which the performance will move the performer toward a 
position they autonomically strive to occupy. By referring to the Raggastani language-
game as “a hybrid thing,” Smith gestures toward the postcolonial concept of hybridity. 
While this concept does not entirely map onto a reading of White Teeth for reasons I will 
be explaining below, it is helpful in providing an account of the genesis and function of 
language-games like this one. In his foreword to Debating Cultural Hybridity, Homi K. 
Bhabha notes that “hybridity works with, and within, the cultural design of the present to 
reshape our understanding of the interstices—social and psychic—that link signs of 
cultural similitude with emergent signifiers of alterity” (III). In order to shed some light 
on the “cultural design of the present” in the novel, I must attend more to the context of 
the above passage. 
In this particular moment of the narrative, 14-year-old Millat has mobilized his 
Raggastanis to join a protest against Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses. No one in his 
crew has read the novel, but “people like Millat were on every channel and every radio 
and every newspaper and they were angry” about it (Smith White Teeth 194). While the 
Raggastani appropriation of Allah is likely as “blasphemous” as anything in Rushdie’s 
novel, Smith suggests that the true source of the anger of Millat and his crew is due to 
the paucity of positions available in the British imaginary for “people like Millat.” Millat 




a Paki no matter where he came from; that he smelled of curry; had no 
sexual identity; took other people’s jobs; or had no job and bummed off 
the state; or gave all the jobs to his relatives; that he could be a dentist or 
a shop-owner or a curry-shifter, but not a footballer or a film-maker; that 
he should go back to his own country; or stay here and earn his bloody 
keep; that he worshiped elephants and wore turbans; that no one who 
looked like Millat … was ever on the news unless they had recently been 
murdered. (194) 
According to the terminology of hybridity, the racist over/under-determination suffered 
by “people like Millat” is caused by what Bhabha calls a discursive “hollow” in 
hegemonic British culture, and “hybridity emerges from, and engages with, these 
‘hollows’ in the democratic regime. The agency of hybridity is profoundly shaped by 
these discriminatory, disempowering hollows” (Bhabha III). We can see, then, how the 
Raggastani language-game may have been a speculative contrivance of Smith’s formed 
as this group of 14-year-old kids’ response to the hollow of the British Paki—the 
invincible bad-ass with Allah in her corner as the inverse of the enfeebled curry-shifter 
bereft of sexuality. 
If in some ways the postcolonial theoretical lens of hybridity maps neatly onto 
aspects of Smith’s work, in other ways this mapping is strained by the humorous tone of 
her prose. As the Ragastannis ride the train to Bradford in order to take part in the 
protest, they banter among themselves: “‘Allah’ll fuck him up, yeah?’ cried Rajik, the 




Bruce Willis. ‘He’ll kick him in the balls. Dirty book.’” (194). In Rainer Emig’s essay 
“The Empire Tickles Back,” he considers the tightrope walked by authors who wish to 
marshal the political efficacy of hybridity while also employing humor. Interrogating 
films like Bend It Like Beckham, Emig notes that the “price to be paid” for winning over 
a mass-cinema audience “was a depiction of Asian-Britain as essentially quirky” (175). 
It is perhaps the case, particularly with White Teeth, that Smith’s sense of humor lends 
the text a “celebratory” tone38 and applies a veneer of quirkiness to her characters—a 
veneer which makes for an awkward postcolonial reading of the text. Thinking past this 
critique, however, Emig reminds us that Bhabha’s conception of hybridity and the kind 
of “third space” it creates “owe their formulation to the acknowledged influence of 
Bakhtinian theory,” and more specifically Bakhtin’s ideas about dialogism (171). Just as 
the novel provides a space where monolithic culture can be subverted and challenged 
when placed in dialog with the voice of the other, hybridity’s third space enables “other 
‘denied’ knowledges” to “enter upon the dominant discourse and estrange the basis of its 
authority—its rules of recognition” (172). In this way, then, hybridity can also be said to 
resonate with Bakhtin’s notion of the carnival, with its “joking temporal reversal of 
rules.” 
Coming back to the notion of connectedness and how it “enlarges the space” of 
being, if Smith’s depictions of hybrid, third spaces don’t overtly lend themselves to 
being mobilized for political purposes, it is because she is less interested in showing how 
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they resist hegemonic cultural norms and more interested in showcasing how these 
spaces become a kind of shelter for those inside them. Given the diversity of 
membership in Millat’s crew (Indian, Pakistani, Bengali), each member brings to the 
community their own internalized warehouse of citable, idiosyncratic memes built in 
moments of registering and enfolding both the diasporic cultural performances of their 
family and the performances found in the canon of Western pop culture. Having found 
each other in the discursive hollow of the British Paki, by renaming and owning this 
space, they are indeed “reversing the rules of recognition” and opening up the possibility 
for authenticating while integrating citations of these memes in their performances. A 
Bengali Raggastani can cite a Pakistani meme, and so long as the performance falls in 
line with the rhetorical grain of the Raggastani language-game, the performer is likely to 
be granted assent. In so doing, both the performer and her fellow Raggastanis will 
register and enfold the effects of the performance, thus effecting a “becoming” for both 
the performer, and via their audience, the Raggastani language-game itself. 
Given the nature of signs, there are no memes, no signifiers which can directly 
correspond to the signified, which according to the model of the authenticating human, 
are always the affective heuristics of the performer. That said, some memes are better 
than others at approximating how we feel in a moment of self-expression. Any 
community where one can perform sincerely and be authenticated has the potential to 
provide an extended horizon of citational precedence for the performer, and in the happy 
circumstances where the performer finds memetic content to cite within such a 




the performer is afforded by the community an opportunity to articulate a sense-of-self 
made more robust because it has been authorized by the other, inculcating in the 
performer a sense-of-belonging. 
If there is a place in Smith’s oeuvre where this valence for “only connect” is 
most distilled, it can be found in On Beauty, in the scene where Kiki Belsey meets 
Carlene Kipps. By the time we reach this scene, it has been established that Kiki’s 
husband Howard considers Carlene’s husband Monty to be his arch-nemesis. In a 
conciliatory gesture, Kiki approaches the Kipps’ new home intending to invite them to a 
party, and she finds Carlene in her garden. Their entire conversation is marked by the 
theme of connection-as-shelter, culminating in Carlene saying, “I love a line from a 
poem: There is such a shelter in each other.39 I think it is so fine. Don’t you think it’s a 
wonderful thing?” (93). The intimacy Carlene insists upon in this scene is startling for 
Kiki—at times she is “left with her mouth open.” Returning to my brief discussion of 
Bakhtin’s notion of “speech genres” in my second chapter and how, as I argue, the 
concept maps neatly onto what I mean by “memes” and how they themselves are subject 
to larger patterning memes or language-games, Bakhtin notes how “finer nuances of 
style are determined by the nature and degree of personal proximity of the addressee to 
the speaker” (Speech Genres 96). Implied here is the notion that proximity has a 
modulating effect on our affective heuristics, such that a greater degree of such 
proximity “gives rise to a certain candor of speech” (97). The apparent function of such 
                                                




candor is the establishment of a new space “more or less outside the framework of the 
social hierarchy and social conventions, ‘without rank,’ as it were.” Indeed, “in intimate 
styles this is expressed in an apparent desire for the speaker and addressee to merge 
completely” (97). Bakhtin’s identification of the “apparent desire” to merge completely 
has some Hegelian implications which, as I will show later, are ultimately incompatible 
with Smith’s conception of connection. Suffice it to say, however, that the opportunity to 
expand one’s horizon of becoming in moments of connection is due not only to a 
“reversal of the rules of recognition” which leaves oneself and the other freer to 
authenticate in a space “without rank,” but also to a privileging of candor—proximity 
through connection, in other words, modulates our affective heuristics, inviting us to 
articulate ourselves more sincerely, to become more intensely. 
Shortly after Carlene’s citation of the poem, their conversation is interrupted by a 
distraction: 
Just passing by the gate five white teenage girls, barely dressed, were 
going by. They had rolled-up towels under their arms and wet hair, stuck 
together in long sopping ropes, like the Medusa. They were all speaking 
at once. / ‘There is such a shelter in each other,’ repeated Mrs Kipps, as 
the noise grew fainter… (94) 
This distraction is rife with imagery—the members of this group are “barely dressed,” 
there is mention of rope, rolls of cloth, water, and a strange simile: “like the Medusa.” 
The presence of the article ‘the’ here feels out of place somehow, or placed intentionally 




reference, in fact, to Théodore Géricault’s painting The Raft of the Medusa, with its 
barely clad survivors waving sheets of cloth and clinging to each other in order to keep 
from falling off the raft and into the ocean. The title of the painting refers to the Medusa, 
“part of a convoy of vessels carrying soldiers, civic officials and colonists to Senegal” 
(Harper 136). When the ship ran aground, “the captain joined the lifeboats and ordered 
cables attached to a makeshift raft holding the remaining 135 crew and passengers. 
Accounts differ about whether the cables were cut or broke. The captain sailed away.” 
At first blush, given the grain of my discussion so far, it makes sense to consider the raft 
a metaphor for connection—it serves as a kind of shelter from the sea, and it 
circumscribes people who need each other to survive. However, there is a troubling 
ambiguity to this reference: “In the days that followed the most appalling acts of 
brutality and betrayal, including cannibalism and murder, took place among those 
abandoned on the raft” (136). This ambiguity is echoed by Carlene, who recounts how 
when told of the line from the poem, her husband Monty said “that was all very well but 
I should place it on a scale—a scale of judgment—and on the other side of the scale I 
should place L’enfer, c’est les autres. And then see which had more weight in the 
world!” (Smith On Beauty 94). Implied by this scene, first off, is the fact that whatever 
Smith means by connection-as-shelter, it is not a phenomenon reserved for those who 
find themselves in discursive hollows (while white, teenage girls find themselves 
gendered in the shadow of hegemonic Western masculinity, their brief appearance here 
doesn’t seem to call attention to this fact). The second implication is that connection-as-




in the hands of the other. The payoff can sometimes mean an expanded horizon; at other 
times, “hell is other people.” 
 While there are moments in Smith’s work, like the scene between Kiki and 
Carlene, that make evident the value of connection, there are just as many (if not more) 
scenes where connection costs so much that it feels less like a shelter and more like a 
trap. Kiki’s daughter Zora is smitten by a young, working class poet named Carl. While 
initially their relationship affords Carl the opportunity to attend creative writing courses 
at Zora’s university, when an expensive painting goes missing from a faculty member’s 
office, the coincidence of his presence is enough for several faculty members to accuse 
him of theft. A similar occurrence happens in Swing Time, when the rekindled 
relationship between the narrator and her friend Tracey leaves Tracey vulnerable to 
accusations of having stolen a cash box. NW is rife with such examples. In the opening 
pages, Leah answers a knock at her door to find an old classmate named Shar in need. 
Leah lets her in, pours her tea, and gives her money to get to the hospital. Upon seeing 
Shar to her cab, Shar gives Leah a kiss. Leah discovers later that Shar had scammed her, 
and the episode haunts her throughout the rest of the novel. Felix Cooper’s gesture of 
kindness toward a pregnant white woman on the tube costs him his life. 
The most disturbing instance of connection-as-cost occurs at the end of NW. 
Earlier, as Natalie wanders the streets of Willesden suffering from enough existential 
angst that she considers committing suicide, she is given connection-as-shelter by her 
estranged classmate Nathan Bogle. Gripped by the candor of their proximity, Nathan lets 




station, thereby making him an accessory to murder (370). Throughout the novel, Natalie 
and Leah, whose relationship forms the narratological backbone of the text, have 
become increasingly distant and at times even hostile toward each other. As the novel 
draws to a close, Leah has become paralyzed by depression, and Natalie is summoned by 
Leah’s husband to see if she can get Leah to talk: 
With what was left of clarity [Natalie] offered her friend a selection of 
aphorisms, axioms and proverbs the truth content of which she could only 
assume from their common circulation, the way one puts one’s faith in 
the face value of paper money. Honesty is always the best policy. Love 
conquers all… She spoke and Leah did not stop her, but Natalie was 
wasting her time. She was in breach of that feminine law that states no 
weakness may be shown by a woman to another woman without a 
sacrifice of equal value in return. Until Natalie paid up, in the form of a 
newly minted story, preferably intimate, hopefully secret, she wouldn’t be 
told anything in return… (398)  
Both Natalie and Leah are burdened with their respective secrets. Natalie’s marriage is 
in ruins upon her husband’s discovery of her sexual escapades. Leah, whose husband 
desperately wants children, has recently had an abortion she keeps secret from him 
because she does not want to have kids. Neither of them are aware of each other’s 
burdens, and neither are willing, here, to pay the cost required by connection. 




Leah found the number online. Natalie dialed it. It was Keisha who did 
the talking. Apart from the fact she drew the phone from her own pocket, 
the whole process reminded her of nothing so much as those calls the two 
good friends used to make to boys they liked, back in the day… “I got 
something to tell you,” said Keisha Blake, disguising her voice with her 
voice. (401) 
Apparently, the “secret” required to rekindle their connection was the one Natalie 
learned from Nathan Bogle. They are calling the police to turn him in, and the cost 
Nathan pays by connecting with Natalie is his freedom. The common thread that runs 
through these instances of disastrous connection is the fact that despite how connection 
entails a flattening of social hierarchy, the reversal of the rules of recognition is 
contingent upon the ephemeral context of a language-game inflected by intimacy. Once 
the spell of candor is lifted, the subject-position matrix snaps back into place with a 
vengeance, requiring a pound of flesh for the breach in protocol. And it is a price that is 
most often paid by the marginalized. 
On the surface, these disasters seem to work against my argument that Smith is 
calling for her readers to only connect. I would counter this, however, by insisting that 




beautiful in the world. On Beauty’s title is a reference to Elaine Scarry’s On Beauty and 
Being Just,40 wherein she writes: 
The banishing of beauty from the humanities in the last two decades has 
been carried out by a set of political complaints against it… Beauty is, at 
the very least, innocent of the charges against it, and it may even be the 
case that far from damaging our capacity to attend to problems of 
injustice, it instead intensifies the pressure we feel to repair existing 
injuries. (57) 
The disasters that befall Smith’s characters after moments of connection always come 
from the outside, from an impersonal system of oppression, even when the system’s 
wheels are set in motion through acts of betrayal. In these moments, the reader feels a 
sense of loss and injustice, of the potentiality of beauty trampled under ugly boots. 
Insisting on the “innocence” and inherent value of beauty is not the same as embracing 
the Hegelian notion that history cannot progress without its bloody battles and brutal 
subjugations. The ends do not justify the means. No amount of beauty can exculpate 
Natalie and Leah from their monstrous betrayal of Nathan Bogle. But for Smith, to say 
that the betrayal happened because of the beauty is a mistake. Rather, the beauty of 
Nathan’s granting-of-assent to Natalie shines despite the betrayal, and continues to do so 
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now as it casts light on the injustice of the color line that belts the global capitalist 
system. 
 
The Indispensable Mundane 
Smith is an author of the small. A writer of the mundane. In this way she is like 
Margaret Schlegel, who upon declaring “Only connect!” the whole of her sermon, 
reveals how connecting is related to a granularity of seeing: 
[Henry] simply did not notice things… He never noticed that Helen and 
Frieda were hostile, or that Tibby was not interested in currant 
plantations; he never noticed the lights and shades that exist in the grayest 
conversation, the finger-posts, the milestones, the collisions, the 
illimitable views. (Forster 168) 
The drama of becoming, for Smith, takes place on the stage of the everyday, and as her 
readers, we are granted access to the “lights and shades” of her character’s 
conversations: we get to watch as they try out “positionings,” and if we attend closely 
enough, we can detect the cleft that marks the difference between sincerity and other-
authentication. In White Teeth, a heated discussion takes place between Alsana Iqbal (the 
mother of Millat and Magid), a Bengali woman who is married to a much older man; and 
Alsana’s niece Neena, who while also Bengali, spent much of her youth in the United 
Kingdom, and identifies as a lesbian. The argument is over the ideal level of 
communication between spouses, and Alsana believes that “for a marriage to survive 




the papers, all this revelation—especially when your husband is old” (65). Neena, 
however, cannot stomach the notion “that a good dose of repression keeps a marriage 
healthy.” Consider the exchange that follows: 
[Alsana says,] “What you don’t understand, my Niece-of-Shame, what 
none of your generation understands…” / At which point Neena cannot 
stop a piece of onion from escaping from her mouth due to the sheer 
strength of her objection. “My generation? For fuckssake, you’re two 
years older than me, Alsi.” 
Here we have crystalized, like a fly trapped in amber, an example of a moment of 
sincerity as I conceive of it under the auspices of the authenticating human. As Alsana 
forms her utterance, her feelings guide and direct the way she strings together pieces of 
memetic content, and in a moment of articulation, she dons a positioning the way one 
might put on a shirt—she attempts to occupy “member of an older, wiser generation.” 
Her attempt to authenticate in this way is rejected by Neena. Alsana, however, has spent 
years of her life being married to a man twenty-five years her senior. The fact of her age 
has little to do with her sense-of-belonging to an older generation: “Alsana continues 
regardless, miming a knife slicing through the Niece-of-Shame tongue-of-obscenity”: 
“[What none of your generation understands] is that not everybody wants to see into 
everybody else’s sweaty, secret parts” (65). Alsana’s dismissal of Neena’s objection 
marks the cleft between what I have been referring to as self-authentication (sincerity), 
whereby Alsana’s affective-heuristics fail to flag her own positioning (belonging to an 




grant assent to Alsana’s positioning. According to my model of the authenticating 
human, the effect of this felicitous moment of sincerity on Alsana’s part is a moment of 
becoming whereby her sense-of-self has become more strongly associated with the 
nexus of memes that resonate in her mind with “older generation.” Had Neena granted 
assent to this performance, the effect of that felicitous moment of interpersonal 
authentication might have been a moment of becoming on the part of everyone 
participating in the conversation—everyone present may have enfolded associations 
between Alsana and “older generation,” thereby inflecting the nexus of memes they 
associate with both entities, if only incrementally. 
For Smith, the mundane also forms the crucible from which emerges (if 
iteratively and over large swaths of time) the very fabric of culture. Her prose envisions 
how small moments set the stage for a renegotiation of the more deeply sedimented, 
infrastructural elements of culture, i.e. religion: 
If religion is the opiate of the people, tradition is an even more sinister 
analgesic, simply because it rarely appears sinister. If religion is a tight 
band, a throbbing vein, and a needle, tradition is a far homelier 
concoction: poppy seeds ground into tea; a sweet cocoa drink laced with 
cocaine; the kind of thing your grandmother might have made. (161) 
The difference between homely, localized traditions and something as far-reaching as 
religion is a difference in potency, dissemination, and embeddedness. Something as 
infrastructural as religion forms the roots of the tree of culture. But Smith insists that 




characters believe that religion forms “deep roots that no storm or gale could displace” 
(161-2), Smith’s fiction often imagines moments of large-scale upheaval so violent that 
“a mammoth tree” will “[tear] itself from the dog shit and the concrete” and land itself 
squarely in one’s living room (188). These moments of upheaval, however, are always 
coming from the outside in her work, from a confluence of impersonal forces that are not 
attributable, in terms of agency, to any one of her characters. 
The final scene of White Teeth can be read as such a moment of violent rupture, 
where the advent of gene-splicing, embodied in the tumor-sprouting “OncoMouse” is 
put on display in Trafalgar Square on New Year’s Eve in 1992. Gathered together in this 
narrative space are fundamentalist Muslims and Christians along with atheist scientists 
and eco-terrorists. Each group is possessed of its own agenda, and is composed of its 
own motley assortment of characters whose homely, mundane interactions form the 
meat of Smith’s text. It’s from the grist of the mundane, Smith seems to argue, that the 
opportunity to renegotiate culture-wide, infrastructural protocols of authentication (what 
counts and doesn’t count as a valid performance) presents itself—the fate of kings and 
empires rests, ultimately, on what one chooses to put in one’s tea. This implies 
something about agency: if we have it, it lies buried somewhere in our affective-
heuristics. Not so much a series of decisions we consciously make, but a bleeding 
through of our singular experiences, an inflecting of the language-games we play with 
our small, idiosyncratic feelings. 
Perhaps for this reason, Smith feels ambivalent toward the political. She often 




sense” (Thalia); and echoed in 2018: “I am not by nature a political person” (Feel Free 
41). This suspicion of the political is derived from her conception of the human being as 
fundamentally limited: “I believe in human limitation, not out of any sense of fatalism 
but out of a learned caution, gleaned from both recent and distant history” (39). These 
limitations do not, however, preclude societal change: “There is still this redeeming 
matter of incremental progress. It might look small to those with apocalyptic 
perspectives, but to she who not so long ago could not vote, or drink from the same 
water fountain as her fellow citizens, or marry the person she chose, or live in a certain 
neighborhood, such incremental change feels enormous” (38). Political change happens, 
and the effects are “enormous,” but the conditions for such change emerge from the 
small, the incremental, the everyday. In order to bring about change, we must first take 
care to only connect by attending to the mundane. 
Political change aside, this attendance to the mundane is ultimately where, Smith 
feels, one can imbue life with something like meaning. In her essay “Smith Family 
Christmas,” she admits that “Christmas is the enforcement of ideals that, in truth, do not 
matter” (Changing My Mind 228). She likens it, along with things like God or marriage, 
to a dream. She finds value, however, in “letting go of that Kantian will of yours, … 
giving it up to a beautiful, insane, mystical idea” (229). The value of “letting go” is that 
it opens you up to connection, where the play of the mundane can work its magic: “It is, 
of course, Family (messy, complex, miserable, happy, so many gradations of those last 
two words) that is the real gift, beneath the wrapping. Family is the daily miracle” (228). 




work are yet another reason why I find reading her alongside Wallace compelling: they 
qualify her as belonging to Wallace’s “next literary ‘rebels’” who are “dare to back away 
from ironic watching” and treat “old untrendy human troubles and emotions” with 
“reverence and conviction” (“E Unibus” 192). 
 
Prayers for Love  
In Smith’s article “In Memoriam: Zadie Smith on David Foster Wallace,” she writes 
chiefly about Wallace’s Brief Interviews with Hideous Men, implicitly arguing that his 
short story collection functions as a kind of homily preached within a context where one 
can become “giddy with po-mo relativity” because “the logic of the market seeps into 
every aspect of life” and it feels as though “you get to decide what you worship.” 
According to Smith, Wallace’s work reminds us that, despite this freedom to choose, 
“nine times out of ten we worship ourselves.” Her final word on Wallace’s Brief 
Interviews sounds less like a description of Wallace’s work and more like a description 
of her own: 
When the praying man puts his hands together, the gesture might be 
metaphysical, but he’s seeking a genuine human connection, which, in 
Dave’s stories, is as hard to find as any god. Love is the ultimate value, 
the absurd, impossible thing—the only thing worth praying for. 
If Wallace fetishizes moments of bravery where, despite the risk of seeming naïve or 
overly sentimental within the postmodern cultural milieu, one chooses to articulate 




despite “the logic of the market” which atomizes, commodifies, and then alienates the 
self, one “prays for love” by recognizing human relationships as the only escape route 
out of solipsism. Much of Smith’s dialogue is a “prayer for love” in that, regardless of 
whatever else the utterance is doing, it also functions as a bid to authenticate with the 
other. In a moment of authentication, the speaker and audience both open the door for a 
chance, however minutely, to adjust the protocols of authentication (what it takes to 
belong) by means of the deployment-of and then granting-assent-to the speaker’s 
performance.  
 There is a kind of sanctification, or re-enchantment of mundane human 
interaction in the assumption that every iterative human performance in the presence of 
the other constitutes an adjustment of the protocols of authentication. The word 
“enchantment” is typically associated in the discourses of the humanities with Max 
Weber’s framing of the ascendency of modern science as a disenchantment, an 
encroachment of the always self-surpassing valuation of scientific achievement over all 
other forms of value creation, including its own (“Max Weber”). The result, according to 
Weber, is that “aesthetic values now stand in irreconcilable antagonism to religious 
values, transforming ‘value judgments (Werturteile) into judgments of taste 
(Geschmacksurteile) by which what is morally reprehensible becomes merely what is 
tasteless.’” This sentiment is echoed by Wallace: “this modernist legacy has formed part 
of a more general ‘intellectualization and aestheticizing of principles and values in this 




Among authors like Smith and Wallace at the turn of the millennium, there was a 
renewed impulse to sound the alarm over “disenchantment,” which has been a persistent 
feature of Western culture since the Enlightenment. It is my contention that this impulse 
arose out of a general cultural anxiety about the nature of the subject, an anxiety that 
stemmed in part from the explosion of the global media industry and the birth of the 
internet. In the face of such exponential growth in both the production and dissemination 
of media, suddenly the implications of the decentered subject of poststructuralism 
seemed more dire. The “surface area” of power’s influence came to include swaths of 
new territory, “territory” both in terms of the nature of the media and the duration and 
frequency of exposure. Throughout the nineties, Wallace was wary of the 5-6 hours per 
diem of television watching the average Westerner. In The Autograph Man, Smith’s 
narrator declares that “You watch too many films is one of the great modern sentences. It 
has in it a hint of understanding regarding what we were before and what we have 
become” (324). In her most recent book of essays, she speaks of “generations” of 
humans using the rhetoric of upgrades, referring to her generation as “Person 1.0” and 
those of her students as “People 2.0” (Feel Free 45). The difference between them, she 
argues, is in part due to Facebook, which is “some of the software currently shaping their 
generation” (46): “We know what we are doing ‘in’ the software. But do we know, are 
we alert to what the software is doing to us? Is it possible that what is communicated 
between people online ‘eventually becomes their truth’?” (56). She is not neutral about 




Harvard sophomore,” it directly impacts the subject in ways that might not be healthy 
(63). 
Imbricated with anxiety about media exposure is the assumption of a subject that 
inevitably becomes, regardless of how mundane the experience it registers. It may be 
that the widespread popularization of cognitive behavioral therapy in the late nineties,41 
with its implicit blurring of the line between our thoughts (mind) and our behavior 
(body), was a contributing factor to this anxiety. Our very thoughts and feelings, 
according to this paradigm, are conditioned by what we habitually do and experience. 
Given this newly popularized understanding of the subject of neuroplasticity and the 
scale of the media bombarding it, what are the limits of this influence, and what features 
of human being might it threaten? Wallace’s Infinite Jest explores the hypothetical that 
there are no limits to media’s influence (consuming the film to which the title refers 
results in the total paralysis of anything like agency), and as I show in my third chapter, 
what is threatened by this infinite influence is the subject’s ability to foster a sense-of-
self robust enough to be able to make any value judgments at all. As I have shown here, 
a recurrent concern of Smith’s work is the inescapable pervasiveness of a “system of 
images,” and the tendency for the impersonal forces that arbitrarily categorize human 
beings into hierarchical stratifications of privilege to isolate and alienate people, 
threatening the possibility of “genuine human connection.” 
                                                
41 In psychologist Albert Ellis’ “The Rise of Cognitive Behavior Therapy” (2001), he 
notes that cognitive behavioral therapy “is perhaps the most common form of 
psychological treatment that therapists actually do today, no matter what system of 




What I try to show in the brief genealogy of sincerity I provide in my third 
chapter is that anxieties like these are cyclical. Just as, in the early modern period, the 
downfall of Catholicism led to anxieties about one’s soteriological status and who can be 
trusted to verify it—anxieties which in turn led to a fetishization of sincerity—so too can 
we consider the turn of the millennium a time when the drastic acceleration of the 
deterritorializing flows of capital led to similar anxieties and a similar fixation on 
sincerity. I would like to add here, however, another layer of resonance between the 
early modern period and our own. Consider Harold Bloom’s controversial, opening 
remarks to Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human: 
Literary character before Shakespeare is relatively unchanging; woman 
and men are represented as aging and dying, but not as changing because 
their relationship to themselves, rather than to the gods or God, has 
changed. In Shakespeare, characters develop rather than unfold, and they 
develop because they reconceive themselves. Sometimes this comes 
about because they overhear themselves talking, whether to themselves 
or to others. (xvii) 
The central argument of Bloom’s book is that “Shakespeare will go on explaining us, in 
part because he invented us,” and it lies far outside the scope of this project to either 
defend or refute statements like Bloom’s. Suffice it to say, however, that the subject of 
literature does not emerge unchanged by the turmoil of the early modern period—the 
function of the literary character adapted to explore questions about who we are, how we 




locate a similar, albeit far more subtle adaptation in the character function of the 
literature of Smith’s generation of writers—a shift I attempt to detect by attending to the 
dialectics of becoming in their work. 
 In Western philosophy, the notion of human becoming via dialectical encounters 
with the other finds its nexus in Hegel, and as Butler shows in Subjects of Desire, one 
can read 20th century French theory as in part a struggle to move beyond the dialectic 
found in The Phenomenology of the Spirit. In Butler’s words, the Phenomenology 
provides the following account of human becoming: 
The Hegelian subject expands in the course of its adventure through 
alterity; it internalizes the world that it desires, and expands to 
encompass, to be, what it initially confronts as other to itself. The final 
satisfaction of desire is the discovery of substance as subject, the 
experience of the world as everywhere confirming that subject’s sense of 
immanent metaphysical place. (9) 
Implicit in this conception is a trajectory, one that vectors both individual and historical 
becoming, and popular Western notions of progress often assume such linearity of 
progress. Smith rejects such notions: “progress is never permanent, will always be 
threatened, must be redoubled, restated and reimagined if it is to survive” (Feel Free 
41). There is also a kind of singularity implicit in the Hegelian dialectic—a self-
conscious, singular subject encounters a self-conscious other, and both are sublated in 




Tynan points out in the opening of this chapter, Smith’s characters have no fixed core. 
One of the epigraphs to Feel Free seems relevant here: 
‘The eyes are not windows. There are nerve impulses, but no one reads 
them, counts them, translates them, and ruminates about them. Hunt for 
as long as you want, there’s nobody home. The world is contained within 
you, and you’re not there.’ / —Daniel Kehlmmann (iii)  
In my second chapter, I do insist on something like singularity for the authenticating 
human, but this singularity resides in the unique patterning and intensity of the pure 
association stored within our neuro-synaptic network. This singularity ought not be 
conflated with something like a sense-of-self, which gets built in the course of 
registering and enfolding while playing language-games. We likely possess as many 
“senses-of-self” as there are language-games that we find ourselves habitually playing, 
and if there’s something like an orchestration between them, it is due to the need to 
efficiently route our associative traffic, and not some kind of inevitable sublation of the 
many according to a unifying telos inherent in the cosmos. The “becoming” envisioned 
by the authenticating human can just as readily lead to fragmentation, to splitting, to 
insurmountable trauma. 
 Additionally, Hegel’s becoming tends to have a single lens, a focus on the One 
subject and the single event. What becomes during “encounters with alterity” according 
to the authenticating human is always a multiplicity of entities at several levels of 
stratification: the neuro-synaptic networks of the performer and each audience member; 




audience member) appealed to in the performer’s citation of memetic content; the 
memes themselves as they accrue new inflections via the performance in the minds of 
every witness; the language-games (including the positions available for players to 
occupy) that pattern these memes; and in felicitous circumstances, a sense-of-self, 
perhaps sutured to a sense-of-community, inculcating in the performer a sense-of-
belonging. And this multiplicity of becomings, of course, is happening at different times 
for different people, over and over again with the granularity of milliseconds in 
neurological time. If there can be said to be a single, overarching thing that “becomes” in 
the wake of a performance, it is what I’ve been referring to as the protocols of 
authentication. 
 Perhaps the most striking difference between a Hegelian dialectic of becoming 
and the one offered here has to do with the function of the “otherness” of the other. With 
Hegel, the other serves as both a limit on the freedom of self-consciousness and as the 
source of “the acknowledging look of the Other who confirms us” (Butler 47). The other 
stands in the way, so to speak, of the Hegelian subject’s desire to find itself reflected in 
the world, and so the erotics of this desire manifest in the subject as a drive to either 
destroy or merge with the other. For the authenticating human, however, encounters with 
the other can only ever take place within the context of a language-game, and so the 
function of the other’s “otherness” is always to locate oneself on the field of play, to 
establish the relative value of one’s positioning. In this way, the difference between 
Hegel’s becoming and that of the authenticating human is like the difference between 




 Altogether, the kind of becoming experienced by the subject of Smith’s fiction is 
more akin to the line-of-flight for Deleuzian nomad: 
This is how is should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment 
with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find 
potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, 
experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out 
continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new 
land at all times. (Thousand Plateaus 161) 
Inherent in this prescription is the assumption of a “self” that is not “a person, subject, 
thing, or substance,” but rather “relations of movement and rest between molecules or 
particles, capacities to affect and be affected,” or what Deleuze and Guattari (D&G) 
refer to as a “haecceity” (261). How can such a thing possess “a small plot of land,” or 
be capable of lodging itself anywhere? According to D&G, “it is by conjugating, by 
continuing with other lines, other pieces, that one makes a world that can overlay the 
first one, like a transparency” (280). Mapping these valences for “only connect” onto 
this way of thinking about the subject, one “conjugates” by imbuing strategic language-
game moves with memetic representations of one’s feelings; by taking risks, by 
enlarging the space in which you can be strong; by hunting for “lines of flight” within 
the present mundane for opportunities to become. These conjugations make something 
like an efficaciously real space—a newly inflected language-game position, a world, a 
raft, a stratum. And regardless of how constructed or contingent or ephemeral, when we 




are granted opportunities to articulate ourselves, and depending on the felicity of such 
performances, we establish a more robust sense-of-self, “a small plot of land” that 
constitutes our point of departure for the next moment of becoming. 
 By conceiving of the subject in this way, as an assemblage of relations in 
ephemeral space, encounters with alterity are less like occasions for mutual recognition 
and more like re-mappings of territory—what D&G refer to as “reterritorialization.” 
Proximity to the other is not figured here as an asymptote of knowledge, it is not an 
affordance of the opportunity to increasingly come to “know” the other. It is rather the 
affordance of an opportunity to articulate what it’s like to be with the other, to describe 
and enact connection-as-space. As such, the other always remains wholly other, and this 
otherness is ultimately what “sanctifies” or “enchants” a granting-of-assent—it is the 
inauguration of a new world despite the unbridgeable chasm that separates its 
inhabitants. 
In Smith’s oeuvre, the enchanted nature of connection is placed most boldly on 
display in White Teeth. Consider Samad Iqbal (Alsana’s husband), who says, “you make 
a devil’s pact when you walk into this country … where you are never welcomed, only 
tolerated” (336). As time passes and the immigrant becomes according to the protocols 
around him, “you begin to give up the very idea of belonging” (337). Samad’s lament 
about a vanishing sense-of-belonging is delivered as dialogue to Irie Jones, the daughter 
of Clara Bowden and Samad’s best friend Archie Jones. Irie inherits her black skin from 
her mother, skin which grants her an even lower default level of ethos according to 




like paradise to her” (337). When Samad asks Irie whether she empathizes with Samad’s 
feelings of loss, Irie recognizes that “what he really meant was: do we speak the same 
language? Are we from the same place? Are we the same?” (337). As a response to these 
questions, “Irie squeezed his hand and nodded vigorously, trying to ward off his tears. 
What else could she tell him but what he wanted to hear? ‘Yes,’ she said. ‘Yes, yes, 
yes.’” In the context of the connection-as-space that “conjugates” Samad and Irie, 
Samad’s expression of lament at belonging nowhere constitutes a “prayer for love,” a 
bid to authenticate, an attempt to belong. What Smith’s prose helps us to see is how, 
beyond the locutionary effects of an utterance like Samad’s (unless you’re white, you’ll 
never feel like you belong in London), every utterance also functions as a bid to 
authenticate. We are able to see how the felicity of any speech act ultimately depends 
not on whether the audience agrees with the perceived content of the speech, but on 
whether the audience assents to the position in the language-game that the speaker is 
attempting to occupy. When Irie repeats the word “yes” to Samad, she is not agreeing 
with his characterization of the cosmopolis as dystopia, or to his assertion that he and 
Irie are the same. Rather, she is granting assent to his attempt to belong with her in his 
sadness despite the fact that she is overdetermined by a separate gender, race, and age. 
While the immediate effect of this felicitous moment of sincerity on Samad’s part may 
be an enfolding of associations that will embolden him to articulate dystopic 
characterizations of the cosmopolis in the future, Irie’s granting-of-assent to Samad also 
inculcates a sense-of-belonging in both of them, one that will push against Samad’s 




Samad go on to perform the calculus of evaluating their positioning in whatever 
language-games they find themselves playing in the future, that calculus will now 
include, however minutely, a consideration of this new conjugation, this world layered 
like a transparency on-top of the old one. 
 
Toward an Ethics of Becoming 
As I have attempted to show, the kind of subject assumed by Smith’s fiction is one for 
whom connection provides an avenue for becoming, not just for the subject herself, but 
for the entire “world” instantiated by her encounter with the other, with its languages-
games and the positions they make available to occupy. By participating in worlds like 
these, no matter how mundane, a tantalizing possibility presents itself, depending on 
how much agency we’re willing to ascribe to the performing subject: the possibility for 
intentionally molding these language-games, for affecting what it takes to belong. In my 
second chapter, as I schematize this authenticating human, I side in many ways with the 
poststructuralist conception of agency, which minimizes, almost to the point of 
disappearing, the conscious sovereignty of the subject over her own behavior. I would 
like to nuance that discussion here by making an important qualification. 
By subsuming all bodily sensation, including cognition, under the rubric of 
“affect,” and by claiming that all affective phenomena are autonomic (a system that 
registers, reacts, and enfolds independently and below the level of consciousness), I am 
not arguing for something like behavioralism or determinism, which holds that discourse 




computer, determining all of human behavior. Such behavioralism requires total 
consistency in the way every human reacts to the same memetic content, just like a 
computer program requires the total consistency provided by the same operating system 
running on multiple computers. The authenticating human insists on singularity, enough 
distinctness in terms of the ordering and intensity of experience to guarantee that the 
same piece of memetic content will never be registered in the exact same ways by any 
two human beings. As such, even though agency is happening automatically, beneath the 
level of consciousness, the performing subject still operates with its own unique set of 
concerns and priorities, representing itself (both in the mimetic and the legislative sense) 
in the language-games it plays. For the performing subject who experiences pain and 
suffering due to the unavailability of viable language-game positions, or even for the 
writing subject who, as a “born-ogler,” perceives such pain and suffering, their own 
unique set of concerns can come to include something like a desire for justice, for a more 
ethical “system of images.” 
Indeed, for Smith the production of what she calls “good writing” requires an 
awareness of the suffering of others: 
Now, a sad American writer, who feels the sadness all around him, has a 
responsibility at this present moment to recall the what-if, the equal pains 
of other people, many of them brown-skinned and far away… This 
sadness takes on a moral aspect and becomes good writing and good 
being (good writing requires, demands good being, I’m absolutely 




The main thrust of this chapter is a reading of Smith’s oeuvre in this light, assuming that 
her work is, at least in part, an attempt to address the suffering of the Western neoliberal 
subject by prescribing a form of connection that solicits sincere expression, that provides 
a shelter and a new horizon for that expression, that attends to the mundane in order to 
set the stage for larger renegotiations of what it takes to belong, and that re-enchants our 
granting-of-assent to the other. Read alongside Wallace’s prescription to be sincere, a 
dialectic of becoming emerges, one that figures a robust sense-of-self and a secure 
sense-of-belonging as vital for the subject caught-up in the deterritorializing flows of 
capital at the turn of the millennium in the neoliberal West. Given this assumption about 
what the subject needs in order to flourish, we find an ethic that insists on playing 
language-games that privilege sincerity, on recognizing and promoting the inherent 
value, warranted by beauty, of human connection. Be sincere! Only connect! So that you 







CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSION: JONATHAN FRANZEN, DAVE EGGERS, JEFFREY EGUENIDES, 
AND THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICATION 
 
In my introduction, I provided as a rationale for reading the fiction of Zadie Smith and 
David Foster Wallace together the hypothesis that their work is exemplary of a larger 
trend that characterizes the work of their literary generation—a generation frequently 
positioned as coming after postmodernism. I further suggest that one of the identifying 
features of this body of work is the assumption of a more affect-centered model of 
subjectivity, a model I refer to as the authenticating human, which I attempt to 
schematize in my second chapter. In this concluding chapter, I will attempt to subject a 
small sampling of the work of Jonathan Franzen, Dave Egggers, and Jeffrey Eugenides 
to the “litmus test” of the authenticating human to make some initial assessments as to 
whether they indeed assume such a subject when crafting their characters. Throughout 
these readings, I will also work toward fleshing out what I call the ethics of 
authentication, which itself tries to take seriously the notion that the subject’s affective 
health in part depends upon its ability to on the one hand speak sincerely for the 
establishment of a sense-of-self, and on the other be granted assent within community 
for the establishment of a sense-of-belonging. I wrap things up by outlining the scope of 
future work for this project, both in terms of my pedagogy and scholarship. 
 In her monograph Affect and American Literature in the Age of Neoliberalism, 




proliferation of what she calls the “affective hypothesis,” which is “the belief that 
literature is at its most meaningful when it represents and transmits the emotional 
specificity of personal experience” (1). Her overarching goal is to trouble this hypothesis 
in part by showing how literature at the turn of the millennium has a tendency to figure 
one’s affects as being privately owned and managed not unlike a stock portfolio, and this 
casting of affect as “personal” has the effect of reifying (rather than resisting) the logic 
of neoliberalism: “Under neoliberalism, a model of the subject emerges that reconciles 
the contradictory commitments of democratic citizenship and capitalist competition by 
jettisoning the political demands of liberalism and retaining the economic imperatives of 
the liberal market” (5). As a case-in-point, she briefly examines both the content and 
reception of Franzen’s The Corrections, and begins by drawing attention to the 
following scene: 
Although in general Gary applauded the modern trend toward individual 
self-management of retirement funds and long-distance calling plans and 
private-schooling options, he was less than thrilled to be given 
responsibility for his own personal brain chemistry, especially when 
certain people in his life, notably his father, refused to take such 
responsibility. But Gary was nothing if not conscientious. As he entered 
the darkroom, he estimated that his levels of Neurofactor 3 (i.e., 
serotonin: a very, very important factor) were posting seven-day or even 
thirty-day highs, that his Factor 2 and Factor 7 levels were likewise 




early-morning slump related to the glass of Armagnac he’d drunk at 
bedtime. He had a spring in his step, an agreeable awareness of his above-
average height and his late-summer suntan. His resentment of his wife, 
Caroline, was moderate and well contained. Declines led advances in key 
indices of paranoia (i.e., his persistent suspicion that Caroline and his two 
older sons were mocking him), and his seasonally adjusted assessment of 
life’s futility and brevity was consistent with the overall robustness of his 
mental economy. He was not the least bit clinically depressed. (137-138) 
In the above passage, Gary Lambert, who is the vice president of a bank, imagines his 
brain as an economic scene, where the performance of certain neuro-chemical indices 
determine emotions and thought-patterns, somewhat constituting an affect-centered 
model of subjectivity, though one satirically imagined as being measured and potentially 
controlled not unlike a stock-market. R.G. Smith argues that “the parallels between 
personal experience and the economic logics that underlie neoliberalism extend beyond 
these satirical passages to the structure of the novel itself,” as evidenced by the novel’s 
organizing conceit of “correction”—a term that refers not only to the stock-market 
correction after the dot-com bubble bursts at the end of the novel, but also to the various 
course corrections Lambert family members undergo (8). 
 In my second chapter, I suggested a kind of homologous relationship between the 
neurological and the economic at two different strata of the authenticating human: the 
efficiently hierarchical yet also associatively rhyzomic patterning of our neuro-synaptic 




Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, and the “affective mathematics” that 
govern the memetic transfer are not unlike the ways in which commodities are ascribed 
value in a capitalist marketplace. What these homologies imply for my purposes here is 
that, like the free-market, both the topology and functioning of the neurological system 
are subjected to a kind of efficiency that self-corrects in ways that have nothing to do 
with “agency.” While I share R.G. Smith’s observation that the novel belies “an apparent 
acceptance of the notion that the economy and the personal function in tandem,” she also 
reads passages like the above “as affectively reinforcing neoliberal norms,” such as the 
cult of “wise self-management” and the notion that “if properly managed, [the self-as-
market will] continue to rise over time” (11, 9). I would argue, however, that Franzen’s 
satirical tone in the passage above functions specifically to critique the notion that one’s 
affects can ever be “wisely managed,” as evidenced by Gary’s denial of being “the least 
bit clinically depressed”—a denial revealed as such later in the novel. Indeed, when 
Gary eventually admits to his wife that he is “extremely depressed,” it releases “weeks 
of accumulated tension” such that “he felt euphoric” (234). Gary does not experience 
this correction of his affective state as the result of wise self-management. He 
experiences it as a “surrender” (234). 
 Reading what Gary experiences in terms of the authenticating human, Gary’s 
denial of his depression via his positioning as “shrewd affect portfolio manager” in the 
language-game of self-help results in a swelling tide of affective leakage which builds 
and pressurizes, compelling him to drink too much and act recklessly. It is only when he 




and only when his wife, no longer estranged from him, grants assent to his performance 
by engaging in sexual intercourse, that Gary establishes a more robust sense-of-self: 
The thought came to him—inappropriately, perhaps, considering the 
tender conjugal act that he was now engaged in; but he was who he was, 
he was Gary Lambert, he had inappropriate thoughts and he was sick of 
apologizing!—that he could now safely ask Caroline to buy him 4,500 
shares of Axon and that she would gladly do it. (235) 
 I would argue, in other words, that the “euphoria” Gary feels upon confessing his 
depression is precisely the feeling of authentication—of having articulated something 
about himself, and upon registering the context updated by that articulation, of feeling 
“right,” as though something had clicked into place. If the resulting sense-of-self that 
becomes as a result of this felicitous speech-act can be reckoned as a “correction,” I 
would argue that it would be a mistake to conflate that correction with an adjustment that 
will inevitably lead to a “rise in the market.” The “4,500 shares of Axon” Gary 
purchases, arguably as a result of this becoming, end up hurting him in the long run, as it 
is later revealed that “he’d taken a nasty little bath on a biotech IPO whose shares he 
couldn’t sell before June 15” (562). Gary has not positioned himself to become more 
successful or virtuous. He is rather more firmly locatable, more comfortable in his skin, 
and thanks to the assent of his wife, he more readily belongs. I believe it is precisely this 
attention to the role affect plays in human becoming that prompt critics to position 
authors like Franzen as coming after postmodernism. As critic Sam Tanenhaus claims in 




its tangled circuitry and inserted in its place the warm, beating heart of an authentic 
humanism” (qtd in R.G. Smith, 10).  
 Setting aside the homology between capitalist and affective economies, I’d like 
to entertain a slightly different analogy for the economy by thinking of it as “language-
game” for the purpose of nuancing what I consider to be the ethics of authentication. In 
the last pages of the novel, Gary’s mother Enid reflects on the dot-com bubble bust: 
It seemed to Enid that current events in general were more muted or 
insipid nowadays than they’d been in her youth. She had memories of the 
1930’s, she’d seen firsthand what could happen to a country when the 
world economy took its gloves off; she’d helped her mother pass out 
leftovers to homeless men in the alley behind their roominghouse. But 
disasters of this magnitude no longer seemed to befall the United States. 
Safety features had been put in place, like the squares of rubber that every 
modern playground was paved with, to soften impacts. (561) 
I draw attention to this passage in order to reflect on whether, just as “safety features” 
can purportedly be built into an economy to shelter its participants from the destabilizing 
effects of self-correction, it might be apt to consider the respective prescriptions of 
Wallace and Smith to “be sincere” and “only connect” as, at least in part, specifications 
for “safety features” that can be built into language-games in order to “soften the 
impact” from the destabilizing effects of deterritorialization. 
Deterritorialization, as I understand the term, is the effect of the constantly 




the wiles of the neoliberal marketplace. By way of example, consider the academic job 
market in the humanities. According to Jonathan Kramnick, whose article “How the Jobs 
Crisis Has Transformed Faculty Hiring” appears in The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
the nature of the hiring process is highly dependent on the field in question, and is 
everywhere “shaped by codes that are nowhere spelled out.” Considered in terms of the 
authenticating human, these codes are comprised of memetic content that must be 
felicitously cited by job applicants in order to be authenticated as a “good candidate”—
they are, in other words, the protocols of authentication. Ever since the 2008 recession, 
and particularly in the humanities, “the number of tenure-track jobs has precipitously 
declined,” and “the implosion of the market colors everything—from the morale of 
students worried about their future to the habits of search committees enjoying a buyers’ 
market.” This crisis has resulted in “broad cultural and institutional shifts.” Whereas 
“there used to be a single job list that appeared in print in mid-October with minor 
supplements added later in the year,” “today that job list has gone digital, appears earlier 
with frequent updates, and has several major rivals.” Whereas “hiring committees as a 
rule used to interview candidates at the annual conference of the Modern Language 
Association,” now, thanks to the wide adoption of, to use Wallace's term, “videophony” 
(Skype, Google Hangouts, etc.), “a once-uniform timeline between advertisements and 
offers has come undone.” The protocols of authentication, in other words, have shifted 
greatly and with great speed over the course of a decade. 
One way to analyze this crisis specifically as a “crisis of authentication” is to 




in my second chapter, there often exists a cleft between what the pressures of the 
language-game compel us to articulate (the strategic) and what we’re actually feeling 
(the mimetic), resulting in a swell of affective “leakage” in the subject. When occupying 
the position of the seller in a buyer’s market, the strategic drastically over-inflects the 
language-game, leaving little if any “space-as-time” for the subject to engage in the 
pursuit of sincere articulation, resulting in feelings of paralysis, as the subject is bereft of 
a sense of “hereness” from which to venture forth. Given the inherently competitive 
nature of such games, and given the dearth of opportunities for the subject to be granted 
assent, the subject also feels alienated, with nowhere to belong. Such an ethics calls 
attention to these feelings of paralysis and alienation, counting them as real human 
suffering—suffering which indicates the existence of real impediments to “becoming.” 
To the degree that the subject experiences affective leakage as a kind of 
suffering, it seems to follow that the establishment of a more robust sense-of-self would 
require the subject to make sense of their condition through what Paul Ricoeur refers to 
as the work of emplotment.42 To articulate “what happened” using the power of narrative 
temporally configures painful experiences on a trajectory of becoming that locates the 
suffering self in the past and builds anticipatory momentum. Dave Egger’s A 
Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius bills itself as such an emplotment. Amid his 
self-referential and repeatedly digressive acknowledgements to the novel, there are 
sections which “acknowledge the major themes of this book” (xxvii). One of those 
                                                




themes is titled “The Telling the World of Suffering as Means of Flushing or at Least 
Diluting of Pain Aspect,” and he provides as an example one of “the author’s” reasons 
for attempting to become a cast member of the seminal reality TV show The Real World: 
to purge himself of his past by trumpeting his recent life’s events to the 
world, and thus, by spreading his pain, his heartbreaking story, to the 
show’s thousands or millions of watchers, he would receive in return a 
thousand tidal waves of sympathy and support, and never be lonely 
again… (xxxi) 
Distilled here are both poles of the dialectic of becoming: to felicitously trumpet recent 
life events establishes a new sense-of-self, and to have that articulation assented to by 
the other amounts to a sense-of-belonging. 
 In ways that resonate with Smith’s insistence on the value of connection for, as 
Forster puts it, “enlarging the space in which to be strong,” Eggers refers to the 
community he belongs to as a lattice: 
The lattice that we are either a part or apart from. The lattice is the 
connective tissue… I see us as one, as a vast matrix, an army, a whole, 
each one of us responsible to one another, because no one else is… You 
wear snowshoes when the snow is deep and porous. The latticework 
within the snowshoe’s oval distributes the wearer’s weight over a wider 
area, in order to keep him or her from falling through the snow. So 
people, the connections between people… become a sort of lattice, and 




troubles or whatnot, the wider and stronger the lattice, and the less likely 
you are to … fall through the snow. (Heartbreaking 212) 
Again, the strength of this lattice is contingent upon the other knowing “your story,” and 
in order for this story to both locate the subject and also assure the subject that it 
belongs, it must be authenticated. 
Intriguingly, Eggers repeatedly employs the acknowledgements of his book as an 
opportunity to engage in what he himself acknowledges as self-deprecation. His second 
reason for wanting to be a cast member on The Real World is 
to become well known for his sorrows, or at least to let his suffering 
facilitate his becoming well known, while at the same time not shrinking 
from the admission of such manipulations of his pain for profit, because 
the admission of such motivations, at least in his opinion, immediately 
absolves him of responsibility for such manipulations’ implications or 
consequences… (xxxi) 
I draw attention to this passage for two reasons. The first is that Eggers’ logic here (the 
disclosure of manipulative motives absolves responsibility) implies an affect-centered 
model of subjectivity in which one’s affects (motives) are themselves agentive, and thus 
not entirely under the performer’s control. While I can imagine how owning up to the 
“impersonal” nature of one’s feelings might be required for a particularly conscientious 
person to feel self-authenticated, I find the notion that acknowledging the agentive 
nature of one’s affects somehow “absolves” the subject from responsibility to be a 




and shift the blame to the victim—“it’s not his fault the way she dressed made him feel 
that way,” etc. In my opinion, rather than absolve the performer, the agentive nature of 
impersonal affects only ever also indicts the cultural “system of images” that the 
performer registered and enfolded iteratively over decades of time. 
The second reason I highlight the passage above is because Eggers is not alone in 
his penchant for self-deprecation. Smith, when referring to her own collection of essays 
in the foreword of Feel Free, writes that “essays about one person’s affective experience 
have, by their very nature, not a leg to stand on” (xi). Wallace, when asked by Larry 
McCaffery about whether he intentionally aggravates a sense of loneliness in his readers, 
responds that, as time passes, “it gets harder to know for sure when [my fiction’s] 
antagonistic elements are in there because they serve a useful purpose and when they’re 
just covert manifestations of this ‘look-at-me-please-love-me-I-hate-you’ syndrome I 
still sometimes catch myself falling into” (McCaffery 136). I argue that this self-
deprecatory tone of the affect realists after postmodernism is a manifestation of the 
ethics of authentication. In order for an articulation to be felicitously self-authenticating, 
the performer must acknowledge somehow the existence of any remainder, of any 
affective leakage that still persists despite the performer’s best attempt to “be true to 
oneself.” Additionally, to the extent that the subject wishes to truly feel like they belong, 
they must subject their emplotments of the self, warts and all, to the authenticating gaze 
of the other. It is only under these conditions that the lattice of the snowshoe can feel 





If Eggers belongs, as Liesbeth Altes claims, “to a young generation of American 
writers who defend the value of lived experience and shared emotions against 
fashionable cynicism and post-modern ironic relativisation” (122), then Eugenides’ The 
Marriage Plot places him firmly within this generation. The novel’s exposition takes 
place at Brown University in 1982, and Madeleine, the protagonist, who possesses “the 
reflexive ability to separate the cool from the uncool,” has taken interest in 
postmodernism: 
If restoration drama was getting you down, if scanning Wordsworth was 
making you feel dowdy and ink-stained, there was another option. You 
could flee … the old New Criticism. You could defect to the new 
imperium of Derrida and Eco. You could sign up for Semiotics 211 and 
find out what everyone else was talking about. (25) 
Semiotics 211 functions in the novel to present an idiosyncratic distillation of the canon 
and tone of high theory. This distillation places Derrida at its center, who is referred to 
by one student as “my absolute god,” and whose Of Grammatology, another student 
confesses, “blew my mind” (26-27). There is also mention of Blanchot, Saussure, 
Pynchon, Barthes, Balzac, Culler, Lyotard, Gaddis, and others (26-28, 41, 48, 57). What 
work does this distillation perform? 
In one sense, Eugenides employs theory so as to pit it against emotion. As Willa 
Paskin and others have noted, one of Madeleine’s classmates, Leonard, is a rather 
obvious tribute to Wallace, in that he “is a philosophy double major who chews tobacco, 




telling classroom scene, Leonard, who is elsewhere referred to as “touchingly sincere,” 
takes issue with Peter Handke’s novel A Sorrow Beyond Dreams: “If I was going to 
write about my mother’s suicide, I don’t think I’d be too concerned about being 
experimental… Didn’t this book strike anyone as a tad cold?” (50, 27). Another student 
named Thurston, who positions himself in the classroom language-game as the teacher’s 
pet, replies: “Better cold than sentimental” (28). Thurston’s “theory” is that Handke 
writes the novel in a cold, detached tone as the answer to the question, “how do you 
write about something, even something real and painful—like suicide—when all the 
writing that’s been done on that subject has robbed you of any originality of 
expression?” In this exchange, the one contribution of the professor, who “didn’t run the 
class so much as observe it from behind the one-way mirror of his opaque personality,” 
is to drop a sarcastic zinger: “‘Popular literature,’ [the professor] quipped, proposing an 
essay title, ‘Or, How to Beat a Dead Horse’” (26, 28). In response to his sarcasm, “a 
spasm of mirth traveled through the class.” I argue then, that one of the ways in which 
Eugenides’ work participates in the larger trend of his literary generation is to adopt a 
posture of critique toward ‘postmodernism,’ a posture which, like Wallace’s, involves 
the construction of a straw man for theory for the purpose of casting it as a trendy but 
emotionally debilitating force in the cultural milieu of the last decades of the 
millennium. 
 Madeleine and Leonard enter into a relationship whose trajectory spans the 
length of the novel—a trajectory marked by Leonard’s rapid decline into manic-




Madeleine declares to him for the first time: “I love you” (66). Leonard’s response is to 
pick up Barthes’ A Lover’s Discourse and point to the phrase “I love you.” As she reads 
these words, 
Madeleine was flooded with happiness. She glanced up at Leonard, 
smiling. With his finger he motioned for her to keep going. The figure 
refers not to the declaration of love, to the avowal, but to the repeated 
utterance of the love cry. Suddenly Madeleine’s happiness diminished, 
usurped by the feeling of peril. (67) 
Theory looms like a specter in the narrative, imperiling not only emotion, but also the 
ability for the novel’s protagonists to find comfort in institutions structured by 
conventional Western metanarratives. 
The novel focuses primarily on two imperiled metanarratives, the first being “the 
marriage plot,” which is both the subject of Madeleine’s thesis and the source of so 
much angst in the novel, given her failing marriage with Leonard. The effect is to 
highlight the embattled state of cultural institutions like marriage in light of the 
ascendency of theory for Madeleine and her cohort, who maintain ambiguous 
relationships with these institutions while nonetheless striving to find meaning within 
them. The second imperiled metanarrative is Christianity. Mitchell, who is the third 
major protagonist and also a student at Brown, is madly in love with Madeleine—a love 
that goes largely unrequited throughout the novel. He is also, however, very much 




He was trying to diagnose the predicament he felt himself to be in. And 
not just his predicament, either, but that of everyone he knew. It was an 
odd feeling… Everyone he knew was convinced that religion was a sham 
and God a fiction. But his friends’ replacements for religion didn’t look 
too impressive. No one had an answer for the riddle of existence. (96) 
Again, Mitchell’s “predicament” is the embattled state of Christianity, and while he is 
constantly beset with doubts about the existence of God or concerns about his faith’s 
imbrication with Western logo-centrism, he, like Madeleine, chooses to “make the 
Kierkegaardian leap” to pursue meaning within the discursive confines of Western 
metanarratives (401). In general, this posture toward metanarratives, which can be 
thought of as a postmodern incredulity held in tension with a pragmatic opportunism, 
seems to be shared by the affect realists after postmodernism. In Smith, the church can 
be a conduit for beauty,43 in Wallace the appeal to a higher power can help addicts 
recover. 
Due to Mitchell’s disappointment at the engagement of Madeleine and Leonard 
and his drive to solve “the riddle of existence,” Mitchell finds himself in Calcutta 
volunteering for the ministry of Mother Theresa. The odd climax of this episode reveals 
something about the kind of subject Eugenides assumes for his characters. After three 
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weeks of volunteering, where his tasks mainly consist of running errands or speaking 
with the infirmed, he is finally entrusted with a more taxing duty: he must bathe an 
elderly man who is in excruciating pain. Shortly afterward, 
Mitchell began to move. Already knowing that he would regret this 
moment for a long time, maybe for the rest of his life, and yet unable to 
resist the sweet impulse that ran through his every nerve, Mitchell headed 
to the front of the home … and up the steps to the bright, fallen world 
above. (321) 
Mitchell is indeed haunted by his sudden abandonment of the ministry, and he is never 
able to account for “the sweet impulse” or why he was unable to resist it, belying an 
affect-centered model of subjectivity. 
 The novel’s resolution, I argue, involves a potent depiction of the phenomenon of 
authentication, and ends with a granting of assent. Upon arriving home from his travels, 
Mitchell goes to stay with Madeleine at her parents’ house—Leonard has abandoned her 
because he does not want to subject her to his depression any longer. Up until his last 
night there, their relationship is strictly platonic. Upon finally making love to the object 
of his desire, however, Mitchell is swollen with affective leakage, and he attends a 
Quaker service whose language-games privilege meditative silence: 
For a while, he went deep. He breathed in and out, and listened, among 
the other listening bodies. But something was different today. The deeper 
Mitchell went inside himself, the more troubled he was. Instead of his 




give way beneath him… A still, small voice was speaking to him, but it 
was saying things he didn’t want to hear. Suddenly, as if he was truly in 
touch with his Deep Self and could view his situation objectively, 
Mitchell understood why making love to Madeleine had felt as strangely 
empty as it had. It was because Madeleine hadn’t been coming to him; 
she’d only been leaving [Leonard]. After opposing her parents all 
summer, Madeleine was giving in to the necessity of an annulment. In 
order to make that clear to herself, she’d come up to Mitchell’s bedroom 
in the attic. / He was her survival kit. / The truth poured into him like 
light, and if any of the Friends nearby noticed Mitchell wiping his eyes, 
they gave no sign. (405) 
Figuring meditative cognition here as a species of articulation, as Mitchell registers his 
own articulation, he feels something click, and experiences an inrushing of light, as 
though an affective traffic-jam has suddenly become sorted. This feeling is precisely the 
phenomenon of self-authentication as I have attempted to present it throughout this 
project, and it results in a becoming: Mitchell now sees himself as occupying the 
position of “survival kit” in the language-game of love. 
After the service, he addresses Madeleine sincerely: 
“From the books you read for your thesis, … was there any novel where 
the heroine gets married to the wrong guy and realizes it, and then the 
other suitor shows up, some guy who’s always been in love with her, and 




thing the woman needs is to get married again, that she’s got more 
important things to do with her life? And so finally the guy doesn’t 
propose at all, even though he still loves her? Is there any book that ends 
like that?” / “No,” Madeleine said. “I don’t think there’s one like that.” / 
“But do you think that would be good? As an ending?” (406) 
The novel closes with a granting of assent, as Madeleine, “smiling gratefully,” answers 
“Yes.” Given its critical posture toward postmodernism, its affect-centered model of 
subjectivity, and its showcasing of the role of authentication in a dialectic of becoming, 
Eugenides’ The Marriage Plot aligns neatly within the affect realist impulse to “make 
room” for affect after postmodernism. 
  As a way of drawing this manifestation of my project to a close, I’d like to 
attend briefly to the limits of the authenticating human and propose a modest project for 
the purpose of subjecting the ethics of authentication to a test. By virtue of presenting 
authentication as a kind of accelerant or even a necessary ingredient for becoming, the 
ethics of authentication calls attention to the gradient landscape of privilege in the West, 
where certain subject-positions are less welcome to engage in sincere expression, due to 
the ways they have been racialized, gendered, or queered by the hegemonic, discursively 
embedded protocols that tend to “overcode” the majority of language-games in the West. 
Consider for instance, Shervin Assari’s statistical analysis of data collected by the 





gain fewer psychological benefits from their education attainment and 
income because of the pervasive racism and discrimination. As the SES 
[socio-economic status] of African American males increases, they are 
subject to more contact with whites, which in turn increases their 
discriminatory experiences. High-SES African American boys attend 
predominantly white schools and high-SES African American men work 
in predominantly white work places. Discrimination, which is shown to 
reduce the health gain of SES, is more common towards male than female 
African Americans. Furthermore, African American males are more 
prone to the effects of discrimination and environmental stressors on 
distress and depression. (5-6) 
What Assari’s work suggests is that, even when black men are in some sense “granted 
assent” in the language-game of the academic hiring process, they still find themselves 
having to occupy the position of “black man” in ways that undermine their opportunities 
to belong. 
Having outlined some ways in which the ethics of authentication calls attention 
to human suffering as induced by an over-inflection of the strategic in language-games, I 
would like to similarly outline how such an ethics might respond to the suffering it 
identifies. Crafting a response to this brand of suffering, however, is greatly complicated 
by the fact that the subject described by the authenticating human is radically 
susceptible, in terms of the shaping of its affective heuristics, to experiences garnered 




single “response” in the form of a specific performance at a specific place and date 
seems futile in its capacity to effect change in affective responses built over decades. For 
this reason, perhaps, Smith points toward the mundane itself as the most effective space 
to change how people feel. If we were to conceive, however, of an efficacious response 
beyond personal relationships, it would need to be conceived of at the cultural level, and 
I argue therefore that an intervention at this scale cannot take place without the powers 
of production and dissemination of the very neoliberal marketplace whose dominant 
language-games such an ethics seeks to “correct.” 
In the fictional story-worlds of the novels of Smith and Wallace, the wiles of the 
neoliberal free-market increasingly encroach upon the mundane. Whether in the form of 
the high doses of media consumption Wallace is wary about, or in the form of the 
“system of images” that encage Smith’s characters, the tendrils of the free-market’s 
influence are largely figured in opposition to what Wallace describes as “those elements 
of what’s human and magical that still live and glow despite the times’ darkness” 
(McCaffery 131), or in opposition to what Smith calls “genuine human connection,” as 
evidenced by the disturbing resolution of her novel NW. Given the susceptibility of the 
authenticating human’s feelings to being shaped by these forces, the ethics of 
authentication might seem, at first blush, to inherently be an ethics that pits the human 
against the market. 
Intriguingly, however, the same tenet of “when we feel we become” that renders 
the authenticating human radically susceptible conversely guarantees that, due to 




subject will always remain, at least to a certain degree, inherently unique, and there’s a 
sense in which wariness toward the market results in a fetishization of the persistence of 
human singularity. Smith’s observation here about the fiction of her generation seems 
particularly poignant: 
Physical death deprives you of body, of consciousness, but there is a 
second death discussed in these stories with more passion: the death of 
authenticity. This is an old, old postmodern story, but for so many of the 
writers … the problem just won’t go away. Advertising stalks these 
stories as a corporeal, evil force in the world, replacing the human voice 
with advertising copy. Just one second of unmediated thought please—
this has become the West’s new literary pastoral pose. (“Burned 
Children” xvi) 
Much like the London urbanite of the 17th and 18th centuries who fetishized the purity 
and simplicity of nature, the neoliberal Western subject fetishizes the “unmediated” 
thought. This sentiment is echoed by Sarah Banet-Weiser, who notes in Authentic™: 
“We want to believe—indeed, I argue that we need to believe—that there are spaces in 
our lives driven by genuine affect and emotions, something outside of mere consumer 
culture, something above the reductiveness of profit margins, the crassness of capital 
exchange” (5). In Banet-Weiser’s analysis, however, rather than inevitably serving as an 
“evil force in the world” working toward the erasure of human emotions, the market can 





Political virtue, emotions, affect, and morality did not, then, disappear 
from the corporate landscape as a consequence of neoliberal doctrine and 
practice (as Friedman suggested they must in order to do the actual work 
of advanced capitalism). Rather, these dynamics have been reimagined 
and made legible from the perspective of individualized politics. This 
reimagining takes place in the context of a contradiction: the rise of 
advanced capitalism, with its blurring between state and corporate 
interests, and the marketization of individuals and the normalization (in 
the US, at least) of self-branding are accompanied by what seems to be an 
oppositional discourse, an increasingly public lament about the loss of 
morals, ethics, community, and meaning in the lives of individuals. (145) 
It may be, then, that the prescriptions implied by Smith and Wallace are themselves a 
byproduct of the very market they position themselves against, and that it is only thanks 
to that market that the need for senses-of- self and belonging has been rendered legible. 
As such, rather than allow the project of such an ethics to be overdetermined as 
sheer resistance to the Western neoliberal marketplace, perhaps such an ethics could be 
better construed as one that seeks to install “safety features” that ensure enough “room” 
for the subject at any location to engage in self-expression and be welcomed by the 
granting of assent. From this vantage point, the marketplace can be considered a 
problematic space in need of remodeling—a “construction zone” rather than the ground 
zero for evil. Such a posture toward the market would prevent these efforts from aligning 




media that has often characterized radical right-wing political agendas, most recently in 
the form of the #FakeNews sentiment that seeks to quell the attempts of journalists to 
hold the Trump administration accountable to the public it purportedly represents. By 
figuring the market as opportunity, this ethics can also valorize certain impulses like that 
of the #MeToo and #BlackLivesMatter movements which, articulated in terms of the 
authenticating human, are language-games that incentivize both the expression of 
trauma-as-feeling and the granting-of-assent to such expression. 
Given its emphasis on authentication, however, this ethics would seem to call for 
more space than is currently allotted to expression over social media. The character 
limits imposed by Twitter (limits which in turn “train” our affect-heuristics to devalue 
more lengthy expression on social media) seem inadequate for the “space” required by 
the felicitous establishment of a sense-of-self. Beyond this, the medium of these 
expressions primarily relies upon text (though perhaps accompanied by a static image), 
and as I have tacitly argued by using the term “meme” throughout my project rather than 
more textually oriented terms, such restrictions arbitrarily limit the full bandwidth of 
human memetic expression. Additionally, the asynchronous and casual nature of 
“favoriting” and “retweeting” strikes me as a poor substitute for the power of assent 
granted by a physically (or at least synchronously) present witness. As such, this ethics 
would seem to account social media movements as supplementary to practices that 
leverage more space, bandwidth, and synchronous time. 
I believe a good place to start, then, for installing the “safety features” of 




market is the humanities classroom. While somewhat dated and certainly framed by 
Marxist ideology, Louis Althusser’s “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” 
makes the case that “the ideological State apparatus which has been installed in the 
dominant position in mature capitalist formations as a result of a violent political and 
ideological class struggle against the old dominant ideological State apparatus [the 
church], is the educational ideological apparatus” (26). And indeed, as I show in my 
third chapter, there is evidence that Wallace in particular believed that the ascension of 
poststructuralist theory in the academy was responsible for the installment of irony as the 
dominant posture in Western language-games at the turn of the millennium. While I 
myself am not interested in the indictment implicit in such claims, particularly given the 
straw man it assumes by minimizing the emancipatory agenda that tends to inflect 
poststructuralist theory, I do find it convincing that the humanities classroom provides 
enough iterative time and space to deeply impress upon students the value of certain 
language-game conventions. 
It is already the case that the humanities classroom is often billed as a “safe 
space” for those who occupy marginalized positions, and in general for the critical 
examination of hegemonic, discursively embedded assumptions. In the spirit of the 
Deleuzian nomad who lodges herself on a stratum and experiments with possible lines of 
flight, I suggest that this impulse for the creation of a “safe space” be leveraged toward 
the establishment of learning objectives that teach students how to identify and reflect 
upon the nature of language-games, how the pressures of these games can unjustly 




how such pressure calls for iterative self-articulation as an opportunity to become and a 
chance to adjust the protocols of authentication. Such a classroom would provide “room” 
for this kind of articulation through discussions and writing assignments that prompt 
them to intentionally engage in the establishment of a sense-of-self. Assent would be 
built-in to such assignments, as they would be counted toward a participation grade. In 
terms of considering concrete steps toward future work for my project, then, my first 
step will be to incorporate these objectives into my own pedagogical practices.  
Beyond this classroom intervention, however, I can imagine the following 
direction for this work. My first step would be to leverage my vocational skills by 
designing and implementing a digital humanities project that would perform a “distant” 
and comparative reading of three aggregated corpora: the collective works of authors 
who have been periodized as ‘postmodern,’ the works of the authors under consideration 
here, and the 18th-century novel of sensibility. The goal of this project would be to detect 
linguistic patterns, such as the frequency of lemmatized words like ‘feel,’ a broad 
sentiment analysis, topic modeling, the tendency to use active or passive sentence 
constructions when referring to the behavior of characters, a network analysis to look at 
the “connectedness” of characters, etc. Such a project would provide evidence that either 
supports or troubles the assumption of a literature ‘after’ postmodernism, while also 
providing a roadmap for engaging in closer readings by identifying unaccounted for 
trends, outlying texts, and recurring themes. 
Equipped with the roadmap provided by a distant reading, I would then develop a 




way to talk about the literature after postmodernism? How do certain authors contribute 
to this movement, and in what ways are they different? Why are certain authors like 
Jhumpa Lahiri, Amy Tan, or Teju Cole often excluded from the discourse surrounding 
these authors, and should that be the case? How different or “new” is this impulse, and 
to what degree might it be a manifestation of recurring “crises” in the West? To what 
degree is a neurologically grounded model of the subject compatible with extant 
psychoanalytic discourse, and what problems do they respectively solve? To what 
degree does authentication overlap with the rhetorical notion of ethos? To what degree 
does this literature (and the ethics it seems to imply) challenge or reify neoliberal norms? 
Regardless of the direction my future work might take, I hope to have already made the 
case that, whatever’s happening in the literature after postmodernism, it involves making 
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